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The fourteenth issue of Nordic Environmental Law Journal includes seven articles. 
Two of them address the issue of legal control of nitrogen pollution. In Agricultural 
nitrate pollution – regulatory approaches in the EU and Denmark, Helle Tegner Anker 
points out that despite almost 25 years since the adoption of the EU Nitrates Direc-
tive, agricultural nitrate pollution remains a major concern in most EU Member 
States, not least in Denmark. She argues for further efforts in terms of a mix of regu-
latory approaches and instruments. The second article – Atmospheric Nitrogen Depo-
sition and the Habitats Directive: Tinkering with the Law in the Face of the Precautionary 
Principle? – is written by Hendrik Schoukens. The critical loads for nitrogen deposi-
tion are exceeded in many Natura 2000-sites across Europe. The article discusses 
how to reconcile continuous economic development with increased attention to 
adverse effects of excessive nitrogen deposition on natural habitats. Schoukens 
analyses critically new regulatory approaches at Member States’ level, such as the 
Dutch Programmatic Approach Nitrogen (PAN). In line with the precautionary 
principle, he proposes a strategy where new economic development is allowed 
only when further reductions of nitrogen deposition levels have been established 
and the effectiveness of restoration measures on the ground is guaranteed.
Two articles focus on the national implementation of the Water Framework 
Directive, more specifically in relation to control of water operations (in particular 
ditching). Anna Christiernsson is the author of Åtgärdsprogrammens funktion vid län-
sstyrelsernas prövning och tillsyn av vattenverksamheter [The Function of Programmes 
of Measures in the County Administrative Boards’ Licensing and Control of Water 
Operations]. According to the 2009 Swedish programmes of measures, the County 
Administrative Boards (CBAs) were obliged to review and regulate water opera-
tions in order to achieve a good water status. The article shows however that the 
programmes of measures had no effect on the outcome of CBAs permits and other 
decisions on ditching operations. Moreover, few CBAs had applied for reviews of 
old water permits or taken other concrete measures to achieve a good status. In The 
Impact of the Water Framework Directive on Diffuse Pollution Control: the Case of Ditch 
Network Maintenance in Finnish Forests, Minna Pappila & Lea Halonen emphasize 
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that while Finnish legislation seems to work relatively well for individual ditching 
projects, there are flaws in the law and in practice that do not enable authorities to 
take cumulative effects properly into account.
Anna Christiernsson analyses, in her second article of this journal issue, the 
Swedish implementation of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) in 
relation to fisheries: God miljöstatus och fiske – Hur effektiva är miljökvalitetsnormer? 
[Good Environmental Status and Fisheries – How effective are environmental qual-
ity standards?]. The study shows a lack of integration between fisheries and Swed-
ish environmental legislation with several loopholes and deficits impeding the 
achievement of a good status of marine ecosystems.
In the article Investigator Self-Interest in the Environmental Process, My Petters-
son and Lena Wahlberg discuss the risk that investigator self-interest decreases 
the adequacy of environmental impact assessments. The article also presents a 
newly made empirical study of whether and how arguments about investigator 
self-interest are considered and taken on board by Swedish environmental courts.
Simon Mashden is the author of The Helsinki Water Convention: Implementation 
and Compliance in Asia. The article reviews the application of the Helsinki Con-
vention in Asia, with a particular focus on implementation and compliance. The 
development of a regime within the Helsinki Convention is needed because of the 
absence of formal reporting and compliance mechanisms, which are considered to 
be essential to modern multilateral environmental agreements.
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Abstract1
Despite the passing of almost 25 years since the 
adoption of the EU Nitrates Directive, agricultural 
nitrate pollution remains a major concern in most 
EU Member States. This is also the case in Den-
mark, although a fairly strict regulatory regime 
has resulted in almost a 50 per cent reduction in 
nitrogen leaching since the mid-80s. Nevertheless, 
further effort is needed, particularly in ecologically 
sensitive areas. This article discusses different regu-
latory approaches – and in particular the need for 
a differentiated nitrate regulation tailored to meet 
site-specific ecological demands – from a legal per-
spective drawing on EU and Danish experiences. It 
argues that there is a need for a mix of regulatory 
approaches and instruments taking into account 
concerns regarding the unequal treatment of farm-
ers and potential interference with private property 
rights. One option might be a differentiation of the 
mandatory specification standards of the Nitrates 
Directive combined with additional instruments to 
address the need for severe restrictions on fertiliser 
use or cultivation practices in the most ecologically 
vulnerable areas.
* Professor of Law, University of Copenhagen
1 This article is partly based on conference papers pre-
sented at the Nordic Environmental Social Science Con-
ference – NESS 2015, Trondheim 9–11 June 2015 and the 
Environmental Law on Three Continents Research Con-
ference on Comparative Environmental Law in China, 
USA and EU, Uppsala 25–28 August 2015. 
1. Introduction
Almost 25 years have passed since the adoption 
of the EU Nitrates Directive in 1991.2 While some 
improvements to the aquatic environment have 
been noted during the years,3 nitrate pollution 
from agriculture remains one of the biggest chal-
lenges to achieve a good status of both surface 
water and groundwater.4 The implementation 
of the Nitrates Directive in the Member States 
may, thus, still be lagging behind.5 Yet, it must be 
kept in mind that regulating agricultural nitrate 
2 Council Directive 91/676/EEC concerning the protec-
tion of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from 
agricultural sources, OJ (1991) L 375/1.
3 According to the most recent implementation report 
from the European Commission, for the reporting period 
2008–2011 compared to the period 2004–2007, there has 
been a slight improvement from 15 % to 14.4 % regarding 
the number of groundwater monitoring stations exceed-
ing 50 mg nitrate/l. A similar improvement can be seen 
for freshwater monitoring stations, although it is difficult 
to compare the trophic status due to a lack of data (see 
European Commission, Report from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament on the imple-
mentation of Council Directive 91/797/EEC concerning 
the protection of waters against pollution caused by ni-
trates from agricultural sources based on Member State 
reports for the period 2008–2011, COM (2013)0683 final). 
4 European Environment Agency (EEA), 2015, The Euro-
pean environment – state and outlook 2015: synthesis 
report, Copenhagen. The report estimates that more than 
40 % of rivers and coastal waters are affected by diffuse 
pollution from agriculture, although nutrient levels in 
European rivers declined by 57 % for phosphate and 
20 % for nitrate between 1992 and 2011. 
5 As of June 2013, ten infringement cases were open 
against Member States as well as seven requests under 
the EU Pilot scheme, see European Commission (2013), 
supra n. 3 p. 10.
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pollution is very complex, the reasons for which 
are manifold. In particular, the diffuse character 
of most agricultural nitrate pollution combined 
with a highly complex multitude of factors, e.g. 
crop and cultivation practices, soil characteristics 
as well as climatic conditions, makes it difficult 
to measure – or even predict – pollution levels 
resulting from the application of fertilisers. Fur-
thermore, local soil conditions, e.g. the capacity 
to retain nitrogen, and ecological conditions in in-
dividual catchments or water bodies may deter-
mine the extent to which a certain nitrogen load 
is harmful or not. The latter implies that a general 
reduction in nitrate pollution is insufficient to ad-
dress site-specific problems of euthrophication 
or high nitrate concentrations in river basins or 
water bodies. Hence, there is a need not only for 
a general reduction in agricultural nitrate pollu-
tion, but also for a differentiated nitrate regula-
tion tailored to meet site-specific environmental 
objectives, e.g. established in accordance with the 
EU Water Framework Directive.6 While farmers 
often resist any kind of restrictions on farming 
practices, in particular the need for a tailored 
or differentiated regulation may raise pertinent 
questions regarding the scientific basis for differ-
ential treatment of farmers as well as the poten-
tial interference with private property rights due 
to individual hardship for some farmers. Con-
sequently, a crucial question is how to ensure 
an appropriate regulation of agricultural nitrate 
pollution both from an environmental and legal 
point of view. This article discusses different reg-
ulatory approaches – and in particular the need 
for a differentiated nitrate regulation tailored to 
6 See also A.M. Keesen et. al. The Need for Flexibility 
and Differentiation in the Protection of Vulnerable Areas 
in EU Environmental Law: The Implementation of the 
Nitrates Directive in the Netherlands, JEEPL 8.2 (2011) 
141–164 and S. Boyle. The Case of Regulation of Agricul-
tural Water Pollution, Env L Rev 16 (2014) 4–20.
meet site-specific ecological demands – drawing 
on EU and Danish experiences. 
At the EU level, the 1991 Nitrates Directive 
specifically addresses agricultural nitrate pollu-
tion through a set of mandatory measures to be 
applied in the so-called nitrate vulnerable zones 
(NVZs) designated by the Member States. This 
reflects a differentiated approach. However, in 
several Member States, it has been appropriate 
to adopt a whole territory approach under the 
Nitrates Directive as only few or no areas could 
be excluded as nitrate vulnerable.7 Since 2000, 
the Water Framework Directive (WFD)8 obliges 
Member States to adopt a river basin manage-
ment approach, including the setting of envi-
ronmental objectives and environmental quality 
standards for relevant surface and groundwater 
bodies as well as the the necessary measures to 
achieve these objectives. As nitrate pollution is a 
major concern for both surface and groundwater 
quality, the WFD sets an overall framework for 
nitrate regulation in combination with the Ni-
trates Directive requiring a tailored nitrate reg-
ulation. To what extent the Member States will 
succeed in linking the environmental objectives 
of the WFD with the measures under the Nitrates 
Directive, however, remains to be seen. 
In Denmark, agricultural nitrate pollution 
has been a major concern in Danish environmen-
tal policy and legislation since the mid 1980s. 
This has resulted in a fairly complex and detailed 
regulation addressing non-point as well as point 
sources. The regulation resulted in almost a 50 % 
reduction in agricultural nitrate pollution to the 
aquatic environment from 1985 to 2003.9 Howev-
7 For the Netherlands, see e.g. Keesen et .al. supra n. 6. A 
similar situation applies in Denmark.
8 European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/60/EC 
of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Commu-
nity action in the field of water policy (2000) OJ L327/1.
9 B. Riemann et. al. Recovery of Danish Coastal Ecosys-
tems after Reductions in Nutrient Loading: A Holistic 
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er, the improvement in water quality in coastal 
waters, in particular, has been lagging behind.10 
Furthermore, the Danish nitrate regulation is in-
creasingly being criticised for putting an unnec-
essary burden on farmers. Thus, nitrate regula-
tion in Denmark – and most likely also in other 
countries – stands at a crossroads where there is 
a need to carefully consider the most appropriate 
regulatory approach and, in particular, the need 
to tailor or differentiate nitrate regulation to meet 
site-specific ecological demands. 
This article analyses the characteristics of 
nitrate regulation within the EU and Denmark 
with a particular view to the legal and regulatory 
challenges associated with the need for a tailored 
or differentiated regulation. Before going into 
detail with nitrates regulation at the EU and na-
tional level, a short account of key concepts and 
distinctions in relation to regulatory approaches 
and instruments is presented. 
2. Regulatory approaches and instruments 
– a nitrate perspective
The notion of regulatory approaches is some-
what ambiguous and often used in different 
ways. One may choose a broad notion covering 
a variety of different approaches most commonly 
divided into: 1) command and control regula-
tion; 2) economic instruments; 3) self-regulation; 
4) voluntarism, and; 5) information strategies.11 
Alternatively, one may choose a narrow notion 
primarily referring to command and control 
regulation, i.e. regulation in a more traditional 
or narrow sense.12 The latter, however, disguises 
Ecosystem Approach, Estuaries and Coasts (2015) DOI 
10.1007/s12237-015-9980-0.
10 Ibid.
11 See e.g. Gunningham & Sinclair. Regulatory Pluralism: 
Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 
Law & Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1999, pp. 49–76.
12 See, e.g. the identification of different options for 
 addressing diffuse pollution in agriculture in Gunning-
ham & Sinclair. Policy Instrument Choice and Diffuse 
the fact that not only command and control regu-
lation, but also the use of economic instruments, 
self-regulation, etc. often requires some degree of 
regulation to set a framework for the use of such 
instruments.13 This article adheres to the broad 
notion of regulatory approaches. Yet, when it 
comes to the analysis of regulatory approaches 
with regards to nitrate pollution in the EU and 
Denmark, they primarily operate within the 
more narrow or traditional category of regulato-
ry instruments – although economic incentives, 
voluntary or informative measures are also used 
to some extent. Furthermore, it must be kept in 
mind that a regulatory approach may include a 
mix of instruments or even express a mix of dif-
ferent regulatory approaches.
Another distinction regarding regulatory 
instruments is the distinction between general 
 regulation or standards, e.g. general standards 
on the use of fertilisers, and individual regula-
tion, e.g. individual permit requirements or indi-
vidual orders at the farm or field level. In relation 
to diffuse pollution from agriculture, Gunning-
ham & Sinclair have distinguished the following 
three types of general standards – performance, 
specification and process. Performance stand-
ards set a limit on the level of pollution, e.g. 
emission limit standards, or an objective to be 
achieved, e.g. environmental quality standards. 
Specification standards dictate a particular type 
of design or physical change, e.g. standards on 
input use or technology choices and may also 
include landscape changes, e.g. riparian zones. 
Source Pollution, Journal of Environmental Law (2005) 
Vol. 17 No. 1, 51–81.
13 Gunningham has defined regulation as a broader 
 category (than state-based law) including “more flex-
ible, imaginative and innovative forms of social control”, 
yet involving the state as a central player as opposed to 
governance, which does not privilege the state, Gunning-
ham. Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance: 
Shifting Architectures, Journal of Environmental Law 
(2009) 21:2, 179–212.
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Process standards, on the other hand, dictate 
management decision-making processes, e.g. 
nutrient management plans.14 In addition, Gun-
ningham & Sinclair point to changes in land-use 
patterns as important mechanisms to address the 
broader scale of, e.g. catchment or sub-catchment 
level, e.g. through planning mechanisms and 
possibly the use of subsidies. According to Gun-
ningham & Sinclair, changes in land-use patterns 
at the catchment scale make it possible to target 
different instruments at the locations or farms 
likely to generate the greatest improvements 
in water quality. The latter signifies the crucial 
point in regulating diffuse nitrate pollution; it 
is not sufficient to focus on farm level practices 
alone. As it will be argued in this article, there is 
a need to tailor farm level practices to meet the 
ecological demands of individual river basins or 
water bodies.15 This is likely to entail a combi-
nation of different regulatory instruments and 
approaches. 
The need for a tailored or differentiated 
regulation is, to some extent, reflected in the 
Nitrates Directive as well as the Water Frame-
work Directive. From the outset, both Directives 
combine the use of planning instruments with 
the use of different types of standards. While the 
Nitrates Directive primarily focuses on specifica-
tion standards, the WFD employs overall perfor-
mance standards at the river basin (or sub-basin ) 
level. Furthermore, both Directives reflect an 
adaptive approach where, in particular, monitor-
ing requirements and planning cycles allow the 
continuous adaptation of appropriate measures 
in order to meet the environmental objectives.16
14 For an analysis of, in particular, specification and pro-
cess standards in EU nitrate regulation as well as options 
for economic instruments, see Boyle, supra n. 6.
15 See also Keesen et al., supra n. 6 and Boyle, supra n. 6 
at 17.
16 Green et al. identify the following seven critical ele-
ments for adaptive governance: 1) multiple overlapping 
levels of control with one level of control or strong coor-
How nitrate regulation can be tailored or dif-
ferentiated is likely to be quite country-specific 
drawing on regulatory traditions, natural con-
ditions as well as the level of scientific knowl-
edge available to justify and preferably also con-
trol a differential treatment. Thus, the potential 
scale or character of differentiation may vary 
from one country to another. In a Dutch study, 
Keesen et al. have identified four options for the 
differentiation of nitrate regulation based on: 
1) the NVZ approach under the Nitrates Direc-
tive; 2) environmental conditions (soil types); 
3) farm performance, and; 4) the river basin lev-
el under the WFD. Differentiation based on soil 
types is regarded as the most feasible solution in 
the Netherlands, whereas differentiation based 
on farm performance would require monitor-
ing efforts that are not considered technically 
feasible.17 
A similar – possibly slightly more detailed 
form of differentiation – has been suggested in 
Denmark based on the existing system of nitro-
gen norms for crops combined with a differen-
tiation based on the capacity of the soil to retain 
nitrogen as well as the ecological sensitivity of 
river basins or water bodies.18 The initial broad 
political support for such a new differentiated 
dination at the relevant social-ecological scale; 2) hori-
zontal and vertical flow of information and coordination 
of decision-making; 3) meaningful public participation; 
4) local capacity building; 5) authority to respond to 
changes across a range of scenarios; 6) monitoring and 
system feedback, and; 7) enforcement, see Green et al. EU 
Water Governance: Striking the Right Balance between 
Regulatory Flexibility and Enforcement? Ecology and 
Society 18(2):10 (2013). 
17 Keesen et al. (2011) supra n. 6, p. 158–159.
18 Natur- og Landbrugskommissionen, Natur og Land-
brug – en ny start (2013), available at http://www.na-
turoglandbrug.dk/slutrapport_2013.aspx?ID=52071. 
Natur- og Landbrugskommissionen (Nature and Agri-
culture Committee) was an expert committee established 
by the former Government in 2012 with the aim of recom-
mending policy initiatives which reconcile agricultural 
and environmental interests. The report with 44 recom-
mendations was published in April 2013.
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nitrate regulation, however, seems to have fad-
ed and the new liberal government, which came 
into power in June 2015, has signalled a relaxa-
tion of the general fertiliser regulation, without 
more precise indications of how to meet site-spe-
cific water quality objectives. It appears that de-
spite a relatively broad consensus on the need 
for a differentiated regulation tailored to meet 
ecological demands at the individual river ba-
sin, sub-basin or water body level, such a regula-
tion is likely to face a number of regulatory (and 
political) challenges associated with a potential 
differential treatment of farmers and potential 
interference with private property rights due to 
individual hardship for some farmers. In this ar-
ticle, however, it is argued that such issues can be 
resolved by carefully designing an appropriate 
mix of regulatory approaches and instruments 
at least from a legal point of view. 
3. EU nitrate legislation
In 1991, the EU adopted specific legislation to 
address nitrate pollution from agriculture. The 
Nitrates Directive, together with the 1991 Urban 
Waste Water Directive,19 was adopted as a fol-
low up to the existing legislation on water qual-
ity (surface water and groundwater) addressing 
two specific – partly diffuse – sources of water 
pollution. The relevant EU legislation on ecologi-
cal water quality was subsequently superseded 
by the 2000 EU Water Framework Directive es-
tablishing close links to the Nitrates Directive. 
More recently, the 2008 Marine Strategy Frame-
work Directive20 lays down the overall objective 
of good environmental status to be achieved by 
2020 for marine waters. Furthermore, water qual-
19 Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concern-
ing urban waste-water treatment (1991) OJ L 135/40.
20 European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/56/
EC of 17 June establishing a framework for community 
action in the field of marine environmental policy (2008) 
OJ L 164/19.
ity is also an important element in the 1992 EU 
Habitats Directive21 as many habitat types and 
species are dependent upon the aquatic environ-
ment. In Denmark, a significant part of the Na-
tura 2000-sites are aquatic and eutrophication is 
a major concern. In addition, other EU directives 
address livestock installations and to some extent 
also the management of livestock manure at the 
farm level. This includes the 1985 Environmental 
Impact Assessment Directive (codified in 2011)22 
and the 1996 Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control (IPPC) Directive23 – now replaced by the 
2010 Industrial Emissions Directive (IED).24 The 
implications of, and linkages between, these Di-
rectives are not crystal clear, which adds to the 
complexity when seeking an appropriate nitrate 
regulation at the Member State level. 
In the following, the focus is on the Nitrates 
Directive and the Water Framework Directive, 
but it should be kept in mind that, in particular, 
the requirements of the Habitats Directive have 
strong implications with regards to nitrate pol-
lution of aquatic Natura 2000-sites. Furthermore, 
the project- or activity oriented requirements of 
the EIA and IE Directives also impose certain 
obligations to include water quality issues in 
individual assessment or permit procedures re-
garding livestock installations, e.g. the so-called 
combined approach of the IE Directive and the 
WFD. 
21 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of 
natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, (1992) OJ 
L 206/7.
22 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/92/
EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public 
and private projects on the environment (codification), 
(2012) OJ L 26/1 as amended by European Parliament and 
Council Directive 2014/52/EU, (2014) OJ L 124/1.
23 European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/1/EC 
on integrated pollution prevention and control (codified 
version), (2008) OJ L 24/7.
24 European Parliament and Council Directive 2010/75/
EU of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (in-
tegrated pollution prevention and control) (2010) OJ 
L334/17.
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3.1 Nitrates Directive
The 1991 Nitrates Directive specifically address-
es nitrate pollution from agricultural sources. 
The objective is to reduce and prevent such pol-
lution by focusing mainly on diffuse sources re-
lated to the excessive use of fertilisers, including 
livestock manure. Yet, the Nitrates Directive does 
not set a clear requirement to achieve a specific 
environmental outcome.25 In this respect, the 
WFD now provides more specific environmental 
objectives and quality standards, including those 
related to nitrates.
According to the Nitrates Directive, Member 
States shall identify all waters that are or could 
be affected by nitrate pollution. The criterion for 
identifying these waters is the actual or potential 
excess nitrate concentration of 50 mg/l in surface 
freshwater or groundwater in accordance with 
the drinking water thresholds laid down in the 
former Drinking Water Directive 75/440/EEC. 
Another criterion is whether surface waters are, 
or in the near future may become, eutrophic, cf. 
Annex I.26 The identification of waters that are, or 
may be, affected by nitrate pollution serves the 
purpose of designating nitrate vulnerable zones 
(NVZs) defined as, “all known areas of land 
… which drain into the waters identified … and 
which contribute to pollution,” cf. Article 3(2). 
A Member State may, however, choose to adopt 
a whole territory approach. Several countries 
have chosen a whole territory approach includ-
ing Denmark.27 The consequence of choosing a 
25 See also Boyle, supra n. 6 and William Howarth, Dif-
fuse Water Pollution and Diffuse Environmental Laws. 
Tackling Diffuse Water Pollution in England, Report by 
the Comptroller and Auditor General HC 186, Session 
2010-2011, 6 July 2010, Journal of Environmental Law 
23:1 (2011), 129–141, at 132.
26 For a critical analysis of the criteria of the Nitrates Di-
rective (and the WFD), see William Howarth, The Pro-
gression Towards Ecological Quality Standards, Journal 
of Environmental Law 18:1 (2006), 3–35.
27 According to the 2013 implementation report from the 
European Commission, COM(2013)0683 supra n. 2 ten 
whole territory approach is that the so-called 
 action programmes must be mandatory through-
out the national territory of the Member State. In 
countries that have chosen to designate NVZs, 
the action programmes are only mandatory in 
the NVZs, whereas general codes of good ag-
ricultural practice, to be implemented by farm-
ers on a voluntary basis, apply outside NVZs, 
cf. Article 4. Codes of good agricultural practice 
shall contain at least the items listed in Annex II 
of the Directive including inappropriate periods 
or  other conditions for land application of fertil-
isers.
According to Article 5, the action pro-
grammes applying in NVZs – or alternatively the 
whole territory – must include a number of man-
datory measures listed in Annex III of the Direc-
tive together with the measures in the codes of 
good agricultural practice which have not been 
superseded by Annex III measures. The manda-
tory measures in Annex III include prohibition 
periods regarding fertiliser application, storage 
capacity for livestock manure equivalent to the 
longest prohibition period, limitation of the land 
application of fertilisers based on a balance be-
tween foreseeable crop requirements and nitro-
gen supply from soil and fertilisers (balanced fer-
tilisation) and a maximum load of 170 kg N/ha/
year of livestock manure. The Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) has maintained that 
a clear and precise transposition and implemen-
tation of the mandatory measures is required. 
In C-322/00 Commission v Netherlands, the Court 
rejected the Dutch use of loss standards as not 
satisfying the balanced fertilisation requirement, 
Member States (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands 
and Slovenia) and two regions (Flanders and Northern 
Ireland) have chosen a whole territory approach. The 
share of NVZs in the remaining Member States varies, 
but there has been an increase in some countries – pos-
sibly as a response to pressure from the European Com-
mission. 
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which presumed standards regarding the use of 
fertilisers.28 According to the Court, “use stand-
ards are applied beforehand and appear to be 
necessary for the purpose of reducing and pre-
venting pollution, while the loss standards under 
the MINAS system are applied at a subsequent 
stage of the nitrogen cycle, and any exceeding 
of those loss standards will necessarily contrib-
ute to pollution” (para. 74). More recently, in 
C-237/12 Commission v France, the Commission, 
amongst other issues, questioned the volatilisa-
tion coefficients used for different types of ma-
nure to calculate the nitrogen level in land appli-
cation of manure.29 The Court stated that “only 
by establishing volatilisation coefficients on the 
basis of the data which estimates the loss of ni-
trogen by volatilisation at the lowest percentage 
is it possible to ensure that the limit laid down 
by Directive 91/676 for the land application of 
manure is properly observed by all French live-
stock units” (para. 141). Furthermore, France had 
failed to ensure the full and correct implementa-
tion of other mandatory measures including a 
failure to provide rules that enabled farmers and 
monitoring authorities to calculate exactly how 
much nitrogen can be applied in order to ensure 
balanced fertilisation (paras. 97–110). 
It follows from Article 5(5) that if it becomes 
apparent that the mandatory measures are in-
sufficient to achieve the objectives, the action 
programmes must include additional measures. 
The Directive does not specify the character of 
such additional measures, but the Court has 
stated that additional measures must be taken 
when the Member State first observes a need 
for them.30 The action programmes must be re-
viewed at least every four years. The Court has 
28 C-322/00 Commission v Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C: 
2003:532.
29 C-237/12 Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2152.
30 C-322/00 Commission v Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C: 
2003:532, paragraph 166.
ruled that the action programmes are, “plans and 
programmes” within the meaning of Directive 
2001/42 on the assessment of the effects of certain 
plans and programmes on the environment.31 
This means that a (strategic) environmental as-
sessment must be carried out prior to the adop-
tion of an action programme. This is also the case 
if an action programme is adopted by legislative 
means. The Nitrates Directive also establishes 
certain monitoring requirements as Member 
States have to draw up suitable monitoring pro-
grammes to assess the effectiveness of the action 
programmes.32
The Nitrates Directive combines the use of 
specification and process standards (in Annex II 
and III) with a planning element in the form of 
the designation of NVZs. Thus, it can be argued 
that the Nitrates Directive encourages a differ-
entiated or tailored regulation in the sense that 
(strict) mandatory measures apply in NVZs, 
whereas less strict measures apply on a voluntary 
basis outside NVZs. This differentiation is, how-
ever, partly undermined when a Member State 
adopts a whole territory approach even though 
the result is mandatory requirements in the en-
tire territory. There is no direct requirement un-
der the whole territory approach to establish a 
linkage between the mandatory measures and 
the ecological needs of, e.g. particularly sensitive 
water bodies, even though additional measures 
are required in Article 5(5). As demonstrated by 
Keesen et al., differentiation may, however, also 
be an option under a whole territory approach.33 
Yet, it is unclear to what extent this is actually 
31 Joined cases C-105/09 and C-110/09 Terre Wallone, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:355.
32 On monitoring requirements in the Nitrates Directive 
and other EU Directives, see B. Beijen, H.F.M.W Rijswick 
and H.T. Anker, The Importance of Monitoring for the 
Effectiveness of Environmental Directives A Comparison 
of Monitoring Obligations in European Environmental 
Directives, Utrecht Law Review 10:2 (2014), 126–135.
33 Keesen et al., supra n. 6.
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being applied in the Member States. As will be 
demonstrated below, this has only been the case 
to a limited extent in Denmark.
The Nitrates Directive reflects an adaptive 
approach through the requirements for monitor-
ing and the adoption of additional measures if 
the basic measures are insufficient to meet the ob-
jectives of the action programmes. The Nitrates 
Directive does not, however, require that envi-
ronmental objectives should be specified in the 
action programmes and environmental quality 
objectives do not follow clearly from the Direc-
tive itself. Howarth34 and Boyle35 have argued that 
the lack of environmental quality standards or 
performance standards in the Nitrates Directive 
is a deficiency, although this deficiency is now 
acknowledged in the WFD. Since 2000, the WFD 
has set an overall environmental objective and 
prescribed the establishment of environmental 
objectives and environmental quality standards 
for water bodies. A crucial point is, of course, 
to what extent the Member States will succeed 
in linking and tailoring the measures under the 
 Nitrates Directive to the environmental objec-
tives of the WFD and the River Basin Manage-
ment Plans.
3.2 Water Framework Directive
The key elements of the EU Water Framework 
Directive in relation to nitrates are the setting 
of environmental objectives for water bodies as 
well as the identification of the necessary mea-
sures to meet these objectives in the so-called 
programme of measures. The setting of environ-
mental objectives as well as the identification of 
appropriate measures must take place as part of 
34 William Howarth, Diffuse Water Pollution and Diffuse 
Environmental Laws. Tackling Diffuse Water Pollution in 
England, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General 
HC 186, Session 2010-2011, 6 July 2010, Journal of Envi-
ronmental Law 23:1 (2011), 129–141, at 132.
35 Boyle supra n. 6.
the river basin management approach and be 
(at least) summarised in the river basin manage-
ment plans (RBMPs). An important element in 
the river basin management approach is the six-
year monitoring and revision structure, which 
implies a continuous adaptation of objectives as 
well as measures.
The overall environmental objectives in 
the WFD are to achieve good surface water and 
groundwater status by December 2015, cf. Article 
4, however, with the possible use of exemptions. 
Member States must also prevent the deterio-
ration of the status of all water bodies.36 Good 
surface water status means that both the ecolog-
ical status and the chemical status are at least 
“good,” while good groundwater status means 
that both the quantitative and chemical status are 
at least “good.” What constitutes “good” ecolog-
ical status is determined more precisely by the 
Member States in accordance with Annex V of 
the WFD. In general, “good” ecological status 
can be described as no or limited deviation from 
undisturbed conditions, e.g. that nutrient con-
centrations do not exceed the levels established 
to ensure the functioning of the ecosystem and 
the values specified for certain biological quality 
elements. Thus, nitrate pollution is an important 
element of good ecological status, although the 
acceptable nitrate level can be difficult to quan-
tify. Good chemical status of groundwater has 
been defined more precisely in the 2006 Ground-
water Directive (GWD)37 which lays down a 
maximum threshold of 50 mg nitrate/l for all 
36 In C-461/13Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz 
Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2015:433 interpreted the con-
cept of “deteroration” as “meaning that there is deterio-
ration as soon as the status of at least one of the quality 
elements… falls by one class..” (para. 70) and stated that 
a project authorization should be refused if it may cause 
deterioration of the status of a water body (para. 51).
37 European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/118/
EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution 
and deterioration (2006) OJ L 372/19.
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groundwater bodies. The general environmental 
objectives of the WFD (and the GWD) as well as 
the more specific environmental quality stand-
ards supplement the Nitrates Directive. This is 
reflected in the so-called combined approach 
of WFD Article 10 according to which Member 
States must not only ensure the proper imple-
mentation of, e.g. the Nitrates Directive, but also 
the setting of more stringent emission controls 
if needed to meet the water quality objectives or 
standards of the WFD.
According to the WFD, a programme of 
measures must include a description of the 
measures necessary to achieve the environ-
mental objectives, cf. Article 11 – the first pro-
grammes were to be established by December 
2009 with the measures becoming operational by 
December 2012. This includes a number of “ba-
sic” measures, i.e. regulatory measures to pre-
vent or control point as well as non-point source 
pollution. Furthermore, “additional” measures 
must be included if the basic measures are in-
sufficient to achieve the environmental objec-
tives, cf. Article 11(5). Additional measures may 
include a range of different initiatives including 
the restoration of wetlands, codes of good prac-
tice, etc. The basic measures include a direct ref-
erence to the Nitrates Directive and it could be 
argued that this in fact also includes additional 
measures in accordance with Article 5(5) of the 
Nitrates Directive. Furthermore, it also follows 
from the “combined approach” in the WFD that 
additional or supplementary measures should be 
adopted if the “basic” measures of the Nitrates 
Directive are insufficient to achieve at least good 
ecological status and good chemical groundwa-
ter status. In this way, it could be argued that 
the WFD necessitates a differentiated (and more 
adaptive or tailored) approach to nitrate regula-
tion also in Member States that have adopted a 
whole territory approach.
It is unlikely that the “basic” measures of the 
Nitrates Directive will be sufficient to meet the 
relevant objectives of the WFD as specified in the 
RBMPs.38 Consequently, it is likely that there will 
be a need to adopt additional measures in view of 
the sensitivity of the individual water bodies or 
river basins including the option to differentiate 
the mandatory measures of the Nitrates Direc-
tive. Additional measures could include different 
regulatory instruments, e.g. informative meas-
ures, voluntary measures as well as incentives/
subsidies, e.g. as provided under the EU Rural 
Development Programme.39 The only require-
ment according to the Nitrates Directive and the 
WFD with regards to additional measures is that 
they should be suitable to meet the environmen-
tal objectives and quality standards considering 
also their effectiveness and their cost relative to 
other possible preventive measures. Thus, there 
is a relatively high degree of flexibility so that 
Member State can choose among different types 
of regulatory instruments or approaches when 
it comes to additional measures. On the other 
hand, the Nitrates Directive offers little flexibil-
ity with regards to the mandatory specification 
standards that, in accordance with the rulings of 
the Court of Justice, must be implemented quite 
precisely at the national level. Hence, it appears 
appropriate to build a tailored or differentiated 
38 According to the EEA 2015 report, supra n. 4, p. 64 
good ecological status is estimated to be achieved in 53 % 
of surface water bodies and concerns about the ecological 
status are most pronounced in areas with intensive agri-
cultural practices and high population densities.
39 Boyle argues that the cross-compliance scheme under 
the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) holds a sig-
nificant unmet potential to make real reductions in agri-
cultural pollution, Boyle supra n. 6, p. 19. Yet, it must be 
noted that art. 4 and 5 of the Nitrates Directive are part 
of the mandatory cross-compliance requirement, which 
includes not only the “basic” measures of the Nitrates Di-
rective, but also those additional measures that are need-
ed to fulfil the objectives. This means that all measures 
necessary for the implementation of the Nitrates Direc-
tive should in fact already be part of the cross-compliance 
schemes in the Member States.
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approach upon the basic measures of the Nitrates 
Directive, e.g. by differentiation of specification 
standards such as the maximum load of animal 
manure or standards for fertiliser use – and then 
to use additional measures to deal with more se-
vere restrictions on farming practices.40 
4. Danish nitrate legislation
Nitrate regulation in Denmark includes a variety 
of different regulatory instruments and measures 
– predominantly based on a command-and-con-
trol approach.41 Danish nitrate regulation has 
been steered by a number of political agreements 
since the mid-1980s. The first Aquatic Action 
Plan adopted in 1987 established a reduction 
target of 49 per cent regarding nitrogen leach-
ing from agriculture and stipulated a number of 
measures to achieve this objective. The Danish 
nitrate regulation, thus, pre-dates the 1991 EU 
Nitrates Directive,42 but has gradually been ad-
justed and strengthened to ensure implementa-
tion of the Nitrates Directive and more recently 
the Water Framework Directive. Denmark has 
chosen a “whole territory” approach under the 
Nitrates Directive applying mandatory measures 
in the entire country and not only in designated 
NVZs. Nevertheless, some differentiated or tai-
40 See also Boyle, supra n. 6 p. 20 arguing for tailored 
specification and process standards as well as tighter 
GAEC rules, i.e. rules on Good Agricultural and Envi-
ronmental Conditions (GAEC) under the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy.
41 For a more detailed analysis of Danish nitrate regula-
tion, see L. Baaner & H.T. Anker, Danish Law on Con-
trolling Emissions of Nutrients in the Baltic Sea Region 
(2013), available at http://www.su.se/ostersjocentrum/
english/beam/legal-aspects-of-the-ecosystem-approach/
country-studies. The following is partly based on this 
report.
42 On the potential influence of Danish and Dutch nitrate 
policies on the Nitrates Directive, see Andersen, M.S. & 
Liefferink, D., Introduction. The Impact of the Pioneers 
on EU Environmental Policy, in Andersen, M.S. & Lieffe-
rink, D. (eds.), European Environmental Policy. The Pio-
neers, Manchester University Press (1997), pp. 1–39.
lored measures have been applied as additional 
measures and as part of individual permits for 
livestock installations. Thus, a distinction can be 
made in Danish nitrate regulation between gen-
eral fertiliser standards applying to (almost) all 
farmers, e.g. on fertiliser use, cultivation practic-
es and nutrient management schemes, and indi-
vidual measures applying to some farmers, e.g. 
individual orders or restrictions on cultivation 
practices at the farm level or permit conditions 
for livestock installations. In Denmark, since 
2007, permits for livestock installations have 
not only included controlling pollution from the 
installation, but also nitrate pollution resulting 
from the application of manure on land and cul-
tivation practices. 
The relatively detailed and comprehensive 
nitrate regulation resulted in the target of a 49 
per cent reduction in nitrogen leaching from 
agriculture being achieved in 2003.43 There has 
also been a general improvement in the aquat-
ic environment – in particular in watercourses, 
whereas improvements in coastal waters have 
been lagging behind.44 Thus, further reductions 
and restrictions have been deemed necessary, 
e.g. to fulfil the Water Framework Directive. 
However, there has been no significant reduc-
tion in nitrogen leaching in the last ten years 
despite new reduction targets and a tighten-
ing of the regulation. In 2009, a political Green 
Growth Agreement was made which set a new 
(additional) reduction target of 19,000 tons N 
43 Ruth Grant and Jesper Waagepetersen, Vandmiljø-
plan II – Slutevaluering, Danmarks Miljøundersøgelser, 
Miljøministeriet, 2003, p. 31. More precisely, a 48 per 
cent reduction was achieved in nitrogen loads from agri-
culture based on estimated figures of a nitrogen load of 
311,000 tons in the mid-1980s to a total load of 162,000 
tons in 2003.
44 Natur- og Landbrugskommissionen (2012), Statusrap-
port, p. 324, available at: http://www.naturoglandbrug.
dk/statusrapport_2012.aspx?ID=51058. See also Riemann 
et.al., supra n. 8.
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and identified the measures necessary to achieve 
at first a 9,000 tons N reduction.45 This includ-
ed mandatory 9–10 m riparian zones along all 
watercourses (50,000 ha),46 140,000 ha additional 
catch crops as well as the (re-)establishment of 
10,000 ha wetlands – the latter to be achieved by 
voluntary agreements or public purchase. Both 
the reduction target as well as the measures have, 
however, been challenged by farmers claiming, 
in particular, that the environmental effective-
ness of the measures lacked documentation and 
that they violated private property rights. Cur-
rently, a court case on the riparian zones is pend-
ing before the Eastern High Court. Meanwhile, a 
2014 Growth Agreement47 resulted in the ripar-
ian zone being halved to cover only 25,000 ha, 
while the additional catch crop requirement was 
abolished. Furthermore, the new liberal govern-
ment, which came into power in June 2015, has 
announced their intentions to abolish the ripar-
ian zones entirely, as well as to ease the general 
standards on fertiliser use. 
Hence, Danish nitrate regulation is currently 
highly contested and stands at a cross-roads. As 
mentioned above, calls have been made for a tai-
lored or differentiated nitrate regulation,48 but so 
far not much has happened, although it is quite 
clear that the current legislation is not well-suit-
ed to achieving the environmental objectives for 
individual water bodies under the WFD (or the 
EU Habitats Directive).49 In the following, the 
main elements in Danish nitrate regulation are 
45 Aftale om Grøn Vækst, June 2009.
46 Since 1992, a mandatory 2 m cultivation free zone has 
applied along natural watercourses.
47 Aftale om Vækstplan for Fødevarer, April 2014.
48 Natur- og Landbrugskommissionen, Natur og Land-
brug – en ny start (2013), available at: http://www.na-
turoglandbrug.dk/slutrapport_2013.aspx?ID=52071.
49 In Denmark, approximately 85 % of the land areas 
drain to (aquatic) Natura 2000 sites most of which do not 
meet the environmental objectives.
analysed focusing on the options for a tailored 
or differentiated regulation.
4.1 General fertiliser regulation
The general fertiliser regulation is centred around 
a mandatory fertiliser management – or account 
– system at the farm level in the Act on Fertiliser 
Use and Plant Cover.50 The fertiliser manage-
ment system mainly aims to ensure compliance 
with the requirement of balanced fertilisation 
under the Nitrates Directive. In addition to the 
fertiliser management system, the general regu-
lation includes mandatory requirements regard-
ing catch crops, cultivation practices, maximum 
application of manure as well as the more recent 
– but highly contested – mandatory riparian 
zones (9 m) along watercourses and lakes. Thus, 
the Danish fertiliser regulation combines fairly 
detailed specification and process standards. 
According to the fertiliser management sys-
tem, it is mandatory to prepare and submit an 
annual fertiliser account documenting that the 
total fertiliser consumption does not exceed a 
calculated nitrogen quota for the farm.51 The ni-
trogen quota is based on information on crops 
and their corresponding nitrogen norms as well 
as a nitrogen forecast determining how much 
nitrogen is available for the crops at the start of 
the growth season, e.g. depending on past cli-
matic conditions. This means that for each farm, 
accounts must be made of the crops grown on 
individual fields and their associated nitrogen 
norms as well as the amount of fertiliser, includ-
ing manure and other organic fertiliser, available. 
50 Consolidated Act 500/2013 (lov om jordbrugets anven-
delse af gødning og plantedække). 
51 The management system is mandatory for farmers 
with an annual turnover above 50,000 DKK and who have 
a minimum level of livestock or receive more than 25 t 
manure or other organic manure. Other farmers with an 
annual turnover above 20,000 DKK may register under 
the system and will then be exempt from a fertiliser tax.
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The general regulation of agricultural ni-
trate pollution has gradually been strengthened 
over the years as a result of political agreements 
– i.e. the aquatic action plans – based on a per-
ceived need for further reduction of agricultural 
nitrate pollution. Currently, it is estimated that 
the nitrogen norms are set 14–18 % lower than 
the calculated optimal norm for the crops. Fur-
thermore, the general catch crop requirement 
has been tightened to 10–14 % catch crops at the 
farm level and new measures have been intro-
duced including the contested the riparian zones 
in 2011. 
Although the current general regulation of 
fertiliser use is based on a certain level of scien-
tific knowledge, e.g. for the purpose of setting 
nitrogen norms for crops, the system does not 
include specific knowledge about the ecological 
sensitivity in local areas or the retention capaci-
ty of the soil. Thus, the current general fertiliser 
regulation is not tailored or differentiated with 
the purpose of achieving environmental objec-
tives and quality standards at the catchment 
or water body level. Moreover, recent scientific 
knowledge indicates that, in some areas, there 
is no or limited justification for the tightening of 
the nitrogen norms, e.g. due to a high retention 
capacity of the soil.52 Thus, the general fertiliser 
regulation appears to be inadequate to address 
site-specific needs for further reduction of nitro-
gen loads, whereas in other areas the regulation 
is likely to be stricter than needed for environ-
mental purposes. This clearly calls for a tailoring 
of the Danish nitrate regulation. So far, however, 
such a tailored or differentiated regulation has 
only been part of the individual regulation at the 
farm level as is explained below. 
52 A.C. Erichsen et al. På vej mod et godt vandmiljø, Vand 
& Jord, Vol. 22:1 (2015), p. 13 indicating the variations in 
demands for reduction of nitrogen at the catchment level 
(from <10 to 75 per cent).
4.2 Individual restrictions 
Individual restrictions on fertiliser use and cul-
tivation practices with the purpose of reducing 
nitrate leaching exist in two different regulatory 
settings. The first set of rules dating back to 1998 
is individual restrictions on existing fertiliser use 
or cultivation practices settled either by volun-
tary agreements or by an individual order ac-
companied by economic compensation for loss 
in accordance with the Environmental Protection 
Act.53 The second set of rules is the option for set-
ting individual restrictions on fertiliser use and 
cultivation practices in environmental permits 
for livestock installations according to the 2007 
Act on Environmental Permits for Livestock In-
stallations.54 In both respects, the setting of indi-
vidual restrictions is presumed to be based on 
a certain level of knowledge about the environ-
mental sensitivity in the local area, i.e. a tailored 
or differentiated regulation. 
The voluntary agreements or individual 
orders on fertiliser use or cultivation practices 
under the Environmental Protection Act only 
address drinking water issues, i.e. groundwater 
aquifers that currently, or in the future, could be 
used for drinking water abstraction.55 There are 
no parallel rules with regards to the protection 
of surface water quality in general. It is a pre-
requisite that a local “action plan” (indsatsplan) 
is produced by the local authorities in areas 
 designated as “action areas” (indsatsområder). 
Furthermore, it is a requirement that the restric-
tions on fertiliser use or cultivation practices are 
necessary to protect drinking water resources, 
i.e. reflecting the proportionality principle. Ac-
cording to the preparatory works, the extent to 
53 Consolidated Act 879/2010 (lov om miljøbeskyttelse).
54 Consolidated Act 868/2015 (lov om miljøgodkendelse 
m.v. af husdyrbrug).
55 See L. Baaner & H.T. Anker, Indsatsplaner og grund-
vandsbeskyttelse, Tidsskrift for Landbrugsret (2012), 
88–101.
Helle Tegner Anker: Agricultural nitrate pollution – regulatory approaches  
in the EU and Denmark
19
which the specific piece of land contributes to 
nitrate pollution should not necessarily be doc-
umented. It is sufficient to document that there 
is a nitrate problem in the area as a basis for the 
local “action plan.” In order to justify this view, 
the preparatory works of the Act refer to the re-
quirement that compensation should be paid to 
landowners for loss as a consequence of an indi-
vidual order. This compensation rule is based on 
the view that individual orders restricting exist-
ing cultivation practices may mount to an undue 
interference with private property rights, i.e. a 
“rule of reasonableness.” 
Individual restrictions on fertiliser use and 
cultivation practices that are laid down as con-
ditions in environmental permits for livestock 
installations under the Act on Environmental 
Permits for Livestock Installations56 have, to a 
certain extent, replaced the need to issue individ-
ual orders under the Environmental Protection 
Act. A major difference is that compensation is 
not paid to farmers when establishing individ-
ual restrictions in an environmental permit. The 
reasoning behind this is quite clear in that it is 
not a direct restriction on existing fertiliser use 
or cultivation practices, but rather a condition 
that is linked to a permit for a new, expanded 
or otherwise restructured livestock installation. 
However, in some cases, it might be difficult to 
draw a clear distinction between such conditions 
for new or amended activities and the potential 
interference with existing fertiliser use or culti-
vation practices. In principle though, the farmer 
can avoid such new conditions by not expanding 
56 The Act on Environmental Livestock Permits sets the 
framework for issuing environmental permits for live-
stock installations. The act applies to farms with more 
than three livestock units (1 AU is equivalent to 100 kg 
N). Small farms, with fewer than 75 livestock units are, in 
most cases, subject to a simplified permit process, while 
larger farms are subject to a detailed and comprehensive 
environmental permit process.
or modifying the installation in which case a per-
mit would normally not be required. 
The environmental permits regulate point as 
well as diffuse pollution, e.g. nitrate and phospho-
rus to the aquatic environment, and the impact 
of ammonia on the surrounding environment in-
cluding terrestrial nature areas. The  acceptable 
level of pollution has been standardised in the 
form of so-called ‘protection levels’ in a Statuto-
ry Order on Permits for Livestock  Installations.57 
The protection levels for nitrate stipulate a dif-
ferentiation of the so-called livestock balance 
requirements in three “nitrate classes” designat-
ed on the basis of the sensitivity of the aquatic 
environment and the retention capacity of the 
soil. The livestock balance requirement primar-
ily serves to implement the maximum load of 
170 kg N/ha of the Nitrates Directive, which in 
Denmark varies between 140–170 kg N/ha de-
pending on the type of livestock.58 Within the 
designated nitrate classes, the livestock balance 
requirement is reduced to 85 %, 65 % and 50 % 
respectively of the 140–170 kg N/ha, i.e. express-
ing a differentiated specification standard to be 
included in an environmental permit. 
In addition, the protection of aquatic Natura 
2000 sites has led to the establishment of strict as-
sessment criteria in a guidance note partly based 
on the decisions of the Nature and Environment 
Appeals Board. According to the guidance note, 
the livestock pressure in the area must not be 
increasing and the total nitrogen load from the 
farm must not exceed 5 % of the total load to the 
water body – or 1 % in the case of very nutrient 
sensitive water bodies.59 If these criteria are not 
57 Statutory Order 1283/2014 (bekendtgørelse om tilla-
delse og godkendelse m.v. af husdyrbrug).
58 An exemption to 230 kg N/ha has been granted for 
cattle farms complying with specific environmental re-
quirements.
59 The guidance is only accessible online on: www.mst.
dk/husdyrvejledning.
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met, a permit cannot be granted unless individ-
ual restrictions are established in order to ensure 
that nitrogen leaching does not exceed leaching 
from cultivation practices based on inorganic fer-
tilisers.60 The strict requirements for the applica-
tion of manure can partly be replaced by alter-
native measures with the same effect in reducing 
nitrogen leaching. The use of catch crops may be 
one option, the use of alternative crop rotations 
another. Such measures are widely used in the 
permits in order for farmers to be able to obtain 
a permit and continue to spread the maximum 
amount of manure over their land.61
Thus, the individual permit system includes 
a detailed and differentiated regulation of ma-
nure spreading and cultivation practices at the 
farm level, which is based on a certain level of 
scientific knowledge primarily about the envi-
ronmental sensitivity of water bodies and the 
retention capacity of the soil. However, this reg-
ulation is unlikely to meet the environmental ob-
jectives and quality standards of the water bodies 
as it only addresses the effects of animal manure 
application – and not the effects of fertiliser ap-
plication in general, which in Denmark is consid-
ered to be the major contributor to agricultural 
nitrate pollution.62
4.3 Differentiated nitrate regulation  
– regulatory challenges 
As demonstrated above, the current Danish ni-
trate regulation is not well-suited to meeting the 
water quality objectives of individual water bod-
ies or even at the river basin or sub-basin level. 
The general fertiliser regulation is not tailored 
60 MAD2011.2694 (Miljøretlige Afgørelser og Domme). 
61 Natur- og Landbrugskommissionen (2012), Natur- og 
Landbrugskommissionens statusrapport, 355.
62 It has been estimated that the application of animal 
manure accounts for 37,000 tons N/year as opposed to 
157,000 tons N/year from the application of all fertilisers 
(including manure), Natur- og Landbrugskommissionen 
(2012) supra n. 61 p. 343.
towards local conditions or ecological sensitiv-
ity, whereas the differentiated individual restric-
tions in the livestock permits only address the 
use of manure and not fertiliser use in general. 
A recommendation from the Nature and Agri-
culture Committee63 in 2013 to introduce a dif-
ferentiated fertiliser regulation initially gained 
broad political support as reflected in a 2014 
political Growth Plan for Agriculture.64 The core 
element in the recommendation was to differ-
entiate the general fertiliser regulation, e.g. the 
nitrogen norms, on the basis of knowledge about 
the nitrogen retention capacity of the soil as well 
as the ecological sensitivity of water bodies. In 
its simple form, such a new differentiated nitrate 
regulation would transfer the system of differen-
tiated “nitrate classes” used in the environmental 
permit scheme to the general regulation of fertil-
isers. This would imply that the differentiation 
based on local soil characteristics and ecological 
sensitivity would apply to all fertilisers and not 
only to the application of manure on farms with 
an environmental permit. At the same time, this 
differentiation would be combined with the ni-
trogen norms for different crops and the fertiliser 
account system. It was also recommended that 
the new regulation should allow the farmer to 
use flexible measures on a voluntary basis, e.g. 
catch crops or riparian zones, with the purpose of 
counterbalancing lower nitrogen norms in sensi-
tive areas. Furthermore, the Committee stressed 
that other instruments, e.g. incentive schemes, 
63 Natur- og Landbrugskommissionen (2013) supra n. 17. 
A similar recommendation had been made by a previous 
committee established by Ministry for the Environment 
in 2010, see Husdyrreguleringsudvalget (2011), An-
befalinger fra Husdyrreguleringsudvalget, available at 
http://mst.dk/media/mst/66628/Endelig%20rapport%20
-%20Husdyrreguleringsudvalget%20pdf.pdf.
64 Aftale om Vækstplan for Fødevarer, april 2014. The 
Growth Plan noted that a new regulation should be 
based on a sound scientific assessment of the state of the 
aquatic environment as well as of the factors affecting 
water quality.
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should be available to address the most sensi-
tive areas. How more precisely a new tailored, 
differentiated and flexible regulation should be 
constructed was, however, not elaborated by the 
Nature and Agriculture Committee. Many dif-
ficult issues were left to the relevant ministries 
to elaborate, including the question of scale, e.g. 
geographical (river basin, sub-basin or water 
body level) and scope, e.g. the degree or span of 
differentiation. 
Despite the initial broad support – also from 
farmer organisations – it appears that political 
support for such a new regulation has faded and 
the new liberal government, which came into 
power in June 2015, has announced its inten-
tions to adopt less strict fertiliser standards for all 
farmers, without clear indications of how to meet 
environmental objectives at the same time. A key 
concern from a political point of view might have 
been how to justify the differential treatment of 
farmers, i.e. what level of scientific knowledge 
is needed to justify the differential treatment of 
farmers and how to cope with individual hard-
ship for farmers in the most environmentally 
sensitive catchments with a low retention capac-
ity in the soil. 
Such concerns must be taken into consid-
eration when designing a differentiated nitrate 
regulation and are likely to require a combi-
nation of different regulatory instruments – as 
also mentioned by the Nature and Agriculture 
Committee. It is important that other regulatory 
instruments are available to address those areas 
where more severe restrictions on fertiliser use 
and cultivation practices are necessary to achieve 
the environmental objectives. This could be in the 
form of different types of incentive schemes, e.g. 
under the EU Rural Development Programme, 
combined with voluntary agreements or public 
purchase obligations. 
It is pertinent that a new tailored or differen-
tiated fertiliser regulation steers clear of a poten-
tial interference with private property rights.65 
If the differentiated norms in effect severely re-
strict the cultivation of land and cause individual 
hardship, the question of potential interference 
with private property rights is likely to under-
mine the regulation. It is unlikely that a sufficient 
scientific basis for justifying severe restrictions of 
existing cultivation practices can be established 
as part of a general regulation. Furthermore, 
a general compensation rule to soften such re-
quirements does not appear to be feasible either. 
Other individual measures, e.g. voluntary agree-
ments, acquisition or expropriation, are likely to 
be  necessary to deal with individual hardship in 
the most sensitive areas, where there is a need for 
severe restrictions in existing fertiliser use and 
cultivation practices. 
Another important question is what level 
of scientific knowledge is needed to underpin a 
differentiated fertiliser regulation including the 
question of whether it would require a higher 
level of scientific knowledge than the existing 
system, i.e. the implications of shifting from dif-
ferentiation based on individual conditions in 
permits for livestock installations, to differenti-
ation following directly from the general stand-
ards. From a legal point of view, the mere shift in 
type of regulation – from individual conditions 
to general norms – does not necessarily imply 
a need for more scientific underpinning. This, 
however, depends upon the level of detail in the 
regulation – and in particular the span in differ-
65 In a European context, law-makers normally enjoy a 
fairly wide margin of appreciation with regards to gen-
eral restrictions and their potential interference with pri-
vate property rights, e.g. as reflected in a decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights stating that a Dutch 
regulation reducing “pig entitlements”, i.e. pig produc-
tion rights, with 15 % for all farmers did not conflict 
with the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
 Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, see Lohuis 
a.o. v the Netherlands, no. 37265/10, 30. April 2013. 
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entiation, i.e. the potential unequal treatment of 
farmers, and the intensity of the restrictions, i.e. 
the potential interference with private proper-
ty rights. It is quite clear that a relatively large 
span in the differentiated norms would require 
a relatively high level of scientific underpinning 
to justify the unequal treatment. Hence, a full 
differentiation of specification standards on, e.g. 
fertiliser use does not appear to be feasible – at 
least not in a Danish context. Additional meas-
ures will continue to be necessary, e.g. incentive 
schemes, nature restoration, public purchase or 
expropriation, to address “hot-spots” where se-
vere restrictions on existing cultivation practices 
are needed to meet the environmental objectives 
for ecologically sensitive water bodies. 
5. Conclusion
Despite the passing of almost 25 years since the 
adoption of the EU Nitrates Directive, agricul-
tural nitrate pollution remains a major concern 
in many Member States. This is also the case in 
Denmark, although a fairly strict regulatory re-
gime has resulted in almost a 50 per cent reduc-
tion in nitrogen leaching since the mid-1980s. 
Nevertheless, further efforts are needed par-
ticularly in ecologically sensitive areas. Nitrate 
regulation stands at a cross-road where there 
is a need for differentiated regulation tailored 
to meet ecological demands at the river basin, 
sub-basin or water body level. This is illustrated 
by the EU Water Framework Directive adding a 
new dimension to the Nitrates Directive through 
the setting of environmental objectives and more 
specific environmental quality standards for rel-
evant water bodies. Thus, the site-specific perfor-
mance standards of the WFD must be combined 
with the specification standards of the Nitrates 
Directive as well as any additional measures nec-
essary to achieve the objectives. This calls for a 
new differentiated nitrate regulation tailored to 
meet ecological needs at the sub-basin or water 
body level and continuously adapted according 
to monitoring results and perceived ecological 
demands for improved water quality. 
The Danish nitrate regulation clearly illus-
trates the need for a differentiated and tailored 
regulatory approach. Denmark has adopted 
a whole territory approach under the Nitrates 
 Directive and has focused on a continued tight-
ening of general specification and process stand-
ards on fertiliser use in order to comply with 
the Nitrates Directive. This has resulted in the 
application of nitrogen norms for crops that are 
now 14–18 per cent below the calculated opti-
mal level in the entire country, i.e. also in areas 
where there is no or limited ecological demand 
for further nitrogen reduction. According to 
farmers, the result is an unjustified loss of agri-
cultural productivity and soil fertility. Calls have 
been made for a differentiation of the nitrogen 
norms based on knowledge of the retention ca-
pacity of the soil as well as the ecological sensi-
tivity of the water bodies. Such a differentiated 
regulation is already used in the Danish permit 
system for livestock installations, albeit apply-
ing only to  animal manure and not to fertiliser 
use in general.  Nevertheless, it appears that the 
initial support for a new, differentiated fertiliser 
regulation has faded partly due to perceived reg-
ulatory challenges, e.g. with regards to the level 
of scientific knowledge needed to justify differ-
ential treatment of farmers as well as potential 
interference with the private property rights of 
farmers subject to the most severe restrictions. 
As it has been argued in this article, such 
regulatory challenges depend on how a differ-
entiated or tailored regulation is more precisely 
constructed. The need to justify the differentiated 
(or unequal) regulation of farming activities with 
reference to scientific knowledge will increase the 
more differentiated or “unequal” the regulation 
becomes – and in particular if the regulation re-
sults in individual hardship for some farmers, it 
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may interfere with the protection of private prop-
erty rights. Hence, the use of differentiated speci-
fication standards on the use of fertilisers has its 
limitations regarding the scope of differentiation. 
It is unlikely that sufficient scientific knowledge 
at the field or farm level will be available to jus-
tify major differential treatment from one field 
or one farm to another. Furthermore, individual 
hardship in the form of severely restricted culti-
vation practices in most cases must be addressed 
through individual regulation at the farm level, 
e.g. voluntary agreements, incentive schemes, 
public purchase or possibly even expropriation. 
Thus, it is necessary to combine a differentiation 
of specification (and process) standards with ad-
ditional instruments to address the most sensi-
tive areas. The latter will often require a more 
flexible regulatory approach based on economic 
incentives and voluntarism, however, backed by 
command-and-control mechanisms if needed. 
Thus, addressing agricultural nitrate pollu-
tion is likely to require a mix of regulatory ap-
proaches and instruments. Within the EU, the 
specification standards of the Nitrates Directive 
must be complied with as a minimum, but it is 
feasible to differentiate or tailor such standards 
to meet the ecological needs at the river basin 
or water body level also where a whole territo-
ry approach has been chosen. It is unlikely that 
the NVZ differentiation between relatively strict 
mandatory requirements (within NVZs) and vol-
untary recommendations (outside NVZs) is suf-
ficient to accommodate such needs. Rather, there 
appears to be a need to differentiate the manda-
tory specification standards of the Nitrates Direc-
tive. Furthermore, additional measures are need-
ed to address the need for severe restrictions on 
fertiliser use or cultivation practices in the most 
ecologically sensitive areas in accordance with 
the Water Framework Directive – and in some 
cases also the Habitats Directive. Although, reg-
ulating farmers is known to be particularly con-
troversial in many countries, it should be pos-
sible to strike an appropriate balance to avoid 
unnecessary restrictions on farming practices, 
while at the same time addressing the site-specif-
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Abstract
The implementation of the EU Habitats Directives 
has urged the permit issuing instances to apply 
more scrutiny when assessing the local impacts of 
nitrogen deposition. At present, the critical loads for 
nitrogen deposition are exceeded in many Natura 
2000-sites across Europe, making it one of the most 
important bottlenecks for the achievement of the 
good conservation status. This article addresses the 
legal conundrum of how to reconcile continuous 
economic development with increased attention for 
the adverse effects of excessive nitrogen deposition 
on natural habitats. In this respect, the exact impli-
cations of the protection scheme tied to Natura 2000 
sites for nitrogen-emitting activities are further dis-
cussed. In particular, a focus is placed on the novel 
regulatory approaches that have recently been im-
plemented at Member States’ level in order to better 
align nitrogen-emitting activities with the recovery 
rationale underpinning the Habitats Directive. The 
Dutch Programmatic Approach Nitrogen (PAN), 
which aims to make preservation and restoration of 
protected habitats possible without impeding room 
for further economic development, stands out as 
one of the most notable regulatory tools in this re-
gard. This article reveals that the majority of the 
recently implemented regulatory solutions, such 
as the PAN, heavily rely upon the expected benefits 
linked to additional reduction efforts and restora-
tion measures that will have to be implemented 
in nitrogen-sensitive Natura 2000-sites. Given the 
current doubts surrounding the effectiveness of 
ecological restoration efforts in offsetting impair-
ments to natural habitats, it remains debatable 
whether such rationale is appropriate and fully 
in line with the precautionary principle. A more 
cautious strategy would be to only allow for new 
economic development once further reductions of 
nitrogen deposition levels have been established 
and the effectiveness of the restoration measures 
on the ground is guaranteed. If it turns out the PAN 
is not capable of reversing the ongoing deteriora-
tion in nitrogen-sensitive Natura 2000-sites, the 
additional room for economic development might 
quickly evaporate. 
1. Introduction
Nitrogen deposition describes the input of 
reactive nitrogen from the atmosphere to the 
biosphere both as gas, dry deposition and in 
precipitation as wet deposition.1 Since the start 
of the 20th century, the skyrocketing human- 
induced nitrogen emissions have significantly 
disrupted the natural nitrogen cycle.2 Recent 
research unveils that human activities currently 
contribute twice as much terrestrial nitrogen fix-
1 N. Dise, ‘Nitrogen as a threat to European terrestrial 
biodiversity’ In M. Sutton et al. (eds.), The European 
Nitrogen Assessment (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 2011), pp. 463–494; R. Bobbink et al., ‘Global As-
sessment of Nitrogen Deposition Effects on Terrestrial 
Plant Diversity: a synthesis’, (2010) Ecological Applications 
20, pp. 30–59.
2 See also: Live Science Staff, ‘Nitrogen Fingered As Lat-
est Ecosystem Evildoer’ (2010), http://www.livescience.
com/8720-nitrogen-fingered-latest-ecosystem-evildoer.
html (Accessed 20 June 2015). 
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ation as natural resources, and provide around 
45 percent of the total biological useful nitrogen 
of the total biological useful nitrogen produced 
annually on earth.3 Nitrous oxide levels are cur-
rently higher than at any other time during the 
last 800,000 years.4 Ecosystems are overloaded 
with nitrogen. Among the primary causes of this 
sharp rise of the atmospheric concentration of ni-
trous oxide are processes such as the industrial-
ization of agriculture, fossil fuel combustion and 
other industrial processes.5 Since the eutrophy-
ing and acidifying effects of atmospheric nitro-
gen deposition are seen as part of the long-range 
transboundary air pollution, they have been sub-
ject to international and EU air pollution abate-
ment rules for several decades.6 
Even when, generally speaking, nitrogen 
emissions are expected to further decline until 
2030, they are still far too high to re-establish the 
so-called ‘favourable conservation status’ of many 
endangered natural habitats across Europe. Cur-
rently, the critical loads of nutrient nitrogen are 
exceeded on 62 % of the ecosystem area in the 
EU-27 countries.7 Among the most vulnerable 
habitats in Europe to elevated levels of nitrogen 
deposition are many of the semi-natural grass-
3 D.E. Canfield et al., ‘The Evolution and Future of 
Earth’s Nitrogen Cycle’, (2010) Science, pp. 192–196.
4 A. Schilt et al., ‘Glacial–interglacial and millennial-
scale variations in the atmospheric nitrous oxide concen-
tration during the last 800,000 years’, (2010) Quaternary 
Science Reviews 29, pp. 182–192.
5 European Environment Agency, Effects of air pollution 
on European ecosystems. Past and future exposure of European 
freshwater and terrestrial habitats to acidifying and eutrophy-
ing air pollutans (Copenhagen: 2014), http://www.eea.
europa.eu/publications/effects-of-air-pollution-on (Ac-
cessed 20 June 2015).
6 Directive 2001/81/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 23 October 2001 on national emission 
ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants, OJ L 309, 27 
November 2001.
7 M. Posch et al., Modelling and mapping of atmospherically- 
induced ecosystem impacts in Europe. CCE Status report 
2012 (The Netherlands: Coordination Centre for Effects, 
RIVM: 2012).
land communities, heather and peatlands in Eu-
rope, which are dominated by species with low 
nutrient requirements.8 According to the recent 
findings of the European Environmental Agen-
cy (EEA), approximately 50 % of the vulnerable 
natural or semi-natural habitats in the EU are 
expected to be at risk of excessive nitrogen de-
position in 2020. Across Europe, and particularly 
in the Atlantic Biogeographic Region, high back-
ground concentrations of nitrogen and ammonia 
continue to stand in the way of the much-need-
ed recovery of many nitrogen-sensitive terres-
trial habitats.9 Accordingly, nitrogen deposition 
has become one of the major challenges for the 
management and conservation of many natural 
habitats in the Atlantic Region. For instance, in 
the United Kingdom 68 % of the area of sensi-
tive habitats is at risk due to exceedance of the 
critical loads10, whereas the bulk of the Dutch 
EU protected sites are severely impacted by ex-
cessive nitrogen deposition levels.11 In its 2015 
Report on the State of Nature of the EU, the EEA 
stressed that the overwhelming majority of the 
protected natural habitats have an unfavorable 
8 C. Nelleman and M.G. Thomsen, ‘Long-term changes 
in forest growth: potential effects of nitrogen deposition 
and acidification’, (2001) Water, Air and Soil Pollution 128, 
pp. 197–205. 
9 A. Nordin et al., ‘New science on the effects of nitro-
gen deposition and concentrations of Natura 2000-sites’, 
In W.K. Hicks et al. (eds.) Nitrogen Deposition and Natura 
2000: Science and practice in determining environmental im-
pacts (COST729/Nine/ESF/CCW/JNCC/SEI Workshop 
proceedings, COST: 2011) http://cost729.ceh.ac.uk/n2k-
workshop (Accessed 20 June 2015), pp. 114–128.
10 Joint Nature Conservation Committee, The UK’s ap-
proach to assessing N impacts in relation to Article 17 
reporting (UK, Workshop proceedings: 2013) http://
ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/platform/
documents/whitfield_wg1_presentation_uk_approach_
eng.pdf (Accessed 20 June 2015).
11 Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Minis-
ter of Infrastructure and the Environment, Programmatic 
Approach Nitrogen (PAN) –Version to be submitted to the 
Advisory Division of the Dutch Council of State (The Neth-
erlands: 2012) https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/
blg-206138.pdf (Accessed 20 June 2015), pp. 8–10.
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status, with a staggering 47 % of the national 
assessments being unfavorable-inadequate and 
30 % being unfavorable-bad.12 What makes the 
nitrogen deposition threat for the EU’s biodiver-
sity even more palpable is that the recovery of 
over-burdened ecosystems from excessive nitro-
gen deposition constitutes a slow process. 
In recent years, however, the issue of nitro-
gen deposition has not stayed confined to the do-
main of ecological management and restoration. 
It also has become a major obstacle for economic 
development in some Member States, such as the 
Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. The appli-
cation of the protection rules set out in the 1992 
Habitats Directive to nitrogen-emitting activities 
and projects, such as dairy farming and industri-
al operations, has resulted in an increasing num-
ber of rejections of planning applications.13 In 
sharp contrast to the more generic air pollution 
rules, the Habitats Directive sets forth a more lo-
calized approach to major environmental threats, 
such as nitrogen deposition, through its so-called 
‘habitats assessment-test’ (Article 6(3) of the Habi-
tats Directive) for new plans and projects. 
This is particularly important for agricul-
tural emissions since the deposition of ammonia 
from cattle farms is relatively high in the vicin-
ity of that source in comparison with the deposi-
tion at a greater distance from that source. The 
 increasingly stringent – some submit rigid14 – 
interpretation of the habitats assessment-proce-
dures linked to EU protected sites has tightened 
up the terms and conditions for the issuance of 
12 European Environmental Agency, State of Nature in 
the EU (Technical report No 2/2015, Copenhagen: 2015) 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/state-of-nature-
in-the-eu (Accessed 20 June 2015).
13 Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the Conserva-
tion of Natural Habitats and Wild Fauna and Flora, OJ 
L 206, 22 July 1992 (Habitats Directive).
14 F.H. Kistenkas, ‘Rethinking European nature conser-
vation legislation: toward sustainable development?’, 
(2013) Journal for European & Planning Law 10, pp. 69–81.
permits to plans and projects likely to impact Na-
tura 2000-sites through their nitrogen emissions. 
As a result of that, the construction of a new road 
bypass or the expansion of an existing cattle farm 
is no longer to be presented as a given whenever 
it is located in the immediate vicinity of nitrogen-
sensitive natural habitats. 
In order to avoid a complete economic pa-
ralysis for nitrogen-emitting activities in the vi-
cinity of Natura 2000-sites, some Member States, 
among which the Netherlands, have come for-
ward novel regulatory solutions aimed at better 
aligning the achievement of the conservation 
 objectives for Natura 2000 with allowing addi-
tional room for economic development.15 Certain 
of these regulatory approaches are grounded on 
a more liberal reading of the second sentence 
of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. For ex-
ample, the recently promulgated Dutch Pro-
grammatic Approach to Nitrogen (PAN) is based 
on the assumption that the implementation of 
additional reduction efforts by the agricultural 
sector, when taken together with the imple-
mentation of robust restoration measures in the 
already affected Natura 2000-sites, will create 
room for economic development without lead-
ing to  further environmental degradation due to 
excessive levels of  nitrogen deposition. 
This analysis presents a critical overview 
of the recently emerged regulatory approaches 
to the issue of nitrogen deposition. In particu-
lar, it will be investigated to what extent the 
incrementing reliance on restoration measures 
in the context of permit policies is in line with 
the precautionary principle, as upheld by the 
Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ/CJEU) in its 
recent case-law regarding the Habitats Direc-
tive. The present analysis mainly focuses on the 
15 J. Zijlmans and H. Woldendorp, Compensation and 
mitigation: Tinkering with Natura 2000 Protection Law, 
(2014) Utrecht Law Review 10, pp. 172–193. 
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current legislative and administrative trends in 
the Netherlands, a Member State renowned for 
its relatively high number of law suits by which 
the EU nature directives are enforced before 
courts, also in nitrogen-related cases. Seeing that 
the Netherlands are currently a frontrunner in 
their dealing with the environmental impacts of 
 nitrogen deposition, it can be expected that the 
below presented analysis will also serve as a use-
ful jumping-off point for future research in other 
EU Member States. 
This article is structured as follows. In order 
to set the legal context for the subsequent discus-
sion, section 2 elaborates on the generic features 
of the protection scheme applicable for the Na-
tura 2000 Network and, subsequently, its appli-
cation in the specific context of decision-making 
procedures for industrial and agricultural activi-
ties liable to emit nitrogen compounds in the vi-
cinity of a Natura 2000-site. Section 3 sheds light 
on the distinct flexible techniques that have been 
promulgated at national level in order to provide 
permit issuing authorities with more leeway in 
the context of nitrogen-related cases. The pur-
pose of section 4 is to discuss the much-anticipat-
ed ruling of the CJEU in the Dutch Briels-case, 
which touches upon the margin for flexibility 
when authorizing nitrogen-emitting projects ad-
jacent to Natura 2000-sites. Thereafter, Section 5 
reflects on the wider implications of the latter rul-
ing and discusses how it might affect the margin 
of manoeuvre for national authorities in the con-
text of economic development nearby nitrogen-
sensitive Natura 2000-sites. More specifically, it 
is examined to what extent the Dutch Program-
matic Approach to Nitrogen (PAN), which is 
regarded by some as an exemplary approach in 
this context, is deemed compatible with the strict 
requirements set out the Habitats Directive. 
2. The Habitats Directive and nitrogen 
deposition: Toward more scrutiny?
2.1 A paradigm shift from status-quo to 
 restoration?
The Habitats Directive is, together with the earli-
er enacted Birds Directive16, considered to be one 
of hallmarks of EU environmental law.17 By re-
quiring Member States to take measures to main-
tain or restore natural habitats and wild species 
listed on the annexes to the Habitats Directive 
at a favorable conservation status, the Habitats 
 Directive lays down a set of robust protection 
and restoration duties for those habitats and spe-
cies of European importance. 
Due to the explicit reference to the concept 
of ‘restoration’ in the Habitats Directive, Member 
States cannot confine their conservation efforts to 
merely maintaining a status quo of the conserva-
tion status of the degraded natural habitats that 
are currently present on their territory. Whenever 
protected natural habitats are at an  unfavorable 
conservation status, Member States will have to 
consider measures aimed at the restoration of 
these habitats.18 
In view of the high number of critical load 
exceedances for nitrogen, the nitrogen deposi-
tion threat persists as one of the most prominent 
16 Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the 
conservation of wild birds (Birds Directive), OJ L 103, 
25.4.1979, p. 1, replaced by Directive 2009/147/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 
2009 on the conservation of wild birds (hereafter ‘Birds 
Directive’), OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7.
17 G. Wandesforde-Smith and N.S.J. Watts, ‘Wildlife 
Conservation and Protected Areas: Politics, Procedure, 
and the Performance of Failure Under the EU Birds and 
Habitats Directive’, (2014) Journal of International Wildlife 
Law & Policy 17, pp. 62–64.
18 See on the topic of ecological restoration: A. Cliquet, K. 
Decleer, H. Schoukens, ‘Restoring nature in the EU: the 
only way is up?’, In C.-H. Born et al. (eds.), The Habitats 
Directive in its EU Environmental Law Context: European 
Nature’s Best Hope? (Routledge: 2015), pp. 265–283.
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obstacles for the much-needed recovery of many 
Natura 2000-sites across the EU.19 
As alluded to above, when compared to the 
higher inputs throughout the sixties and seven-
ties, the projected lower inputs will certainly 
slow down the rate of further damage to natural 
habitats. However, they will still compromise the 
recovery patch which is mandatory for degraded 
natural habitats. In many instances, the expan-
sion and the ecological improvement of the natu-
ral habitats that are adversely affected by exces-
sive levels of historic nitrogen loads remains the 
only sustainable pathway to the achievement of 
the good conservation status at site-level.20 
2.2 Article 6 of the Habitats Directive and 
 nitrogen deposition: increasingly intertwined?
So far, this article mainly focused on the ecologi-
cal underpinnings of the threat elevated levels 
of nitrogen deposition are posing for natural 
habitats. However, In order to understand the 
full scope of the regulatory challenges Member 
States are facing in this respect, a further analysis 
of the protection duties incumbent on the Mem-
ber States is warranted. Article 6 of the Habitats 
Directive provides a useful starting point for a 
further discussion. In particular, the habitats 
assessment-rules included in Article 6(3) and (4) 
of the Habitats Directive have, due their major 
impact on spatial and economic planning poli-
cies, risen to the fore in many Member States. In 
former days, economic interests were capable of 
easily trumping nature conservation-based argu-
ments. With the implementation of the Habitats 
Directive more weight needs to be given to the 
19 See more extensively: W.K. Hicks et al., Nitrogen depo-
sition and Natura 2000: Science and practice in determining 
environmental impacts (COST729/Nine/ESF/CCW/JNCC/
SEI, Workshop proceedings: 2011) http://jncc.defra.gov.
uk/pdf/airpol_WG6article63assessments.pdf (accessed 
20 June 2015).
20 Nordin et al., supra n 9. 
conservation and, as explained above, the resto-
ration of degraded natural habitats and species. 
Judges no longer refrain from halting projects 
that have not observed the protection rules 
linked to Natura 2000-sites. Yet Member States 
also have to take into account the more generic 
conservation duties set out in Article 6(1) and 
6(2) of the Habitats Directive. Therefore also the 
latter provisions are further analyzed. 
2.2.1 Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive: 
 implementing restoration measures for over- 
burdened Natura 2000-sites?
Pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive 
Member States are required to take proactive 
management measures for the Natura 2000-sites 
that have been designated on their territory. The 
latter provision lays down the groundwork for 
the Member States when implementing the sub-
stantive protection requirements for their Natu-
ra 2000-sites. It thus provides a first touchstone 
for their nitrogen-related policies. The positive 
management measures referred to in Article 
6(1) of the Habitats Directive have to enable the 
Member States to maintain or, as the case may 
be, restore the natural habitat types and species, 
listed in Annex I and II of the Habitats Directive, 
at a favourable conservation.21 
Although often overlooked, Article 6(1) of 
the Habitats Directive has an important bearing 
on the scope of the implementation duties that 
are resting upon the shoulders of the Member 
States in the context of excessive nitrogen deposi-
tion levels. 
For starters, nitrogen impacts will have to 
be taken into account when establishing the site-
specific conservation objectives for many Natura 
2000-sites. It is clear that, whenever a Natura 
21 European Commission, Establishing conservation 
measures for Natura 2000-sites (Brussels: 2014) http://
ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/manage-
ment/docs/conservation%20measures.pdf. 
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2000-site finds itself in a severely degraded state, 
for instance due to its exposure to elevated ni-
trogen deposition levels throughout the past 
decades, restoration objectives will have to be 
set up. Consequently, the conservation mea-
sures, will also have to cover restoration efforts, 
aimed at reducing the nitrogen burden for the 
affected natural habitats.22 For instance, in cas-
es where Natura 2000-sites are not expected to 
recover in the short run from overexposure to 
elevated levels of nitrogen deposition, active on-
site management measures are to be considered 
as an appropriate tool to accelerate the natural 
processes of nitrogen removal. In cases where 
such measures, such as habitat maintenance or 
grazing are already implemented, more robust 
and ambitious restoration measures will have 
to be contemplated.23 This could include the 
implementation of additional measures against 
acidification by restoring the water cycle, the 
removal of nutrients by excavation, sod cutting, 
shopping, measures aimed at restoring wind and 
water dynamics.24 It is obvious that the financial 
and economic burden associated to these mea-
sures will considerably affect the political fea-
sibility thereof, especially in times of economic 
austerity. In the absence of any direct trade-offs 
with economic development, it remains doubt-
ful whether many Member States will be found 
ready to take their restoration duties seriously, at 
least on the short term. 
22 Ibid.
23 C. Stevens et al., Review of the effectiveness of on-site hab-
itat management to reduce atmospheric nitrogen deposition 
impacts on terrestrial habitats (CCW Science Series Report 
No: 1037 (part A), CCW, Bangor: 2013), p. 83.
24 See more extensively on recovery strategies: N.A.C. 
Smits and D. Bal (eds.), Recovery strategies for nitrogen-sen-
sitive habitats (The Netherlands: 2012) http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/nature/natura2000/platform/documents/
part-i-chapter-1_nov-2012_2013-09-10_en.pdf (Accessed 
20 June 2015). 
Be that as it may, non-compliance with Ar-
ticle 6(1) of the Habitats Directive, for example in 
cases of continuous degradation due to excessive 
nitrogen deposition, might considerably limit the 
room for further economic development when 
application is made of Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive. In cases where the natural habitats are 
already at an unfavourable conservation status, 
any additional impact on degraded natural habi-
tats could be qualified as ‘significant’ in view of 
Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive (cf. infra). 
In this respect, it is important to underline that 
Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive does not put 
forward an explicit deadline for the achievement 
of the favourable conservation status for the nat-
ural habitats. However, the CJEU has recently 
underlined that the conservation and restoration 
measures need to be put in place within six years 
after the inclusion of a Natura 2000-site in the list 
of Sites of Community Importance.25 
2.2.2 Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive: avoiding 
further deterioration by ongoing and new activities?
Article 6 of the Habitats Directive does not 
merely focus on the implementation of positive 
management measures for Natura 2000-sites. For 
instance, article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive es-
tablishes a general obligation to take appropriate 
protective steps to avoid the deterioration of nat-
ural habitats and the disturbance of species, in so 
far as such disturbance could be significant in re-
lation to the objectives of that directive. Also this 
protection duty plays an increasingly prominent 
role in determining the room for manoeuvre con-
ferred upon the Member States when assessing 
the threat posed by excessive nitrogen deposition 
to nitrogen-sensitive Natura 2000-sites. In con-
trast to Article 6(1), which focuses on additional 
recovery measures, Article 6(2) of the Habitats 
25 CJEU, Case C-90/10, Commission v Spain (2011) ECR 
I-134, para. 64. 
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Directive lays emphasis on the duty to take pre-
ventative measures in order to avoid further sig-
nificant deterioration. 
At first sight, the standard of protection im-
posed by Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive 
appears to be relatively high. The latter provi-
sion, when interpreted literally, seems to explic-
itly prohibit all forms of deterioration, even those 
who do not usually produce a significant effect 
on a Natura 2000-site26. Evidently, such interpre-
tation is not without relevance for the issue of 
nitrogen deposition, since it entails that Member 
States also have to take into account the impact 
of small-scale emission sources nearby Natura 
2000-sites. Opposite to that interpretation, some 
Dutch authors have advocated for a more rea-
sonable approach to Article 6(2) of the Habitats 
Directive, assuming that non-significant deterio-
rations can be left out of consideration.27 In a 2009 
infringement procedure against France, Advo-
cate General Kokott debunked the latter reason-
ing when holding that the French implementing 
rules, according to which human activities could 
only be restricted if they have significant effects, 
stand at odds with Article 6(2) of the Habitats 
Directive.28 Still, in its final ruling the CJEU did 
not pronounce itself on the matter, thereby leav-
ing the issue essentially moot.29 
In terms of economic impact, Article 6(2) 
of the Habitats Directive has consistently been 
interpreted by the ECJ/CJEU as an overarching 
26 Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive does, however, 
only rule out disturbances to protected species ‘in so far 
as such disturbance could be significant in relation to the objec-
tives of that directive’.
27 Backes et al., Stikstofdepositie en Natura 2000. Een rechts-
vergelijkend onderzoek (Universiteit Maastricht/Alterra: 
2011) http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-pub-
licaties/rapporten/2011/09/13/stikstofdepositie-en-natu-
ra-2000.html (Accessed 20 June 2015), pp. 29–31. 
28 Advocate General Kokott, Case C-241/08 Commission 
v France, Opinion of 25 June 2009, para. 20.
29 CJEU, Case C-241/08 Commission v France (2010), 
ECR I-01697, para. 18–24. 
‘catch all-clause’, obliging Member States to scru-
tinize all harmful activities with adverse con-
sequences on the protected natural habitats for 
which the site has been designated.30 By conse-
quence, Member States are barred from exempt-
ing certain categories of ongoing activities, such 
as existing cattle farming activities and the use of 
nearby roads by vehicle traffic, from Article 6(2) 
of the Habitats Directive with reference to the 
economic importance attached thereto.31 More-
over, the duty to avoid deterioration also clearly 
applies to ongoing activities that have been au-
thorized and/or initiated before the area at hand 
had been designated as a Natura 2000-site.32 
Consequently, in cases of excessive nitrogen de-
position, also already authorized nitrogen-emit-
ting activities are to be reconsidered whenever 
they are responsible for a further deterioration 
of an adjacent Natura 2000-site. This might urge 
Member States to redraw their permit policies 
and impose stricter permit conditions to ongoing 
cattle farming operations. In cases of continuing 
environmental degradation, Member States will 
even have to consider the withdrawal of exist-
ing permits for major nitrogen polluters in the 
vicinity of a Natura 2000-site. The stark economic 
consequences of such actions for the holder of 
the permit could be mitigated through finan-
cial compensation or the availability of subsidy 
schemes.
As is widely known, Article 6(2) of the Habi-
tats Directives establishes an obligation of result. 
Most importantly, the latter provision could also 
force the Member States to contemplate active 
restoration measures in some instances. This 
30 See more extensively: H. Schoukens, ‘Ongoing Activi-
ties and Natura 2000: Biodiversity Protection vs Legiti-
mate Expectations’, (2014) Journal for European Environ-
mental & Planning Law, pp. 1–30. 
31 Ibid, 
32 CJEU, Case C-404/09 Commission v Spain (2011) ECR 
I-11853, paras. 144–160. 
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will, among others, be the case whenever res-
toration is crucial to halt or reverse an ongoing 
deterioration due to excessive nitrogen impacts. 
For instance, in its notable decision on the de-
terioration of the habitat of the Red Grouse in 
Ireland, the ECJ ruled that it was necessary for 
the authorities ‘not only to take measures to stabilise 
the problem of overgrazing, but also to ensure that 
damaged habitats are allowed to recover’33. A similar 
reasoning is to be applied in the context of ele-
vated levels of nitrogen deposition. This begs the 
question to what extent Member States are still 
obliged to consider robust restoration measures 
for Natura 2000-sites that have been severely 
affected by historic levels of nitrogen deposition. 
In its recent ruling in the Cascina Tre Pini Ss-case, 
the CJEU underscored that a declassification of a 
Natura 2000-site can only be considered where, 
despite compliance with Article 6(2) of the Habi-
tats Directive, the site has become irretrievably 
unsuitable to meet the objectives of the Habitats 
Directive, so that its classification no longer ap-
pears justified.34 To that end, a mere allegation 
of environmental degradation will not suffice. 
Thus, in order to successfully apply the declas-
sification-option for severely degraded Natura 
2000-sites, a Member State will have to demon-
strate it has taken all the necessary measure to 
restore the site, thereby avoiding further dete-
rioration.35 Member States are therefore in prin-
ciple required to find comprehensive solutions in 
order to halt the ongoing degradation of Natura 
2000-sites caused by current nitrogen deposition 
impacts, even if the majority of the damage has 
been incurred before the designation of the area 
as Natura 2000-site. Only if it can be established 
33 ECJ, Case C-117/00, Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR 
I-5335, para 31.
34 CJEU, Case C-301/12, Cascina Tre Pini Ss (2014), 
para. 32.
35 Opinion Advocate General Kokott, Case C-301/12 
Cascina Tre Pini Ss, 20 June 2013, para.50
that the bulk of the degradation is to be assigned 
to pre-designation activities, sufficient recovery 
measures have been implemented in the mean-
time and have proven to be not successful, a de-
classification option might possibly still be in line 
with the protection duties enshrined in Article 
6(2) of the Habitats Directive. 
2.2.3 Article 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive: 
assessing the adverse effects of new nitrogen-emit-
ting developments?
Whereas Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive 
includes a clear-cut result obligation, it leaves it 
to the Member States to consider which specific 
regulatory actions are necessary in order to avoid 
further deterioration. By contrast, the procedural 
rules laid down by Article 6(3) and (4) of the Hab-
itats Directive are more straightforward in terms 
of legal procedures to be applied in the context of 
permit policies and other decision-making pro-
cesses. The latter provision explicitly sets out the 
procedures to be followed in respect of a plan 
or project which is not directly connected with 
or necessary to the management of the Natura 
2000-site but which is likely to have a significant 
effect thereon. 
Pursuant to the first sentence of Article 6(3) of 
the Habitats Directive, any plan or project likely 
to have a significant effect on a Natura 2000-site, 
either individually or in combination with other 
plans or projects, shall undergo an appropriate 
assessment to determine its implications for the 
site. The competent authorities can only agree to 
the plan or projects after having ascertained that 
it will not adversely affect the integrity of the site 
concerned. Only in exceptional circumstances, a 
plan or project could still go ahead, in spite of a 
negative assessment. Evidently, these procedural 
assessment obligations have major implications 
for the permit policies pertaining to new and, in 
some instances, also ongoing nitrogen-emitting 
activities.
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Stock-taking of the ECJ’s notable ruling in 
the Waddenzee-case, which related to ongoing 
mechanical cockle fishing activities, one might 
be inclined to hold that ongoing nitrogen loads 
emitted by farm holdings fall firmly within the 
scope of the habitats assessment-rules.36 Yet, in 
view of more recent case-law developments at 
EU level, this conclusion needs to be adjusted. In 
its jurisprudence pertaining to the Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive, the CJEU 
pointed out that the mere renewal of an existing 
permit to operate an ongoing installation, in the 
absence of any works or interventions  involving 
alterations to the physical aspects of the site, can-
not be classified as a ‘project’ which falls within 
the scope of the rules on EIA.37 Likewise, the 
CJEU steadfastly reasserted that  ongoing activi-
ties that had been authorized before the desig-
nation of a site or before the entry into force of 
the Habitats Directive, even when they entail 
physical interventions, fall outside of the realm 
of the assessment rules laid down by Article 6(3) 
of the Habitats Directive.38 Therefore, depending 
on the national policy options, ongoing nitrogen-
emitting activities such as the continuing use of 
a motorway will not necessarily fall within the 
scope of the habitats assessment-rules. 
To be more precise, a permit renewal for the 
operation of an existing farm nearby a Natura 
2000-site will not necessarily qualify as a ‘project’ 
within the meaning of Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive if it does not entail physical expansion 
works. The same goes for a governmental deci-
36 ECJ, Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud 
van de Waddenzee en Nederlandse Vereniging tot Be-
scherming van Vogels (2004) ECR I-7405 (Waddenzee), 
paras. 23–27. 
37 CJEU, Case C-275/09, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest 
[2011] ECR I-01753, para. 24.
38 CJEU, Case 226/08 Stadt Papenburg v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (2010), ECR I-00131, para. 47; CJEU, Case 
C-90/10, Commission v Spain (2011) ECR I-134 (Papen-
burg), para. 124–125.
sion to rise the speed limit on a highway adjacent 
to a Natura 2000-site. By contrast, it remains un-
contested that new plans and projects that are 
prone to emit additional nitrogen emissions, such 
as road development projects or the extension of 
an existing cattle farm, remain subject to the as-
sessment procedures included Article 6(3) of the 
Habitats Directive. In other words, also changes 
in ongoing activities, which include physical in-
terventions in the natural environment (e.g. the 
construction of a new stable), will trigger the ap-
plication of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. 
Evidently, Member States can decide to opt for a 
more broad understanding of the term ‘project’ in 
their national or regional legislation, thereby ren-
dering also ongoing activities subject to a prior 
assessment in cases of permit renewal. 
Lastly, it is not unimportant to address the 
specific articulation between Article 6(3) and Ar-
ticle 6(2) of the Habitats Directive. As alluded to 
above, Member States are required to avoid fur-
ther deterioration of protected natural habitats 
pursuant Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive. 
That said, whenever an authorisation is granted 
in accordance with Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive for a plan or project, this necessarily 
 assumes that it is considered not likely to affect 
the integrity of the affected Natura 2000-site 
and, accordingly, not to give rise to deteriora-
tion within the meaning of Article 6(2) of the 
Habitats Directive.39 Only if the project would, 
due to unforeseen circumstances, still give rise 
to significant effects, Member States are forced 
to avoid additional deterioration through the ap-
plication of Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive. 
Additional monitoring schemes will have to en-
sure that further deterioration is avoided in such 
instances. 
39 Waddenzee, supra n 36, para. 36. 
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2.3 Precautionary approach vs. economic 
 development?
The above-conducted analysis has indicated that 
Member States are, at least in theory, obliged 
to adopt and implement ambitious recovery 
schemes for Natura 2000-sites that are or have 
been affected by an overload of nitrogen deposi-
tion. In addition, the Habitats Directive requires 
the Member States to tighten up the permit con-
ditions for new nitrogen-emitting activities. The 
fundamental question now arises to what extent 
the protection rules leave room for balancing the 
continuation of economic activities with the con-
servation objectives for Natura 2000-sites.
2.3.1 In dubio pro natura?
The over-arching protection duty laid down by 
Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive is to be re-
garded as a major touchstone for the decision-
making process for ongoing and, to a lesser 
 extent, new detrimental activities. However, for 
now, it is clear that the habitats assessment-rules 
included in Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive 
are gaining the most traction at national level. 
By and large, they are more relevant for new 
economic developments, such a road construc-
tion works or the expansion of an existing agri-
cultural holding, which might adversely affect 
Natura 2000-sites. 
In recent years, the environmental issues 
related to excessive nitrogen deposition par-
ticularly rose to the surface in the context of the 
habitats assessment-rules. This should not come 
as a surprise since the CJEU has consistently as-
serted that the authorisation criterion laid down 
in the second sentence of Article 6(3) of the Habi-
tats Directive integrates the precautionary prin-
ciple. Hence, competent national authorities are 
only permitted to allow projects or plans if they 
have made certain, in the light of the appropri-
ate assessment and the applicable conservation 
 objectives, that they will not adversely affect the 
integrity of that site. That is the case where no 
 reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the ab-
sence of such effects.40 In cases where the Natura 
2000-site at issue finds itself already at an un-
favourable conservation status due to high levels 
of nitrogen deposition, putting forward the re-
quired degree of certainty as to the absence of ad-
verse effects for new nitrogen-emitting activities 
could prove to be difficult, if not impossible. More-
over, the CJEU has reaffirmed that the applicable 
site-linked conservation objectives for the Natura 
2000-site, which might reflect restoration options 
for severely degraded natural habitats, are de-
terminative for the outcome of decision-making 
procedure under the second sentence of Article 
6(3) of the Habitats Directive.41 For example, in 
its recent Sweetman-decision, which concerned 
the development of a road leading to the perma-
nent loss of approximately 1.47 hectares of lime-
stone pavement, the CJEU underscored the im-
portance of the obligation to maintain or restore 
a Natura 2000-site to a favorable conservation 
status.42 
Accordingly, plans or projects capable of 
compromising the attainment of these conserva-
tion and/or restoration objectives will in principle 
not pass the significance-test. Also cumulative 
 effects have to be considered in the appropriate 
assessment, which even further reduces the room 
for manoeuvre in cases of excessive nitrogen de-
position levels which are the accumulate result of 
the operation of several cattle farms in the vicin-
ity of a Natura 2000-site. In some instances, also 
future recovery options will have to be taken into 
consideration in the context of an appropriate as-
40 Waddenzee, supra n 36, para. 59.
41 Ibid, para. 53. 
42 CJEU, Case C-258/11, Sweetman (2013), paras. 39 and 
46. See more extensively: H. Schoukens, ‘The ruling of the 
Court of Justice in Sweetman: How to avoid a death by a 
thousand cuts?’, (2014) ELNI Review, pp. 2–12
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sessment. This might raise the bar even higher 
for many harmful project developments nearby 
Natura 2000-sites. 
2.3.2 Critical loads as new yardstick?
Over time, the concept of ‘critical load’ has 
emerged as the determining factor to assess the 
significance of nitrogen emissions in the context 
of Natura 2000-sites. It is commonly defined 
as ‘a quantitative estimate of an exposure to one or 
more pollutants below which significant harmful ef-
fects on specified sensitive elements of the environ-
ment do not occur according to present knowledge’43 
and also serves as a benchmark against which 
to measure the significance of permitted nitro-
gen contributions in the context of a Natura 
2000-site.44 In recent years, site relevant critical 
loads for acidification and eutrophication have 
been established in several Member States, such 
a Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium (Flem-
ish Region).45 While the use of threshold values 
could be  defendable from a pragmatic point of 
view, an exclusive focus on critical loads blurs 
the fact that the ongoing deterioration of a Natu-
ra 2000-site is often not exclusively attributable to 
elevated levels of nitrogen deposition. Depend-
ing on the specific factual circumstances of the 
site at hand, it can also be related to other fac-
tors, such as the absence of sound hydrological 
management.  Indeed, when approached from 
the perspective of EU nature conservation law, 
43 J. Nilsson and P. Grennfelt (eds.), Critical loads for Sul-
phur and Nitrogen (UNECE/Nordic Council workshop re-
port, Sweden, Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen: 
1988).
44 Hicks et al., supra n 19. 
45 W.J. Bealey et al., ‘Approaches to Assessing the Im-
pacts of New Plans and Projects on Natura 2000-sites’, 
In W.K. Hicks et al. (eds.,) Nitrogen deposition and Natura 
2000: Science and practice in determining environmental 
impact (COST729/Nine/ESF/CCW/JNCC/SEI Workshop 
proceedings: 2011) http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/pdf/airpol_
WG6article63assessments.pdf (Accessed 20 June 2015), 
pp. 12–19. 
the achievement of the ‘overall’ good conserva-
tion status, which is dependent on many factors, 
prevails over the observance of critical loads for 
nitrogen. Even more so, the Habitats Directive 
does not include a specific reference to the lat-
ter concept. As result, the use of critical loads, 
while highly recommendable in assessing the 
significance of additional nitrogen emissions on 
a Natura 2000-site, will not necessarily leads to 
conclusive results in this regard. 
Be that as it may, several national courts, 
such as the Dutch Council of State, have ruled 
that any extra nitrogen emission, regardless of 
its exact size, can be deemed have significant ef-
fects to a Natura 2000-site in which the critical 
loads for nitrogen deposition have already been 
exceeded.46 Against the backdrop of the afore-
mentioned case-law developments, it is not hard 
to understand how the image emerged of the EU 
nature directives as rigid pieces of legislation, 
characterized by a ‘dogmatic’ and ‘strict’ assess-
ment rules. This was particularly the case in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and the UK, 
where the EU nature directives are frequently 
invoked in lawsuits against new project devel-
opments.47 
2.3.3 The derogation-clause of Article 6(4) of the 
Habitats Directive: merely a theoretical option in 
many instances?
The increasingly tight case-law has created a 
backlash for EU nature conservation law, which 
is now often regarded as an inflexible set of rigid 
protection rules by project developers and busi-
ness people. As has become obvious through-
46 See more extensively: M. Uittenbosch, ‘Nederland 
toch op slot; helaas geen aprilgrap’, (2009) Milieu en Recht, 
pp. 482–488.
47 On the Netherlands, see more extensively: Beunen 
M. and M. Duineveld, ‘Divergence and Convergence in 
Policy Meanings of European Environmental Policies: 
The Case of the Birds and Habitats Directive’, (2010) 
International planning studies 15, pp. 321–334. 
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out the past decade, the image of the habitats 
assessment-rules as an obstacle course is to be 
nuanced in view of the poor application and 
lax enforcement of the protection rules on the 
ground.48 Moreover, it is often overlooked that 
the Habitats Directive contains a specific clause 
allowing planning authorities to derogate from 
the general system of protection for reasons of 
overriding public interest. 
By virtue of Article 6(4) of the Habitats Di-
rective, plans or projects may be authorized, by 
way of derogation and in spite of a negative as-
sessment of the implications for the site, where 
there are imperative reasons of overriding pub-
lic interest (IROPI), there are no alternative solu-
tions and all compensatory measures necessary 
to ensure the overall coherence of the Natura 
2000 Network have been taken. 
Still, a closer analysis of the 2012 Guidance 
document produced by the European Commis-
sion as to Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive49 
indicates that the derogation conditions are to 
be interpreted in a restrictive manner and thus 
not offer a general fall-back option for economic 
development. This appears to be reaffirmed in 
the ECJ/CJEU’s more recent jurisprudence.50 In 
addition, the simple fact that private interests 
are, as a matter of principle, not up for consid-
eration under Article 6(4) of the Habitats Direc-
tive51, severely restricts its application for private 
48 J. López-Bao et al., ‘Toothless wildlife protection 
laws’, (2015) 24 Biodiversity and Conservation, pp. 2105–
2108.
49 European Commission, Guidance Document on Article 
6(4) of the ‘Habitats Directive’ 92/43/EEC. Clarification of 
the Concepts of: Alternative Solutions, Imperative Reasons of 
Overriding Public Interest, Compensatory measures, Overall 
Coherence, Opinion of the Commission (Brussels: 2012)
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/
management/docs/art6/new_guidance_art6_4_en.pdf 
(Accessed 20 June 2015).
50 See ECJ, Case C-239/04, Commission v. Portugal 
[2006] ECR I-10183.
51 CJEU, Case C-182/10, Marie-Noëlle Solvay and  Others 
v. Région Wallonne (2012), paras. 75 and 76. 
activities, such as cattle farming, in the vicinity 
of an overburdened Natura 2000-site. The set of 
stringent conditions that have to be observed in 
order to apply the derogation clause partly ex-
plains the reluctance at national level to apply 
this derogation clause for detrimental project 
developments giving rise to additional nitrogen 
emissions. Even for plans or projects that are 
eligible as ‘imperative reasons of overriding public 
interest’, such as large-scale road development 
projects and power stations, the mere prospect 
of a thorough alternatives assessment, in which 
the aim of the project needs to be tested against 
the background of other reasonable alternatives, 
might scare off many project developers. 
In other words, whereas it could be sub-
mitted that Article 6(4) poses no insurmount-
able obstacle to authorisation for large-scale 
project developments that might lead to addi-
tional  nitrogen emissions, the scrutiny and time 
delays associated thereto help to explain its 
limited  application so far. This stands in sharp 
contrast to the recent administrative practice of 
the  European Commission under the second 
subparagraph of Article 6(4) which, at least ac-
cording to some authors, gives too much weight 
to economic factors and thus insufficiently takes 
into account the preventative approach upon 
which the Habitats Directive is grounded.52
3. Towards more flexibility: Novel 
 regulatory approaches to avoid  
additional deadlocks?
The above-portrayed interpretation of the pre-
cautionary principle in the context of the EU 
nature directives poses additional constraints 
for the issuance of permits for both new and on-
going activities that create additional nitrogen 
52 D. McGillivray, ‘Compensating Biodiversity Loss: The 
EU Commission’s Approach to Compensation under Art 
6 of the Habitats Directive’, (2012) Journal of Environmen-
tal Law 24, pp. 417–450.
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emissions. Given the fact that the accumulated 
nitrogen deposition levels currently exceed nu-
trient nitrogen critical loads over a substantial 
area in Europe, neither the mere continuation of 
cattle farms nor the construction of new road de-
velopment projects can be presented as a given 
in a Natura 2000-context. 
3.1 Quick fixes for short-term certainty?
In order to alleviate the administrative burden as-
sociated to the afore-mentioned protection rules, 
Member States have tried to further formalize 
the use of the assessment procedure for project 
developers. Different approaches have emerged 
in this regard. Throughout the past years, the use 
of the afore-mentioned critical loads has enabled 
the national permit issuing authorities to further 
rationalize the application of the habitats as-
sessment-rules both in the screening stage (first 
stage) and, later on, in the decision-making stage 
(integrity-test). In some Member States, generic 
de minimis-thresholds based on critical loads are 
being used to further guide the project propo-
nents and permit issuing authorities through the 
so-called ‘screening stage’ of Article 6(3) of the 
Habitats Directive. 
By applying these thresholds, activities 
whose contribution to the total level of nitrogen 
deposition in an area is deemed trivial at best, 
are liberated from the duty to carry out a more 
laborious and time-consuming appropriate as-
sessment. At the same time other Member States 
have started to apply critical loads as a reference 
criterion in the decision-making process under 
the second sentence of Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive. In earlier times, relatively generous 
threshold values were applied by permit issuing 
instances. For instance, in the Flemish Region a 
10 % threshold had been used in relation to cattle 
farms until some years ago, while in the UK an 
acceptable process contribution of 20 % of the 
critical load had been applied in the assessment 
of nitrogen emissions originating from existing 
livestock installations.53 
In recent years, however, the bulk of these 
thresholds have been tightened up by the na-
tional authorities in the light of the poor conser-
vation status of many protected natural habitats. 
For example, in Germany a 3 % threshold is 
now used in order to determine whether or not 
a new activity should be subject to a prior ap-
propriate assessment. The use thereof is, among 
others, grounded on the assumption that these 
small project contributions are not detectable in 
the environment because of natural fluctuations 
and the lack of sensitivity of measuring instru-
ments.54 According to the German competent 
authorities, a causal link between the emission 
of such negligible amounts of nitrogen and the 
deterioration of a Natura 2000-site is hard, if not 
impossible, to establish. This reasoning was reas-
serted by the German Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
in its recent case-law, in which the validity of 
the above-mentioned thresholds was explicitly 
 upheld.55 
That said, if not balanced with an assessment 
of possible cumulative effects, a wide-spread use 
of generic de minimis thresholds entails the risk 
that the so-called ‘in combination’-effects linked 
to the operation of permitted facilities in the 
 vicinity of a Natura 2000-site are left out of con-
sideration. In order to avoid a so-called ‘death by a 
thousand cuts’-scenario it appears seminal to keep 
the threshold values as low as possible and to 
53 Bealey et al., supra n 45, pp. 15–16. 
54 R. Uhl, ‘Approaches to assessing and permitting plans 
and projects (where they are sources of air pollution) for 
Article 6.3 assessments’. In Department for Environment 
Food and Rural Affairs and Joint Nature Conservation 
Committee, Nitrogen Deposition and the Nature Directives. 
Impacts and Responses: Our shared experiences (Workshop 
Proceedings: 2013) http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/pdf/airpol_
WG6article63assessments.pdf (Accessed 20 June 2015). 
55 Bundesverwaltungsgericht (2014) BVerwGA25.12.
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avoid a too generous application thereof in cases 
of severe degradation of a Natura 2000-site. 
Another regulatory technique to avoid ad-
ditional deadlock scenarios consists in exempt-
ing ongoing use from the assessment rules set 
out by Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. This 
approach was, among others, implemented in 
the Dutch 2010 Crisis and Recovery Act and, 
albeit in a slightly more ambiguous manner, in 
the Flemish 2014 Nature Conservation Decree56. 
Accordingly, permitted activities that were on-
going at the moment of designation of a Natura 
2000-site and have not been intensified or modi-
fied since then, are excluded from the obligation 
to carry out a prior appropriate assessment. The 
rationale underpinning the Dutch law reform 
was confirmed in the subsequent national case-
law57, partly because it implemented the reason-
ing put forward by the CJEU in its ruling in the 
Stadt Papenburg-case.58 Moreover, as was men-
tioned above, the mere renewal of an environ-
mental permit of an ongoing installation does 
not necessarily qualify as a ‘project’ under EU 
 environmental law, creating even more leeway 
for Member States in this regard. 
However, critics submit that the inclusion of 
this exemption clause in the applicable regula-
tory framework basically comes down to a legal-
ization of the historic nitrogen exceedances that 
were present at the time of the final designation 
of a Natura 2000-site.59 In addition, excluding the 
56 See more extensively: H. Schoukens et al., ‘Het ver-
nieuwde Natuurdecreet: a Game Changer’, (2014) Tijd-
schrift voor Omgevingsrecht en Omgevingsbeleid, pp. 473–
513.
57 Dutch Council of State (2010), case no. 200903784/1. 
58 Stadt Papenburg, supra n 38, para. 47. 
59 Along similar lines, see: C.J. Bastmeijer, ‘Natuur-
beschermingsrecht in crisistijd: ‘opzij, opzij, opzij… 
maak plaats, maak plaats, maak plaats… wij hebben 
 ongelofelijke haast’, (2009) Milieu en Recht, pp. 628–633; 
J. Veltman and G. Smits, ‘De voorgestelde regeling van 
stikstofdepositie in de Crisis- en Herstelwet’, (2009) 
 Milieu en Recht, pp. 638–641. 
majority of the ongoing uses from a prior assess-
ment, and thereby stricter scrutiny, puts even 
more weight on the shoulders of the developers 
of new plans and projects giving rise to addition-
al nitrogen emissions. In other words, an overly 
generous use of this exemption scheme is capa-
ble of further compromising the achievement of 
the restoration targets for Natura 2000-sites that 
have already been severely affected by excessive 
nitrogen loads throughout the past decades. 
Henceforth, pursuant to Article 6(2) of the 
Habitats Directive competent authorities are still 
required to consider adjusting or, as the case may 
be, revoking the permits of ongoing installations 
which are a source of continuing deterioration of 
a Natura 2000-site.60 In this respect, due regard 
must be given to the applicable restoration tar-
gets for the Natura 2000-sites at hand. Or, differ-
ently put, exemption rules should mainly be re-
garded as a useful ‘regulatory trick’ to offer short 
term relief for ongoing activities, which are given 
additional time to readjust their operations or, al-
ternatively, phase out. Yet, the use of exemption 
clauses offers no fundamental breakthrough or 
long-term solution for the authorization of new 
plans and projects causing additional nitrogen 
emissions on adjacent nitrogen-sensitive Natura 
2000-sites. Even more so, if overly relied upon, 
the use of exemption clauses could backfire for 
nature conservation as it will be invoked by 
public authorities as additional justification for 
the absence of more robust restoration policies 
toward heavily degraded Natura 2000-sites. Ad-
mittedly, the additional flexibility could help in 
relieving the much-feared additional burden as-
sociated with the Habitats Directive in cases of 
existing activities. However, in turn, this might 
lead competent authorities to believe that com-
ing forward with more comprehensive solutions 
for the issue of nitrogen deposition is less urgent. 
60 Backes et al., supra n 27, pp. 45–47. 
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3.2 ‘Banking’ with nitrogen emissions as mid-
term solution for new project developments?
In order to provide the permit issuing authorities 
with more discretionary margin when authoriz-
ing new or modified projects, the Dutch 2010 Crisis 
and Recovery Act introduced yet another flex-
ible regulatory tool. It provided the opportunity 
for permit appliers to offset their nitrogen emis-
sions with reductions that are implemented at 
other operational facilities (in Dutch: ‘salderen’). 
By doing so, the Dutch legislator codified a ratio-
nale that had already been applied in the exist-
ing case-law of the Dutch Council of State.61 By 
allowing permit issuing authorities to take into 
account emission reduction efforts, which are the 
immediate result of permit withdrawals or revo-
cations for other operating facilities, additional 
room for manoeuvre is created in scenarios 
where the exceedance of the critical loads would 
normally lead to a deadlock for economic activi-
ties. In some instances, an operator can also offset 
additional emissions linked to a new installation 
with the revocation of an environmental permit 
for another installation on the same site. The off-
setting rules, if applied strictly, will not lead to a 
net-increase of the total amount of nitrogen de-
position in the adjacent Natura 2000-site. Hence, 
the instrument also seems to be compatible with 
Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. In some 
Dutch provinces, the competent authorities have 
gone that far to establish ‘nitrogen emission banks’, 
from which permit applicants can withdraw the 
necessary permit rights needed for their new op-
erations. As a result, formal negotiations were no 
longer needed with holders of existing permits. 
That said, the promulgation of the novel 
offsetting rules did not pass unnoticed in the 
61 C.J. Visser, ‘Stikstof en saldering; vallen nu ook de 
depositiebanken om?’, (2013) Tijdschrift voor gezondheids-
schade, milieuschade en aansprakelijkheidsrecht, pp. 155–160. 
Dutch legal literature.62 While some of the coun-
ter-arguments that were raised against it appear 
well-founded from environmental perspective, 
they can be, at least partly, refuted on legalistic 
grounds.63 As to the risk of in-combination ef-
fects linked to the additional nitrogen emissions, 
it remains indeed hard to see how this risk will 
exacerbated by the application of the offsetting 
rules. Provided the offsetting rules are applied in 
a rigorous and consistent manner, no additional 
net contribution of nitrogen will be deposed on 
the adjacent Natura 2000-sites. 
However, at least some part of the criticism 
seems to hold ground when approached from 
the perspective of the standstill-obligation laid 
down by Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive. 
Indeed, whenever additional reduction efforts 
are merely used to create so-called ‘development 
room’ for new economic project developments 
that lead to additional nitrogen deposition, the 
further degradation of Natura 2000-sites will 
probably not be halted in the long run. As al-
ready alluded to above, a clear distinction must 
be drawn between the habitats assessment-rules 
laid down by Article 6(3) of the Habitats Direc-
tive and the standstill-obligation laid down by 
Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive. The former 
merely requires permit issuing instances to en-
sure that plans or projects will not give rise to 
adverse effects in a Natura 2000-site. This obli-
gation seems to be complied with whenever the 
project at hand does not lead to an increase of 
the nitrogen deposition levels, at least on a net-
level. Still, when all additional reductions are 
immediately ‘re-used’ in order to authorize new 
development projects, the Netherlands could 
eventually be held accountable for not observing 
its obligations under Article 6(2) of the Habitats 
62 Bastmeijer, supra n 59. 
63 Backes, supra n 27, pp. 46–47. 
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Directive if the existing deterioration continues. 
In other words, a generous use of the offsetting 
rules might further compromise the attainment 
of the EU conservation goals in general and thus 
lead to possible infringement proceedings before 
the CJEU. 
The application of the offsetting rules is also 
severely restricted as a result of the more recent 
case-law developments before the Dutch Council 
of State.64 For instance, it is not possible re-use 
the withdrawal of a permit for an activity which 
has adverse effects on another habitat type or 
Natura 2000-site as an offset for a new economic 
development. Also under the banking rules, it 
must be guaranteed that nowhere in the affected 
Natura 2000-site a net-increase of nitrogen de-
position levels can be detected. In addition, the 
Dutch Council of State has highlighted that the 
proposed mitigating measure needs to be inex-
tricably linked to the filed permit application. In 
order to fulfil this requirement, is has to be ascer-
tained that the permitted activity, which serves 
as mitigating measure under the second sentence 
of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, will be 
effectively withdrawn or revoked in a short time 
frame.65 Also a clear-cut link is to be established 
between the withdrawn permit and the purport-
ed nitrogen emissions.66 Whereas the latter case-
law developments at the national should defi-
nitely not be read as an outright rejection of the 
instrument of deposition banks, they do serve as 
a cautionary tale that also in this respect no quick 
wins are possible.67
64 See also: Zijlmans and Woldendorp, supra n 15. 
65 Dutch Council of State (2011), case no. 200908730/1. 
66 Dutch Council of State (2013), case no. 201303243/1, 
201303324/1, 201303514/1 and 201303816/1.
67 See also more recently: Dutch Council of State (2015), 
case no. 201402973/1/R3 and 201308952/1/R3.
3.3 ‘Nature inclusive design’ as long-term 
 go-between for project developments in 
the context of nitrogen-sensitive Natura 
2000-sites?
Absent more generic regulatory solutions to de-
fuse the deadlock scenarios that have emerged in 
certain scenarios, planning authorities continued 
searching for novel flexible strategies vis-à-vis 
mitigation. Interestingly, a recent shift toward a 
more lenient approach to mitigation is detectable 
in the planning policies of some Member States, 
such as the Netherlands and Belgium (Flemish 
Region). It was submitted that, by taking into ac-
count the positive effects of restoration measures 
that are functionally linked to a project develop-
ment, additional leeway for permit issuing au-
thorities in the context of over-burdened Natura 
2000-sites might be created. The latter approach 
is built on the premise that such restoration 
measures can be coined as ‘mitigating measures’ 
under the second sentence of Article 6(3) of the 
Habitats Directive. It was assumed that such ap-
proach could trump the overly strict application 
of the precautionary principle in permit policies 
for nitrogen impacts.
Whereas, as a matter of principle, plans and 
projects prone to create residual significant ef-
fects cannot be authorized under the second 
sentence of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, 
this more liberal approach seems to offer more 
flexibility. Accordingly, a permit application 
leading to additional nitrogen deposition would 
not have to be rejected if restoration measures in 
other parts of the affected Natura 2000-sites are 
capable of offsetting this damage by, for instance, 
setting forth the restoration of resilient habitats 
in the coming years. Evidently, such approach 
will create more flexibility within the decision-
making process for harmful activities. 
The sudden rise of such novel techniques 
should therefore not come as a surprise. Increas-
ingly, ecological restoration and management 
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measures are presented as a key mechanism to 
combat the adverse effects of nitrogen deposition 
on protected natural habitats. The incorporation 
of such measures into spatial developments was 
seen as the ultimate gateway to a more stream-
lined permit approach in regions which are al-
ready characterized by high background levels 
of nitrogen deposition. Its success lies in the fact 
that it allows permit issuing authorities to negate 
the current unfavourable conservation status of 
natural habitats by anticipating on the beneficial 
effects of future restoration measures.68 
By accepting this more progressive ap-
proach to the habitats assessment, the EU nature 
directives would no longer be perceived as an 
obnoxious brake on economic development. At 
the same time nature would also benefit from the 
additional restoration measures. Depending on 
the context, this more facilitative approach to the 
habitats assessment is referred to in Dutch legal 
literature as ‘nature inclusive design’ or ‘integral 
planning’69. Regardless of the specific name tag, 
all these approaches clearly depart from a more 
legalistic interpretation of the habitats assess-
ment-procedure and give way to a more flex-
ible reading of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Direc-
tive.70 In spite of the promising results in terms of 
flexibility at permit level, the legal qualification 
of measures aimed at creating, restoring or en-
hancing an area of to-be-affected protected habi-
tat remained unclear at best. 
Initially, the Dutch Council of State dis-
played a remarkable openness to the more liberal 
reading of the habitats assessment. One of the 
first notable cases in which the above-mentioned 
68 See more extensively: H. Schoukens and A. Cliquet, 
’Mitigation and compensation under EU nature conser-
vation law in the Flemish region: beyond the deadlock 
for development projects?’, (2014) Utrecht Law Review 2, 
pp. 194–215.
69 Zijlmans and Woldendorp, supra n 15. 
70 Kistenkas, supra n 14.
progressive approaches toward mitigation had 
been successfully applied, was the so-called 
Dutch ‘IJburg-case’. In these proceedings, a large-
scale building project implied the destruction of 
mussel beds serving as a foraging site for dif-
ferent protected bird species which nested in a 
nearby Natura 2000-site. However, by having in-
tegrated the creation of 132 hectares of new mus-
sel beds in the project design, the project devel-
opers were able to submit that the integrity of the 
Natura 2000-site would not adversely affected 
by the purported works. When faced with legal 
challenges, the Dutch Council of State qualified 
these measures as ‘mitigation’, which could be 
taken into account in the appropriate assessment 
for the construction of the housing zone in the 
IJmeer.71 Interestingly, the Dutch Council of State 
seemed poised to apply a similar reasoning in 
nitrogen-related cases. 
In a more recent ruling concerning the exten-
sion of the Port of Eemshaven, the Dutch Coun-
cil of State accepted a so-called ‘system-based ap-
proach’. Under this interpretation, the integrity 
of the affected Natura 2000-sites, which were 
already at an unfavourable conservation status, 
would not be significantly impaired by the lim-
ited increase of nitrogen deposition levels. The 
additional nature conservation measures that 
had been attached to the contested nature per-
mits would ensure the resilience of the affected 
sites. It was assumed that the envisaged nature 
conservation and restoration measures, which 
included the removal of nitrogen by stripping 
off the upper layer of the soil as well as excluding 
the ongoing shrimp fishers in one of the affected 
Natura 2000-sites, would render the nitrogen-
sensitive habitats in the site more resilient and 
thus enable them to absorb the additional nitro-
71 Dutch Council of State (2010), case no. 200901224/1.
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gen deposition without any risk for further de-
terioration.72 
Be that as it may, not all national courts 
were swayed by this more progressive interpre-
tation of the habitats assessment. In seemingly 
sharp contrast with the allegedly ‘liberal’ Dutch 
case-law, the Belgian Council of State displayed 
more reluctance vis-à-vis the use of restoration 
measures in an appropriate assessment.73 This 
was strikingly illustrated by its 2013 ruling in 
the legal proceedings concerning the construc-
tion of a road bypass (‘Noordzuidverbinding’) in 
the province of Limburg. In this case, the appro-
priate assessment had taken into the beneficial 
effects of a to be created nature corridor zone, lo-
cated several kilometres away from the affected 
Natura 2000-site. The Belgian Council of State, 
however, reasserted the counter-claims raised 
by the opponents of the project. It took the line 
that such measures are to be ruled out as mitiga-
tion. Instead they are to be tagged as compen-
satory measures and application should have 
been made of the derogation clause included in 
 Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive. This led the 
Council to conclude that the requirements of the 
derogation clause had been violated in the pres-
ent case.74 
The latter case was not a stand-alone ruling. 
In a more recent decision the Belgian Council of 
State again had to shed light on the function of 
autonomous restoration measures for Natura 
2000-sites in an appropriate assessment for a 
harbour development project. Instead of repli-
cating its earlier rationale vis-à-vis mitigation, 
the Council confined itself to pointing out that 
the integral planning-approach had not been 
adequately strict translated in the conditions 
72 Dutch Council of State (2014), case no. 201304768/1.
73 See more extensively: Schoukens and Cliquet, supra 
n 68. 
74 Belgian Council of State (2013), case no. 223.083 Vzw 
Natuurpunt Limburg.
attached to the planning permit. No clear-cut 
guarantees for the attainment of the conservation 
objectives had been included in the planning per-
mit and thus Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive 
had not been complied with. Consequently, the 
planning permit was suspended.75 
4. The Briels-ruling of the CJEU: One step 
back for the flexible approaches toward 
the habitats assessment?
4.1 Persisting legal uncertainty? 
The above-portrayed integrative approaches to 
the habitats assessment might lead to additional 
‘win-win scenarios’. Indeed, given the limited po-
litical weight that is attached to nature conserva-
tion, many harmful projects will eventually go 
through, regardless of environmental objections. 
Thus, from a pragmatic viewpoint, it would be 
better to implement these project developments 
while at least having the explicit assurance that 
the necessary robust restoration measures are 
 attached to it. Some environmentalists, how-
ever, counter the latter assumptions by pointing 
out that a wide-spread application of the latter 
 approach could well undermine the preventa-
tive approach that is underpinning the Habitats 
Directive. 
Translated in legal terms, this debate basical-
ly revolves around the question whether restora-
tion measures can serve as a general means to 
outweigh and/or balance the detrimental impact 
of a purported project in the assessment stage 
under Article 6 (3) of the Habitats Directive, or, 
alternatively, can only be taken into account as 
‘compensation’ when application is made of the 
restrictive derogation clause under Article 6 (4) 
of the Habitats Directive. 
The CJEU was offered the opportunity to 
shed light on this matter when the Dutch Coun-
75 Belgian Council of State (2013), case no. 225.676 Hilde 
Orleans.
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cil of State decided to refer the so-called ‘Briels’-
case to Luxemburg. The proceedings revolved 
around the broadening of a section of the A2 mo-
torway between the cities of Eindhoven and Den 
Bosch. According to the appropriate assessment 
the further increase of motorway traffic would 
give rise to adverse effects on the nitrogen-sen-
sitive blue marshes in the neighboring Natura 
2000-site, which were already at an unfavorable 
conservation status. The CJEU was asked by the 
Dutch Council of State to indicate to what extent 
measures with a view to ensure the creation of 
new blue marshes elsewhere in the same time, to 
replace and augment the natural habitats affect-
ed by the increase of nitrogen deposition levels 
linked to the extension of the motorway, could 
be qualified as ‘mitigating measures’ in the context 
of an appropriate assessment under the second 
sentence of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive 
or, alternatively, could merely be taken into ac-
count when application is made of the deroga-
tion clause. In the case at hand, the purported 
restoration measures allowed the appropriate 
assessment to conclude that the integrity of the 
nearby Natura 2000-site would not be adversely 
affected by the purported project development. 
4.2 The CJEU rejects the broad interpretation 
of the second sentence of Article 6(3) of the 
Habitats Directive
In its highly readable Opinion of 27 Febru-
ary 2014, Advocate General Sharpston was not 
swayed by the arguments raised by the propo-
nents of the newly emerged mitigation strategy.76 
While accepting that measures incorporated 
in project which effectively minimize its im-
pact may be taken into account when assessing 
whether that project adversely affects the integ-
76 Advocate General Sharpston, TC Briels and Others 
v. Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu, Opinion of 27 
February 2014.
rity of a site77, she refused to qualify the creation 
of new meadows as mitigating measures. In any 
event, according to the Advocate General ‘the 
new habitat will be, to some extent, artificially created 
and cannot become a true natural habitat for some, 
possibly quite considerable time’78. In addition, the 
Advocate General pointed to the importance of 
the applicable conservation objectives for the site 
at hand, which indicated that an expansion of 
the area of blue marshes and improvement of its 
quality was needed in order to attain a favorable 
conservation status.79
The CJEU basically reasserted the view-
points raised by the Advocate General in its rul-
ing of 15 May 2014. The progressive reading of 
the second sentence of Article 6(3) of the Habi-
tats Directive, which underpinned the appropri-
ate assessment for the Dutch road development 
project, was ultimately dismissed.80 In the light of 
the subsequent analysis, it is interesting to take 
a closer look at the exact steps of the reasoning 
used by the CJEU in its ruling. 
In a first section, the CJEU further elaborated 
on the semantic difference between mitigation 
and compensation. The EU judges firmly reject-
ed the more liberal interpretation approach that 
had been applied in the appropriate assessment 
for the extension of the Dutch motorway. In the 
CJEU’s view, the application of the precaution-
ary principle requires the competent national 
authority to assess the implications of the proj-
ect for the Natura 2000-site concerned in view of 
the site’s conservation objectives and taking into 
account the protective measures forming part of 
that project aimed at avoiding or reducing any 
direct adverse effects for the site, in order to en-
sure that it does not adversely affect the integrity 
77 Ibid, para. 32.
78 Ibid, para. 42.
79 Ibid, para. 41. 
80 CJEU, Case C-521/12 TC Briels and Others v. Minister 
van Infrastructuur en Milieu (2012).
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of the site.81 This entails that protective measures 
provided for in a project which are aimed at com-
pensating for the negative effects of the project 
on a Natura 2000-site cannot be included in an 
appropriate assessment.82 
As a result of that, the future creation of an 
area equal or greater size of the affected habitat 
type in another part of the site which will not be 
directly affected by the project, cannot be quali-
fied as avoidance measures under Article 6(3) of 
the Habitats Directive.83 Instead such measures 
basically seek to counterbalance the unavoidable 
negative impacts that go along with the project 
and therefore should be tagged as compensatory 
measures within the meaning of Article 6(4) of 
the Habitats Directive.84 Since none of the res-
toration measures tied to the road development 
project were aimed at avoiding nor reducing 
the effect on the affected patches of habitat, they 
were not eligible as mitigation. 
However, given the absence of an explicit 
referral to mitigation in the Habitats Directive, 
the CJEU needed to come forward with addi-
tional arguments in order to refute the claims 
for a more lenient interpretation of the habitats 
assessment-procedure. Also in this regard, the 
CJEU followed in the footsteps of the Advocate 
General. In its decision, it heavily relied upon the 
precautionary principle which is underpinning 
Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. In particu-
lar, the CJEU noted that any positive effect of a 
future creation of a new habitat which is aimed 
at compensating for the loss of area and quality 
of that same habitat type on a protected site, even 
where the new area will be bigger and of higher 
quality, are highly difficult to forecast with a de-




84 Ibid, para. 31. 
only several years into the future.85 In the light of 
the continuing uncertainty on the effectiveness 
of habitat management techniques to mitigate 
nitrogen deposition impacts, this statement is 
not without relevance for the remainder of this 
analysis.
Interestingly, the CJEU also rebuked the 
criticism which pointed to the alleged rigidity to 
which such an interpretation might lead. It did so 
by underlining that the restoration and enhance-
ment measures, if inextricably linked to the road 
development project, could still be taken into 
account as compensatory measures in the con-
text of the derogation clause of Article 6(4) of the 
Habitats Directive. Under the CJEU’s approach, 
the fact that the measures are to be implemented 
in the affected Natura 2000-site has no bearing 
on it being principally eligible as a compensa-
tory measure under Article 6(4) of the Habitats 
Directive.86 
4.3 A first assessment of the Briels-decision
The Briels-ruling is to be seen as a landmark-de-
cision in the field of EU nature conservation law, 
especially given its major implications for per-
mit policies at national level in relation to Natura 
2000-sites. Compared to the lenient approach 
to mitigation put forward in some national or 
regional planning policies, the rationale of the 
Briels-ruling seems to restrict the conditions un-
der which new projects can be authorized in the 
context of over-burdened Natura 2000-sites. Still, 
before addressing the wider consequences of the 
Briels-ruling for the Natura 2000 permit policies 
at national level, it is appropriate to assess the 
decision from a wider perspective. 
First, when assessed from a legalistic per-
spective, the reasoning applied by the CJEU 
does appear justified. In the light of the well-
85 Ibid, para. 32. 
86 Ibid, paras. 35–37. 
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vested mitigation hierarchy, which is implicitly 
underpinning Article 6(3) of the Habitats Direc-
tive, the outcome of the Briels-proceedings be-
fore the CJEU can hardly be called surprising. In 
the case at hand, no genuine steps were taken to 
further reduce the risk of the increased nitrogen 
deposition levels linked to the extension of the 
motorway. While it is true that, for instance in 
the United States, restoration measures are often 
dubbed ‘mitigation’ in the context of offsetting 
schemes, the basic semantic distinction between 
mitigation (or minimization or reduction) and 
compensation (or offsetting) is not controver-
sial, especially not in the view of the prevention 
principle. 
Thus, at semantic level, it remained uncon-
tested that the restoration and enhancement 
measures would not be capable of preventing the 
environmental damage to materialize in the first 
place. The measures merely comprised of the cre-
ation of similar habitats elsewhere in the affect-
ed Natura 2000-site. Likewise, the stress that is 
placed on the precautionary principle should not 
come as a surprise either, given the ECJ/CJEU’s 
earlier reliance on the precautionary approach in 
the notable Waddenzee-ruling.87
However, the CJEU’s alleged stringent rea-
soning also seems reasonable when assessed 
against the backdrop of the available scientific 
research on the effectiveness of ecological resto-
ration. Indeed, recent reports consistently point 
to the relative ineffectiveness of restoration ef-
forts in the context of biodiversity offsetting 
schemes.88 Restoration efforts, also when applied 
in the context of planning permit schemes, only 
rarely equal those of the reference state, even for 
87 Waddenzee, supra n 36. 
88 D. Moreno-Mateos et al., ‘Structural and Function-
al Loss in Restored Wetland Ecosystems’, (2012) Plos 
Biol. 10: e1001247, http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1001247 (Accessed 20 
June 2015).
‘easy to restore’ natural habitats such as wetlands 
and grasslands. Replicating ecosystems that 
have been lost to human development will give 
rise to considerable uncertainty and time delays, 
especially when it concerns old growth habitats. 
All too often current offset practices fail to take 
into account the uncertainty in restoration and its 
considerable time lags.89 
In general, the afore-mentioed conclusions 
also apply in the specific context of the adverse 
ecological effects caused by the high levels of 
 nitrogen deposition. There indeed exists an 
 apparent lack of comprehensive studies on the 
subject of ecological restoration and intensified 
management as a mechanism to combat the ad-
verse effects of nitrogen deposition on Natura 
2000 habitats.90 Even more so, a recent review of 
the effectiveness of on-site habitat management 
to reduce atmospheric nitrogen deposition im-
pacts on terrestrial habitats revealed that, while 
on-site management techniques might improve 
habitat suitability, it could also lead to unintend-
ed consequences.91 
Thus, as a preliminary conclusion, it can be 
submitted that the CJEU had common sense at 
its side when it decided to limit the room left for 
implementing habitat creation and restoration 
measures within the framework of the habitats 
assessment. Whereas a more widespread inte-
gration of restoration measures in spatial and 
economic developments must be welcomed as 
89 M. Curran, S. Hellweg and J. Beck, ‘Is there any em-
pirical support for biodiversity offset policy?’, (2014) Eco-
logical Applications 24, pp. 617–632. 
90 H. Kros and D. Bal, ‘The effectiveness of on-site (in-
tensified) habitat management measures and restoration 
measures to mitigate impacts and to promote recovery’, 
In Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
and Joint Nature Conservation Committee, Nitrogen De-
position and the Nature Directives. Impacts and Responses: 
Our shared experiences (Workshop Proceedings: 2013) 
http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/pdf/airpol_WG7Ecologicalres-
torationmeasures.pdf (Accessed 20 June 2015).
91 Stevens et al., supra n 23. 
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such, since it at least avoids additional losses for 
nature, an over-reliance on restoration measures 
in assessment schemes could effectively put into 
jeopardy the preventative approach underpin-
ning the habitats assessment scheme. In the 
CJEU’s eyes, the creation of new natural habitats 
should basically be seen as a last resort-option, 
in order to offset unavoidable damages linked 
to projects that are necessary for imperative rea-
sons of overriding public interest. Given the poor 
compliance with procedural and substantive re-
quirements of the habitats assessment-test on the 
ground in many Member States, the CJEU’s re-
luctance appears warranted.92 
4.4 Toward more scrutiny?
While the CJEU’s approach might have science 
and the law on its side, critics could tag the rul-
ing as yet another stark illustration of the in-
ability of the Habitats Directive to support more 
progressive approaches vis-à-vis biodiversity 
offsetting and nature conservation. Even more, it 
could eventually backfire at EU nature conserva-
tion law. The stringent interpretation-line might 
be capable of further jeopardizing the legitimacy 
of the Habitats Directive among policy-makers 
and the wider public. For one, it could be por-
tended that the achievement of the conserva-
tion objectives will, as such, not be guaranteed 
by  applying strict scrutiny to nitrogen-emitting 
projects whose contributions have, in them-
selves, no notable  effect on nitrogen-sensitive 
Natura 2000-sites. Accordingly, it can be argued 
that, by excluding the use of restoration measures 
92 See, among others: Milieu ltd. et al., ‘National legis-
lation and practices regarding the implementation of 
Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the con-
servation of natural habitats and wild fauna and flora, 
in particular Article 6’ (Brussels: 2009) http://www.eu-
roparl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200910/2009
1013ATT62399/20091013ATT62399EN.pdf (Accessed 20 
June 2015).
in an appropriate assessment under Article 6(3) 
of the Habitats Directive, the CJEU clearly nar-
rows down the already limited leeway available 
to national permit issuing instances for future 
project developments in a Natura 2000-context. 
This could be seen as the ultimate proof of the 
dogmatic and inflexible approach of the CJEU to 
the EU nature directives and its fundamental un-
willingness to accommodate a more pragmatic 
approach to economic development.93 
Along the same lines, it could be contend-
ed that large-scale project developments offer a 
unique opportunity for implementing robust res-
toration efforts for degraded Natura 2000-sites 
because of the large sums of money that are 
available in such instances. Therefore, adopting 
a too restrictive stance could do away with one 
important trigger for ecological restoration. In 
the end, the additional rigidity brought about 
by the Briels-ruling might be detrimental for the 
EU’s biodiversity in the long run, especially since 
the compliance with the autonomous restoration 
 duties under Article 6(1) of the Habitats is far 
from satisfactory. 
By holding that habitat restoration and 
creation measures are compensation, the CJEU 
seemingly indicated that such measures can 
only be taken into account in exceptional cases, 
i.e. when application is made of the derogation 
clause set out by Article 6(4) of the Habitats Di-
rective. Yet, as alluded to above, the additional 
constraints and possible delays linked to the ap-
plication of the derogation clause have rendered 
it increasingly unpopular among planning au-
thorities. Even in the case of large infrastructure 
projects, which might still meet the standard 
of ‘imperative reason of overriding public interest’, 
authorities are often quite reluctant in consider-
ing the application of Article 6(4) of the Habitats 
 Directive. 
93 Kistenkas, supra n 14. 
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Having said that, in my view, this weariness 
on the part of the permit issuing authorities is 
not completely justified. In most instances, the 
application of Article 6(4), will not represent an 
insurmountable obstacle to the authorization of 
the purported project development, even in the 
context of increasing levels of nitrogen deposi-
tion. This is further evidenced by the fact that the 
European Commission, when being asked to de-
liver an opinion on the acceptability of a request 
for application of the derogation clause, has only 
in one instance delivered a negative response.94 
Ergo it should not a priori ruled out as last resort-
solution in the context of large-scale infrastruc-
ture works. 
4.5 Nature inclusive design and nitrogen 
banking in the post-Briels-era?
In post-Briels-times a reconsideration of the lim-
ited use of Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive 
might bring about additional leverage for large 
infrastructure projects. Yet it will not avoid the 
predicament that many private projects are 
facing, for instance in regions with high back-
ground values of nitrogen deposition. Private 
projects, such as the extension of a pig farm, will 
not meet the standards set out by the deroga-
tion clause since they do not relate to ‘imperative 
reasons of overriding public interest’. It is apparent 
that the prospects for private project develop-
ment in the post-Briels-era are less promising, 
at least in the context of the application Natura 
94 In recent years, several authors have contended that 
many of the Commission’s opinions, which are issued 
under the second subparagraph of Article 6(4) of the 
Habitats Directive, do not fulfil the applicable derogation 
requirements set about by Article 6(4) of the Habitats Di-
rective. All too often mere economic considerations seem 
to overrule the conservation objectives of the Habitats 
Directive. See among others: D. McGillivray, ‘Compen-
sating Biodiversity Loss: the EU Commission’s Approach 
to Compensation under Art. 6 of the Habitats Directive’, 
(2012) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 417–450. 
2000-rules at permit level. However, it remains to 
be seen whether all margin for manvoeuvre has 
indeed completely disappeared with the Briels-
ruling.
Remarkably so, the final outcome of the 
Briels-proceedings itself before the Dutch Coun-
cil of State does not display a shift toward more 
rigidity. Rather ironically, a new appropriate as-
sessment had been drafted up for the contested 
project, which concluded that, contrary to earlier 
reports, the blue marshes were still at a favor-
able conservation status in the affected site and 
thus no extension of the affected natural habitats 
was deemed necessary. Therefore, the discussion 
on the legal qualification of the creation of new 
natural habitats had become  irrelevant in order 
to assess the validity of the new planning permit 
that had been issued for the purported road ex-
tension works.95 
Obviously, a newly drafted appropriate as-
sessment will not be able to provide for an al-
ternative escape route in every single case. The 
more recent jurisprudence of the Dutch Council 
of State clearly points to more rigidity for the 
 authorization of new project developments in 
the Natura 2000-context.96 In several of its recent 
decisions, the Dutch Council of State rejected the 
use of restoration measures for projects which led 
to the outright destruction of protected habitats 
located inside a Natura 2000-site.97 It was only 
found ready to accept the use of restoration mea-
sures in cases where project development inter-
fered with foraging areas that were located in the 
immediate vicinity of a Natura 2000-site (but not 
95 Dutch Council of State (2014), case no. 201110075/4 
and 201201853/3.
96 See more extensively: R. Frins, ‘Het onderscheid  tussen 
mitigatie en compensatie: alea jacta est?’, (2015) Tijdschrift 
voor Bouwrecht, pp. 198–205.
97 Dutch Council of State (2015), case no. 201401736/1; 
Dutch Council of State (2014), case no. 201202327/1 and 
201300125/1.
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within its boundaries).98 By contrast, the Dutch 
judged adopted a more rigid approach in cases 
where the authorized project was liable to cause 
adverse effects to protected natural habitats that 
are effectively located within the boundaries of 
a Natura 2000-site. For example, in yet another 
nitrogen-related case, the Council of State ruled 
that the increase of nitrogen deposition levels 
cannot be balanced at site level unless the miti-
gating measures effectively prevent the occur-
rence of adverse effects on the protected habi-
tats that will be affected by the project.99 In line 
with the allegedly strict stance of the CEU, the 
Dutch Council of State assumed that habitat cre-
ation or restoration measures can only be quali-
fied as mitigation under the second sentence of 
Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive whenever 
they relate to the same affected habitat. Conse-
quently, measures relating to other patches of 
habitats that will not be impacted by the pur-
ported project development can not be taken into 
account.
Still, it would be erroneous to assume that 
with the Briels-ruling all room for discretion has 
disappeared. As such, the underlying Briels- logic 
does not preclude the integration of genuine 
avoidance and minimizing measures in proj-
ect developments, such as additional nitrogen-
capture measures and other means to abate ni-
trogen and ammonia emissions at facility-level. 
In other cases, the withdrawal or revocation of 
one or more permits for other cattle farms that 
are located in the immediate neighbourhood 
of the proposed activity might still prevent a 
net-increase of nitrogen deposition on the pro-
tected habitats of an adjacent protected site. In-
deed, offsetting nitrogen additional emissions 
with reduction efforts that are implemented in 
nearby operational facilities has not been ren-
98 Dutch Council of State (2014), case no. 201309630/1.
99 Dutch Council of State (2014), case no. 201309655/1.
dered illegal by the Briels-decision. That is, pro-
vided that they both relate to the same affected 
patches of natural habitats. In itself, the Briels-
proceedings did not revolve around the ques-
tion whether the withdrawal of a permit for an 
activity which is impacting the same habitat as 
the one that will be affected by a new plan or 
project qualifies as mitigation. In contrast to the 
creation of new natural habitats, the withdrawal 
of a permit for an activity which is located in 
the immediate vicinity of the purported plan 
or project will effectively avoid any additional 
adverse effects to materialize in the first place. 
Hence, nitrogen banking, when applied with 
the necessary caution, would not necessarily go 
against the precautionary principle. However, 
as already underlined in the above-conducted 
analysis, it must be ensured that the withdrawal 
of an existing permit is not merely an autono-
mous measure, which would have taken place 
anyway, regardless of the purported project de-
velopment. If that were to be the case, it cannot 
be taken into account as a mitigating measure. 
Moreover, it needs to be guaranteed that the ter-
ritorial scope of the permit overlaps with the im-
pact area of the projected new activities.100 
On a more general note, it might be con-
tended that the CJEU does, as such, not rule out 
the use of habitat creation and restoration mea-
sures as mitigation for excessive nitrogen depo-
sition loads per se. While it does certainly limit 
the possibility for relying on the positive effects 
of habitat creation and restoration measures in 
the context of an appropriate assessment not all 
room for flexibility appears to have vanished. 
Pursuant to one interpretation-line, restoration 
measures that are directly related to the same 
patch of habitat as the one that will be affected 
100 H. Woldendorp and H. Schoukens, ‘De Habitatricht-
lijn als Doos van Pandora: het A2-arrest van het Europese 
Hof van Justitie’, (2015) Milieu en Recht, pp. 2–15.
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by the increased level of nitrogen deposition, re-
main eligible as a genuine mitigating measure 
under the second sentence of Article 6(3) of the 
Habitats Directive. It could be portended that 
such measures still qualify as mitigation since 
they immediately relate to the affected habitats. 
They could yield more resilient natural habitats, 
which are better equipped to absorb additional 
nitrogen emissions. 
Still, the more pressing question remains 
whether an appropriate assessment can explic-
itly anticipate on the beneficial ecological effects 
that will be produced by the purported restora-
tion measures in the context of a harmful project 
development, regardless of whether they relate 
to the affected habitats themselves or more dis-
tantly located natural habitats. In the light of the 
limited effectiveness of ecological restoration in 
general, especially when applied in the context 
of a biodiversity offsetting scheme, it remains 
uncertain whether the precautionary principle 
does not pose a more fundamental additional 
constraint in this regard. If that were to be the 
case, also the use of restoration measures that are 
directly linked to the affected patches of natural 
habitats is to be ruled out in the context of an ap-
propriate assessment. 
For the time being, the Dutch Council of 
State does not seem to adopt such a strict stance. 
In one case, it at least implicitly accepted that res-
toration measures which are legally guaranteed 
in a planning permit, provided they relate to the 
to-be-affected protected habitat, can still be of 
use under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. 
However, so far, the Dutch Council of State has 
only touched upon that issue indirectly, which 
makes it hard to draw general conclusions in this 
regard.101 
When approached with the necessary cau-
tion, the Briels-ruling could be framed as an im-
101 Frins, supra n 96. 
plicit invitation to project developers to imple-
ment restoration measures in a more early stage 
of the planning process. This would allow permit 
issuing authorities to take into account the posi-
tive effects which have already materialized in 
the meantime during a subsequent ecological as-
sessment. Yet, understandably, awaiting the fi-
nal results of restoration measures will not be an 
appealing prospect for many project developers. 
It will create additional delays. Therefore, one 
might ponder whether adaptive management 
techniques, if attached to a strict monitoring 
protocol, could not provide for a more elegant 
go-between for the inherent contradiction that 
arises in this respect.102 In itself, adaptive man-
agement does not necessarily have to go against 
the precautionary approach laid down by the 
CJEU. Interestingly, the European Commission 
has already pointed to the obvious link between 
mitigation and monitoring in some of its recent 
guidance documents103, whereas Advocate Gen-
eral Kokott herself has already underscored the 
underlying rationale of adaptive management 
in the context of Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
 Directive. In cases where scientific uncertainty 
remains, the Advocate General accepted that it 
must be possible to gain further knowledge of 
the adverse effects by means of associated scien-
tific observation and implementation of the plan 
and project accordingly.104 Likewise, national 
102 P.F.M. Opdam, M.E.A. Broekmeyer and F.H. Kisten-
kas, ‘Identifying Uncertainties in Judging the Signifi-
cance of Human Impacts on Natura 2000-sites’, (2009) 
Environmental Science & Policy 12, pp. 912–921.
103 European Commission, EU Guidance on Wind Ener-
gy Development in Accordance with the EU Nature Leg-
islation (Brussels: 2010) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
nature/natura2000/management/docs/Wind_farms.pdf 
(Accessed 20 June 2015), pp. 83–84.
104 Advocate General Kokott, Landelijke Vereniging tot 
Behoud van de Waddenzee en Nederlandse Vereniging 
tot Bescherming van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Land-
bouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Opinion of 29 January 
2004. 
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case-law reasserts, albeit under strict conditions, 
the use of adaptive management protocol as a 
means to reconcile a rather stringent precaution-
ary approach with harmful new project develop-
ments.105 
The particularity of adaptive management 
in the context of elevated levels of nitrogen de-
position would be that it allows tracking the 
 effective progress of the restoration measures 
on the ground. Thus, it might serve as back-up 
for mitigating measures that have been included 
at permit level. A gradual approach is thinkable 
whereby additional nitrogen emissions are only 
allowed whenever preliminary monitoring re-
sults indicate the effectiveness of the restoration 
measures on the ground. Obviously, the specific 
monitoring conditions and the legal consequenc-
es attached to negative monitoring results need 
to be precisely circumscribed in the planning 
permits in order to comply with the precaution-
ary principle. 
5. The Dutch Programmatic Approach to 
Nitrogen (PAN): A panacea for all ills?
5.1 A more integrated approach to excessive 
nitrogen deposition levels in Natura 2000-sites
In spite of the looming legal uncertainty sur-
rounding the qualification of habitat restoration 
and creation measures in the context of Article 
6(3) of the Habitats Directive, the Dutch govern-
ment was poised to implement a similar ratio-
nale on a more generic level. 
The key insights deduced from the inclusion 
of restoration measures at project-level, are inte-
105 See more extensively: R. Frins and H. Schoukens 
(2014) Balancing wind energy and nature protection: 
from policy conflicts towards genuine sustainable devel-
opment. In L. Squitani, B. Vanheusen, M. Reeze and B. 
Vanheusden (eds.), Sustainable Energy United in Diversity 
– Challenges and Approaches in Energy Transition in the Eu-
ropean Union, (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing: 2014), 
pp. 84–110.
grated in a national program aimed at compre-
hensively addressing the excess of nitrogen depo-
sition in all affected Natura 2000-site. Also some 
of the other above-discussed regulatory tools – 
such as the de minimis-thresholds, the exemption 
for ongoing use and internal off setting practices 
– are partly included in the newly established in-
tegrated approach to  nitrogen, coined Program-
matic Approach Nitrogen (PAN). The PAN entered 
into force on the 1 of July 2015 after several years 
of tense political negotiations.106 With its choice 
for a programmatic approach to the nitrogen 
issue, the Dutch government aims to solve the 
ever-recurring conflict between the strict nature 
protection rules and economic  issues in a more 
lasting manner. 
Given its novelty and its linkages to above-
suggested solutions, a closer analysis of the PAN 
is merited. The core of the PAN, which has a run-
time of (at least) 15 years, is to make preservation 
and restoration of the nature quality possible 
without jeopardizing economic development. 
The PAN, which takes into account an expect-
ed economic growth of 2,5 %, includes binding 
agreements that have made about remedial mea-
sures in the Natura 2000-sites and additional re-
ductions of the nitrogen load from agriculture, 
transport and industry. It is an integral program 
of the Dutch government and the joint provinces, 
which also relies on the cooperation and involve-
ment of many different actors, such as the Asso-
ciation of Dutch Municipalities, the Association 
106 Decision of the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
and the Minister of Infrastructure and Environment of 
10 June 2015 nr. DGAN-NB/15076652 to adopt the Pro-
grammatic Approach Nitrogen, Dutch Official Gazette 29 
June 2015. The Programmatic Approach Nitrogen (final 
version) can be consulted at the following (Dutch) web-
site: http://pas.natura2000.nl/ (Accessed 20 June 2015). 
See also: H. Woldendorp and H. Schoukens, ‘De Pro-
grammatische Aanpak Stikstof (PAS) in Nederland als 
inspiratiebron voor Vlaanderen: pas op de plaats of een 
stap vooruit?’, (2015) Tijdschrift voor Omgevingsrecht en 
Omgevingsbeleid, pp. 320–344.
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of Water Boards, the agricultural and horticul-
tural organisations, the employers’ organisation 
VNO-NCW and the various land management 
organisations. In terms of territorial range, the 
PAN has a wide range, since it includes generic 
reduction measures for all relevant nitrogen pro-
ducing sectors. Most importantly, it specifically 
focuses on the Natura 2000-sites with over-sen-
sitive natural habitats to which specific recovery 
goals are linked. 
In itself, the PAN has a double purpose. Not 
only does it aim to ensure compliance with the 
conservation duties incumbent upon the Nether-
lands for its nitrogen-sensitive Natura 2000-sites 
(cf. infra), it also re-uses the positive nature  effects 
of the reduction efforts in order to create more 
so-called ‘deposition room’ for economic develop-
ment, such as the expansion of industrial facili-
ties and dairy farms. The integrated approach 
rests upon two pillars: (1) reducing point-based 
emissions from agriculture, transport and in-
dustry through on-site measures; (2) reduc-
ing the effects of nitrogen deposition in Natura 
2000-sites through appropriate restoration and 
management measures. The additional reduc-
tion efforts will create some room for economic 
development. To be more precise, 50 % of the ad-
ditional reductions will be returned to economic 
operators as ‘development room’. The restoration 
efforts should, in turn, guarantee that the autho-
rized ongoing nitrogen-emitting activities do not 
further deteriorate the already affected Natura 
2000-sites. 
While the nature management and restora-
tion measures do not as such create additional 
room for development, they do ensure that 
 Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive is complied 
with and that, on the long run, also the achieve-
ment of the conservation goals under Article 
6(1) of the Habitats Directive remains a realistic 
objective. The restoration measures are needed 
since the reduction efforts alone would not suc-
ceeding in stopping the ongoing deterioration in 
many overburdened Natura 2000-sites. 
A significant part of the ‘deposition room’ will 
be turned into ‘development room’ for new eco-
nomic activities and projects, of which the most 
important are outlined in the PAN itself. The re-
maining part of the room for development will 
serve to offset the additional contributions linked 
to autonomous activities, such as the increase of 
motorway traffic. The source-related reduction 
efforts (which are primarily implemented in the 
agricultural sector) and nature management 
measures that are set forth will be used as justifi-
cation for allowing new project developments in 
the vicinity of  Natura 2000-sites.107 
The PAN goes off the beaten track by opt-
ing for a cross-sectoral approach, which tries to 
reduce nitrogen deposition in all relevant societal 
sectors (agriculture, industry and transport) by 
generic source-related measures, that go beyond 
the existing commitments. This should guaran-
tee a further decrease of the levels of nitrogen 
deposition. With the purported restoration mea-
sures, the Dutch government tries to halt the con-
tinuing deterioration of natural habitats in the 
Natura 2000-sites that are affected by atmospher-
ic nitrogen deposition. Such measures might in-
clude measures against acidification by adding 
basic substances and/or restoration of the water 
cycle, the removal of nutrients by excavation, 
dredging, moving, burning or litter removal, … 
and interventions in the vegetal succession by, 
among others, coppice management. If a certain 
effect of nitrogen on this quality can be reduced 
by measures that are themselves not focused on 
nitrogen deposition, such a measure can be char-
acterised as a mitigating measure under the inte-
grated PAN-approach. For this reason, measures 
107 G.C.W. Van der Feltz, ‘Stikstof, recente ontwikke-
lingen in wetgeving en rechtspraak’, (2014) Tijdschrift 
voor Bouwrecht 2014, p. 53.
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aimed at hydrological restoration have, among 
others, gotten a prominent place within the re-
cently established recovery strategies. 
For each separate Natura 2000-site a site-
analysis has been produced, in which the specific 
challenges and possible restoration and man-
agement measures are being enumerated and 
assessed. This site-specific analysis has been sub-
jected to a prior appropriate assessment, while 
also the PAN in its entirety has been assessed in 
the light of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. 
After having outlined the necessary site-related 
recovery measures, the analysis explicitly lays 
down the room for economic development that 
becomes available if these measures are imple-
mented. Within the context of a site-specific 
analysis the beneficial impacts tied to the addi-
tional reductions and management measures are 
balanced with the room for economic develop-
ment. Provided the purported project develop-
ments can be framed in the room for economic 
development which has been assigned by the 
PAN, the analysis will serve as appropriate as-
sessment for these projects. By doing so, it will 
significantly alleviate the administrative burden 
for new plans and projects. 
The latter permit applications will thus no 
longer have to be subject to a comprehensive ap-
propriate assessment. Instead the project propo-
nent is merely required to demonstrate that the 
purported project development can be framed 
within the applicable PAN-approach and the 
associated site-analysis. It is assumed that the 
restoration measures provided for in the area 
analysis will ensure that no further deteriora-
tion of the Natura 2000-site will ensue. The cal-
culation tool AERIUS is crucial in this regard. 
It calculates nitrogen emissions and deposition 
levels for Natura 2000-sites, caused by new or 
expanding economic activity. AERIUS support 
the process of permits being granted for eco-
nomic activities involving nitrogen emissions 
and monitors whether the total nitrogen burden 
will continue to decline.108
Taking into account the measures aimed at 
reducing point based emissions from agricul-
ture, transport and industry, on the one hand, 
and the positive effects of the on-site restoration 
measures, on the other hand, new economic de-
velopment can be allowed, also in the vicinity of 
nitrogen-sensitive Natura 2000-sites. In addition, 
new projects that do not cause a nitrogen deposi-
tion of more than 1 mol nitrogen per hectare on 
a protected habitat are exempted from a prior 
permit requirement109, while also the exemption 
for certain ongoing uses, which has been treated 
above, in section 3.1, remains applicable.
5.2 The programmatic approach as ultimate 
go-between?
In itself, the PAN constitutes a prime example 
of how to reconcile new economic development 
with nature conservation. In 2014, the founda-
tions for a similar approach have also been im-
plemented in Flemish nature conservation law.110 
Its appeal lies in the fact that it allows economic 
development in the context of over-burdened 
Natura 2000-sites at a time when critical levels 
are still exceeded. The latter sites will be subject 
to robust restoration measures, which go beyond 
current management measures. In exchange for 
further reduction and restoration measures, proj-
ect developers are offered more flexibility when 
applying for new project developments. In the 
absence of this shift to more ambitious reduc-
tion and recovery efforts, no room for further 
economic development would be available, at 
108 See also: https://www.aerius.nl/nl (Accessed 20 June 
2015). 
109 Projects and activities that are prone cause an addi-
tional nitrogen deposition between 0,05 and 1 mol on a 
nearby protected habitat will be subject to a prior decla-
ration.
110 Schoukens et al., supra n 56. 
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least not at short-term. However, the Dutch ap-
proach is also not uncontested, especially in view 
of the outcome of the Briels-proceedings. In 2012, 
the Advisory Division of the Dutch Council of 
State issued a very readable Opinion on the PAN, 
in which some interesting points relating to its 
compatibility with the EU nature directives were 
raised.111 
By accepting that part of the ‘nature gains’ 
will not be primarily used to comply with Article 
6(1) of the Habitats Directive – the achievement 
of the favourable conservation status – the Coun-
cil explicitly reasserted the main premise upon 
which the PAN is built. The absence of a con-
crete time schedule in Article 6(1) of the Habitats 
Directive (cf. supra) seems to leave the Member 
States a certain discretion in this regard, as long 
as the achievement of the good conservation sta-
tus is not definitively compromised.
This being the case, the Council voiced ad-
ditional concerns as to the observance of the 
standstill-principle which is enshrined in Article 
6(2) of the Habitats Directive. In its view, it re-
mained uncertain whether the PAN had taken 
into account the deterioration that had taken 
place in between the designation of the Natura 
2000-sites and the entry into force of the PAN. 
Pertaining to Article 6(3) of the Habitats Direc-
tive, the Council principally accepted that both 
the source-related and the area-oriented restora-
tion measure, upon which the room for economic 
development is based, can serve as a mitigation 
at project-level. The Council acknowledged that 
there is a direct and inextricable link between 
the  allocated room for economic development at 
site level and the  additional reduction measures 
that will be implemented within the agricultural 
sector. Still, it stipulated some additional condi-
tions which will have to be observed in order to 
111 Advisory Division of the Dutch Council of State 
(2012) No.W 15.12.0046/IV.
ensure compliance with Article 6(3) of the Habi-
tats Directive. Only if the restoration measures 
are being implemented according to plan, it is 
sufficiently ascertained that the allocated room 
for economic development will not harm the 
integrity of the Natura 2000-sites. In order to 
avoid adverse effects, the Dutch Council of State 
 recommended to allocate the room for additional 
economic development in a gradual manner. 
The 2014 Briels-ruling seems to have com-
pounded matters even further. At first sight, one 
of the basic premises upon which the PAN is 
grounded – i.e. safeguarding the necessary room 
for economic development by, among others, 
anticipating on the effectiveness of purported 
restoration measures – remains dubious at best. 
On the surface, the CJEU seems to dismiss 
approaches to the habitats assessment-test which 
explicitly anticipate on the beneficial effects of 
future habitat creation and restoration measures. 
Thus, by indirectly accepting the effectiveness of 
the restoration measures from beforehand as a 
means to justify the allocation of development 
space, the PAN seems to stand at odds with the 
strict interpretation of the precautionary principle 
as set out by the CJEU in its Briels-ruling. Pursu-
ant to the latter ruling, room for economic devel-
opment should only become available whenever 
the effectiveness of the restoration measures has 
been established. Along the same lines, some au-
thors have pointed to the ambiguity of the exact 
wording of some of the site-specific analyses that 
have been carried out for the involved Natura 
2000-sites.112 Moreover, the implementation of 
additional restoration measures will, in some in-
stances, also give rise to additional ecological im-
pacts. Several natural habitats, such as peatlands, 
do not require further intensive management 
and restoration measures. Hence, the implemen-
tation of restoration measures in order to offset 
112 Frins, supra n 96. 
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future nitrogen emissions might, in the long run, 
lead to even more degraded ecosystems. At any 
rate, whenever the future adequacy of some of 
the restoration measures that are included in the 
site-analyses is openly denounced in the PAN-
related documents and analyses, the PAN will 
indeed fall short of the standards set out by the 
CJEU. In addition, the PAN is also explicitly 
moving away from the traditional approach to 
mitigation, in which ad hoc-restoration measures 
are explicitly linked to a specific project develop-
ment. Even more so, with its reliance on generic 
source based efforts and restoration measures, 
the PAN also no longer provides for an explicit 
link between a plan or project and a collection of 
mitigating measures at site-level. 
5.3 A silver lining?
In spite of the additional difficulties to which the 
Briels-ruling might lead for the further imple-
mentation of the PAN, there could be a silver 
lining to it. 
First, as alluded to above, it could be ar-
gued that the CJEU does not rule out the use 
of restoration measures per se in the context of 
an appropriate assessment. In that regard, it is 
not unimportant to point out that the PAN has 
been preceded by comprehensive ecological re-
search which aimed to scientifically evaluate the 
capabilities for mitigating the adverse effects 
caused by excessive nitrogen deposition levels 
in Natura 2000-sites.113 This research, which is 
ground-breaking in its own right, led to the con-
clusion that, on general grounds, the presented 
management measures are effectively capable of 
offsetting the adverse effects related to elevated 
nitrogen deposition levels. This conclusion is 
further backed up by the site-specific analyses, 
in which the most appropriate restoration mea-
sures are selected and the correlating room for 
113 Smits and Bal, supra n 24. 
economic developments has been enumerated. 
Following that line of reasoning, one might in-
deed contend that the PAN does not allow a sce-
nario to unfold which is similar to the facts that 
led to the Briels-ruling.114 In itself, the PAN is not 
about discounting adverse effects in one part of 
a Natura 2000-site with the positive effects linked 
to restoration measures in another part of the 
 Natura 2000-site. 
The PAN ensures that no deterioration 
takes place over the whole surface of the Natu-
ra 2000-sites that are included in the program. 
Moreover, the additional room for development 
is in itself only linked to the additional reduc-
tion pledges by the relevant economic sectors. In 
addition, the final version of the PAN explicitly 
underlines that every area analysis is based on 
the best scientific knowledge available and that, 
for none of them it can be concluded that seri-
ous doubts remain as to whether the continuing 
deterioration will be halted and the applicable 
conservation objectives will be met.115
Second, the monitoring requirements that 
are linked to the PAN could help in ensuring 
the compatibility of the programmatic approach 
with the EU nature directives. The monitoring 
rules will allow the competent authorities to 
continuously monitor the progress of the imple-
mentation of the PAN but, most importantly, 
will also check the effectiveness of the restoration 
measures and the results linked to the addition-
al reduction measures. If the monitoring results 
would reveal that, in spite of the implemented 
reduction and restoration measures, the ongoing 
deterioration of a Natura 2000-site still continues, 
the competent authorities are  required to revise 
these measures, contemplate additional source-
114 Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Min-
ister of Infrastructure and Environment, Note of Reply, 
1 July 2015, available at http://pas.natura2000.nl/ (Ac-
cessed 20 June 2015), pp. 25–26.
115 PAN, supra n 106, pp. 24–25.
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based or restoration measures or, ultimately, 
temporarily adjust the development room that 
has been allocated for future economic activi-
ties in the immediate surroundings of the Na-
tura 2000-site. Moreover, as a corollary of this 
adaptive management-approach, the room for 
economic activities that are not already explicitly 
enumerated in the PAN, will be allocated in a 
gradual manner. Under the final version of the 
PAN, at maximum 60 % of the economic devel-
opment room will be allocated in the first three 
years after the entry into force of the PAN. Only 
when it can be demonstrated that the restoration 
measures have indeed yielded the predicted 
positive effects, a bigger share of the room for 
economic development can be allocated. 
By and large, the above-listed guarantees, if 
properly implemented, could enable the PAN to 
generally come forward to at least some of the 
above-portrayed concerns. Yet the latter safe-
guards do not take away the risk that some of 
the restoration measures will not yield the ex-
pected positive ecological effects on the ground. 
Moreover, in terms of timing it remains rather 
worrisome that further economic development 
is allowed at a time when the beneficial effects 
of the ecological restoration measures have not 
yet materialized. The soundness of the ecological 
fundamentals upon which the PAN is ground-
ed will therefore be instrumental to ensure the 
legal underpinnings of the PAN. Awaiting the 
first results of the effectiveness of the restoration 
measures, however, new economic activities will 
already be authorized under the PAN-approach. 
Taking into account that no significant reduc-
tion of nitrogen deposition have taken place at 
least in some Dutch Natura 2000-sites during the 
past ten years, this strategy might further under-
mine the ecological quality of at least some of the 
Dutch Natura 2000-site. Admittedly, given the 
allegedly robust ecological underpinnings of the 
PAN, it can be entertained that such a scenario is 
not very likely to unfold. Yet nature is unpredict-
able. Seeing the degraded status of many nitro-
gen-sensitive Natura 2000-sites it is not unrea-
sonable to think that, at least in some instances, 
additional restoration measures are required in 
order to avoid a further decline. 
Obviously, if monitoring result were in-
deed to display a further decline of most Natura 
2000-sites, the basic fundamentals of the PAN 
might quickly evaporate. This will be the case 
whenever the expected decrease of nitrogen de-
position does not see itself translated in the moni-
toring results on the ground. How ever, even as-
suming that the EU and/or national judges would 
reassert the legality of the Dutch adaptive man-
agement approach, it is certainly worth point-
ing out that a more fundamental concern on the 
viability of the PAN is still looming around the 
corner. One of the basic premises of the PAN is to 
re-use the beneficial effects tied to the purported 
restoration measures as a counterbalance for the 
creation of new development space. The mea-
sures should avoid additional significant effects 
to materialize in the first place. Thus, it remains 
to be seen whether restoration measures in the 
context of a degraded Natura 2000-sites can be 
used as leverage for authorizing new economic 
activities while, at the same time, Member States 
are also required to implement measures in order 
to achieve the favorable conservation status for 
the affected natural habitats. In other words, it 
could be entertained that Member States should 
first focus on the implementation of Article 6(1) of 
the Habitats Directive. Only when this obligation 
has been complied with, new room for economic 
development should become available. Under 
the PAN-approach, the beneficial effects linked 
to restoration measures are immediately re-used 
in exchange for further economic expansion. 
The PAN tries to solve this last riddle by 
pointing out that, while the restoration measures 
are indeed primarily seeking to avoid further 
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deterioration, they are also ambitious enough 
to maintain the recovery-path needed to achieve 
the favorable conservation status according to 
Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive. 
6. Conclusion and outlook
Excessive atmospheric nitrogen deposition levels 
represent a major anthropogenic impediment for 
the recovery of many Natura 2000-sites across 
the EU. This paper has demonstrated that, in the 
light of the rigid interpretation of the precaution-
ary principle by the CJEU, national and region-
al permit issuing authorities in many Member 
States are facing increasingly tight margins when 
granting authorizations for plans or projects 
leading to additional nitrogen emissions. Imple-
menting more scrutiny in relation to unsustain-
able economic development would be the obvi-
ous response to the overload of nitrogen that is 
present in our ecosystems. However, accepting a 
so-called ‘degrowth-scenario’ merely in function of 
the much-needed restoration of threatened natu-
ral habitats, probably represents a no go-zone for 
most if not all politicians.
This article sought to address the legal solu-
tions that are capable of better aligning econom-
ic developments with a realization of the EU’s 
ambitious recovery targets for its most valuable 
natural sites. 
In a first tier, the analysis has shown that an 
increasing number of Member States are using 
threshold values in order to further streamline 
the habitats assessment-procedures and alleviate 
the administrative burden for plans and projects 
whose nitrogen emissions are limited in them-
selves. A first conclusion is that such approaches 
might indeed help in objectivizing the appli-
cation of the habitats assessment in nitrogen-
related cases. Still, when applied in a generous 
manner, the use of thresholds remains debatable 
in the light of the preventative approach under-
pinning Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. 
Moreover, exempting ongoing use from a prior 
assessment does not offer a long-term solution 
to the environmental issue of nitrogen surpluses 
in degraded Natura 2000-sites, especially not 
since Member States also have comply with the 
autonomous protection and restoration duties 
set out in Article 6(1) and 6(2) of the Habitats 
Directive. 
A second conclusion is that many of the 
novel regulatory efforts which aim to further 
reconcile economic developments with nitrogen 
mitigation seem to go against the precautionary 
approach laid down by the EU nature directives. 
Newly coined concepts such as ‘nature inclusive 
design’, which is grounded on a more lenient in-
terpretation of the concept of ‘mitigation’ within 
the context Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, 
explicitly anticipate on the positive effects of hab-
itat creation and restoration measures. This ar-
ticle sought to demonstrate that that, taking into 
consideration the outcome of the recent Briels-
proceedings before the CJEU, a more generous 
reading of the habitats assessment-rules will be 
harder to sustain in the coming years. Whereas 
not all room for leverage has disappeared with 
the 2014 Briels-ruling, the lack of conclusive evi-
dence on the effectiveness of restoration mea-
sures for over-burdened natural habitats will 
probably represent the most formidable obstacle 
to a more flexible approach to the EU nature 
 directives. At any rate, the CJEU has steadfastly 
refused to let go its strict interpretation of the 
precautionary principle in the context of Article 
6(3) of the Habitats Directive. At the same time 
offsetting possible environmental damage with 
reduction efforts that have been achieved in  other 
permitted operations, while not being ruled out 
by the Briels-ruling, only has limited potential in 
the context of the habitats assessment-obligation 
given the additional strict requirements that 
have to be complied with.
Which bring us to a third and final conclu-
Hendrik Schoukens: Atmospheric Nitrogen Deposition and the Habitats Directive:  
Tinkering with the Law in the Face of the Precautionary Principle?
57
sion. The Dutch programmatic approach (PAN), 
which entered into force in July 2015, is to be wel-
comed as a more sensible and long-term solu-
tion to the problem of excessive nitrogen deposi-
tion for affected Natura 2000-sites. By utilizing 
comprehensive source-related reductions and 
site-linked restoration measures as a means to 
underpin the creation of new room for economic 
development, it may have struck a right balance 
between economic development and nature con-
servation. However, this article has emphasized 
that, especially taking into account the outcome 
of the Briels-ruling, it will be paramount to safe-
guard that the room for economic development 
is not abused to allow further economic expan-
sion in a context where the Natura 2000-sites 
are facing a continuous decline. Much, if not all, 
will depend on the soundness of the ecological 
underpinnings of the PAN. The robust moni-
toring package, which is included in the PAN, 
is designed to avert a worst case-scenario. Yet, 
while the Dutch approach should certainly be 
credited for having struck a common ground 
 between economic development and nature 
conservation, its application on the ground will 
be determinative for its survival in the long run. 
If monitoring results were to reveal an increase 
of nitrogen deposition levels, possibly due to a 
more lenient implementation of the additional 
source-reduction measures or the limited results 
of the restoration efforts, the legal underpinnings 
of the PAN would quickly evaporate. Ultimately, 
the Dutch PAN-approach could still be criticized 
for not having implemented the more evident 
response to excessive nitrogen deposition levels 
in Natura 2000-sites. Such a solution would con-
sist in maintaining strict permit policies pend-
ing the implementation of the reduction and 
restoration measure. Only if the results on the 
ground were to indicate a decrease of nitrogen 
deposition levels and a recovery of the affected 
habitats, more leniency at permit level should be 
allowed. Instead the PAN has opted for a more 
pragmatic approach, by allowing a direct trade-
off between future restoration efforts and short-
term economic development. 
In conclusion, and returning to the paper’s 
title, tinkering with the law might be part of the 
short-term solution for overcoming economic 
paralysis due to strict nature protection rules. 
However, as long as the latter approaches are 
not backed up by genuine and effective efforts 
to restore degraded Natura 2000-sites in the first 
place, they will fail to deliver long-term relief for 




Åtgärdsprogrammens funktion vid länsstyrelsernas  
prövningar och tillsyn av vattenverksamheter
Anna Christiernsson*
1. Inledning
Genom antagandet av Europaparlamentets och 
rådets direktiv 2000/60/EG av den 23 oktober 
2000 om upprättandet av en ram för gemenska-
pens åtgärder på vattenpolitikens område (nedan 
”Ramvattendirektivet”) skapades ett rättsligt 
ramverk för en avrinningsområdes-baserad för-
valtning av vatten inom hela den Europeiska 
Unionen.1 Ett av direktivens syften är att uppnå 
en god ytvattenstatus senast år 2015 i staternas 
inlandsvatten, övergångsvatten och kustvatten.2 
Detta syfte ska nås genom att medlemsstaterna i 
cykler om sex år genomför en s.k. adaptiv plane-
ring.3 En viktig del av denna adaptiva planering 
är fastställandet och genomförandet av åtgärds-
program.4
I Sverige antogs de nu gällande åtgärdspro-
grammen år 2009. Av dessa följer att markavvatt-
ning och annan vattenverksamhet i stora delar av 
1  För en beskrivning av direktivet, se exempelvis Eke-
lund Entson och Gipperth (2010). Mot samma miljömål. Im-
plementeringen av EU:s ramdirektiv för vatten i Skandinavien, 
särskilt s. 15–28 samt Olsen Lundh (2014). Four points on 
point four. Implementing environmental quality stan-
dards in Sweden. Scandinavian Studies in Law. Volym 59, 
s. 319–349.
2 Andra mål gäller grundvatten, skyddade områden och 
icke-försämring. Det finns ett antal undantag från denna 
övergripande målsättning, bland annat möjligheterna att 
förlänga tidpunkten för uppfyllandet. 
3 Se mer om direktivets adaptiva planering i t.ex. Mi-
chanek och Christiernsson (2014). “Adaptive Manage-
ment of EU Marine Ecosystems – About Time to Include 
Fishery.” Scandinavian Studies in Law, 59, s. 206–221. 
4 Åtgärdsprogram ska upprättas för varje avrinnings-
distrikt (fem i Sverige) om det krävs för att uppfylla miljö-
kvalitetsnormer. 
Abstract 
According to the programmes of measures, estab-
lished in 2009 to implement the requirements of the 
Water Framework Directive, the Swedish County 
Administrative Boards (CBAs) were obliged to 
review and regulate water operations to achieve 
a good status in Swedish waters. This study how-
ever shows that the programmes of measures have 
had virtually no effect on the decision-making of 
CBAs. The programmes have for example had no 
effect on the outcome of permits and other deci-
sions on ditching operations. Moreover, few CBAs 
have applied for reviews of old water permits or 
taken other concrete measures to achieve a good 
status, despite the fact that a large number of water 
operations have never been tried under the Envi-
ronmental Code. The lack of efficiency of the pro-
grammes in steering decision-making of CBAs can 
be explained by the legal context in which the pro-
grammes are formulated and implemented. To im-
prove the function of the programmes of measures 
in steering decision-making towards a good status 
of Swedish waters and to fully implement EU-law, 
several amendments in the Swedish legislation are 
therefore necessary.
* Anna Christiernsson (jur. dr) är forskare vid Havs-
miljöinstitutet, Göteborgs Universitet. Artikeln utgör ett 
delarbete inom forskningsprojektet ”A System Perspec-
tives on Environmental Quality Standards” (SPEQS), 
finansierat av Naturvårdsverket. Författaren tackar Gab-
riel Michanek (Juridiska fakulteten, Uppsala Universi-
tet) samt anonym granskare för värdefulla kommentarer. 
Eventuella kvarstående felaktigheter ska dock endast till-
skrivas författaren.
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landet orsakar fysiska förändringar och övergöd-
ning som motverkar uppfyllandet av målet om 
en god ekologisk status i ytvatten. Av denna an-
ledning anger åtgärdsprogrammen att tillstånds-
pliktiga vattenverksamheter som riskerar att på-
verka vattenmiljön ska ses över och vid behov 
omprövas, särskilt i områden där en god status 
inte uppnås, eller riskerar att inte uppnås.5 An-
svaret för denna åtgärd ligger på länsstyrelserna. 
Syftet med denna artikel är att analysera 
och diskutera vilken roll åtgärdsprogrammen 
har haft i länsstyrelsernas arbete med vatten-
verksamheter under perioden 2009–2014. För att 
uppnå detta syfte har tre olika fallstudier genom-
förts.
• Den första fallstudien omfattar länsstyrelser-
nas återrapporteringar mellan 2010 och 2014. 
Syftet med fallstudien är att undersöka i vil-
ken utsträckning länsstyrelserna själva har 
rapporterat att de har arbetat med åtgärd 28 i 
åtgärdsprogrammen, som bl.a. anger att läns-
styrelserna ska göra en översyn och vid behov 
verka för omprövning av befintliga tillstånds-
pliktiga vattenverksamheter (avsnitt 2.2). 
• I den andra fallstudien undersöks länsstyrel-
sernas tillsynsplaner. Syftet med fallstudien är 
att undersöka om åtgärdsprogrammen nämns 
som ett styrdokument för länsstyrelsernas till-
synsarbete vad gäller vattenverksamheter i 
tillsynsplanerna (avsnitt 2.3). 
• I en tredje fallstudie analyseras rättstillämp-
ning i fråga om markavvattning i tre län. Syftet 
med fallstudien är att undersöka om åtgärds-
programmen och/eller miljökvalitetsnormer 
haft någon betydelse för utfallet i tillstånds- 
och dispensprövningar av markavvattning el-
ler vid tillsynen av dikesrensningar (avsnitt 3). 
5 Se åtgärd 28. Denna beskrivs närmare i avsnitt 2.2. 
Avslutningsvis diskuteras kortfattat förslaget till 
de nya åtgärdsprogrammen (avsnitt 4) samt be-
hov av rättsliga förändringar för att öka åtgärds-
programmens effektivitet i att styra mot en god 
status i svenska vatten (avsnitt 5).
2. Åtgärdsrapportering och tillsynsplaner 
2.1 Bakgrund 
I december 2009 beslutades om de första sexåriga 
åtgärdsprogrammen.6 Dessa gäller fram till de-
cember 2015. Åtgärdsprogrammen utgör som 
beskrevs ovan en del av den adaptiva vattenför-
valtningen.7 Åtgärdsprogrammen ska innehålla 
de åtgärder som behövs för att miljökvalitetsnor-
mer ska följas. Åtgärdsprogrammens funktion 
med att fördela miljökrav mellan olika påver-
kansfaktorer är viktig, eftersom miljökvalitets-
normer i sig inte säger något om vem eller hur 
den önskade miljökvaliteten ska nås.8 
De nu antagna programmen riktar sig till 
myndigheter och kommuner och åtgärderna, 
såväl styrmedel som fysiska åtgärder, har speci-
ficerats för kommuner samt olika nationella och 
regionala myndigheter, däribland länsstyrelser-
na.9 Det är med andra ord kommunerna och de 
6 Se Vattenmyndigheten Bottenhavet (2009). Åtgärdspro-
grammet för Bottenhavets vattendistrikt 2009–2015, Vatten-
myndigheten Bottenviken (2009). Åtgärdsprogram Botten-
vikens vattendistrikt 2009–2015, Vattenmyndigheten Norra 
Östersjön (2009). Åtgärdsprogrammet för Norra Östersjöns 
vattendistrikt 2009–2015, Vattenmyndigheten Södra Öster-
sjön (2009). Åtgärdsprogrammet för Södra Östersjöns vatten-
distrikt 2009–2015 och Vattenmyndigheten Västerhavet 
(2009). Åtgärdsprogrammet för Västerhavet 2009–2015.
7 5 kap. 4 § 1 st. MB och 6 kap. 1 § förordning (2004:660) 
om förvaltning av kvaliteten på vattenmiljön (nedan 
”vattenförvaltningsförordningen”). 
8 För en teoretisk diskussion om rättslig operationalise-
ring av miljökvalitetsnormer, se Gipperth (1999). Miljö-
kvalitetsnormer – En rättsvetenskaplig studie i regelteknik för 
operationalisering av miljömål. Akademisk doktorsavhand-
ling, Uppsala Universitet. 
9 Programmen är med andra ord inte direkt bindande 
för enskilda och utgör förvaltningsbeslut utan myndig-
hetsutövning mot enskilda (och behöver och kan där-
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utpekade myndigheterna som ska genomföra 
de åtgärder som behövs enligt åtgärdsprogram-
men.10 En av dessa åtgärder är åtgärd 28, som 
anger att länsstyrelserna ska;
”göra en översyn och vid behov verka för 
omprövning av befintliga tillståndspliktiga verk-
samheter, enligt 9 och 11 kap. miljöbalken, vilka 
kan ha en inverkan på vattenmiljön, särskilt i om-
råden med vattenförekomster som inte uppnår, 
eller riskerar att inte uppnå, god ekologisk status 
eller god kemisk status”.11
Länsstyrelserna ska med andra ord dels 
skaffa sig kunskap om vilka befintliga tillstånds-
pliktiga vattenverksamheter som behöver om-
prövas, dels initiera omprövningar när det finns 
behov med anledning av kemisk eller ekologisk 
status. Den enda vägledningen åtgärdsprogram-
met ger är att områden med vattenförekomster 
som inte uppnår eller riskerar att inte uppnå en 
god ekologisk eller kemisk status ska prioriteras. 
Ett stort antal vattenförekomster faller in under 
denna kategori. Åtgärden måste också genom-
föras inom ramen för de befogenheter länsstyrel-
serna har enligt gällande rätt. 
Att länsstyrelserna har det operativa till-
synsansvaret för vattenverksamheter (såväl till-
ståndspliktiga som icke-tillståndspliktiga) följer 
av miljötillsynsförordningen.12 Tillsynsinstru-
mentet innebär bland annat att länsstyrelserna 
på eget initiativ eller efter anmälan ska ”i nöd-
vändig utsträckning kontrollera efterlevnaden 
av miljöbalken samt föreskrifter, domar och 
andra beslut som har meddelats med stöd av 
balken samt vidta de åtgärder som behövs för 
att åstadkomma rättelse”.13   
med inte överklagas). Se diskussionerna kring detta i 
SOU 2005:113, Åtgärdsprogram för miljökvalitetsnormer, 
särskilt, s. 75 och 131–144.
10 5 kap. 8 § MB. 
11 Det finns ytterligare åtgärder som riktar sig till läns-
styrelserna i programmen (se åtgärd 29–31). 
12 2 kap. 29 § p. 2 MB. 
13 26 kap. 1 § 2 st. MB. 
För att uppnå tillsynens syfte kan föreläg-
gande och förbud användas.14 Det kan t.ex. 
handla om att förelägga en verksamhetsutövare 
att omhänderta rensmassor vid dikesrensning på 
ett sätt så att inte värdefulla biotoper skadas, att 
minimera läckage av näringsämnen vid grävning 
eller förbud mot fortsatt verksamhet.15 Bestäm-
melsen är omfattande och gäller all verksamhet 
som omfattas av miljöbalken.16 Föreläggande 
 eller förbud får dock inte begränsa ett beslut 
eller en tillståndsdom som har rättskraft enligt 
24 kap. 1 § MB.17 Ett antal domar från mark- och 
miljööverdomstolen har klarlagt att tillsynsmyn-
digheten kan förelägga vattenverksamheter som 
bedrivs med stöd av urminnes hävd eller privi-
legiebrev att söka tillstånd enligt miljöbalken.18 
Domarna är dock omdiskuterade och frågan har 
ännu inte prövats av Högsta Domstolen.19
14 26 kap. 9 § 1 st. MB. Syftet med tillsynen är att säker-
ställa att miljöbalkens mål nås (26 kap. 1 § 1 st. MB).
15 Mer ingripande åtgärder än vad som är nödvändigt i 
enskilda fallet får inte tillgripas. 26 kap. 9 § 2 st. MB.
16 Se t.ex. M 2893-10 (2011-02-08) (Brickegården) där 
Mark- och miljööverdomstolen (MÖD) uttryckte att 
26 kap. 9 § gäller all verksamhet som regleras i miljöbal-
ken oavsett om den förelagda åtgärden är tillståndsplik-
tig eller inte. 
17 26 kap. 9 § 3 st. MB. Detta gäller inte om verksam-
hetsutövaren bedriver verksamhet som inte omfattas av 
domen eller beslutet. Det finns också möjligheter att före-
lägga i brådskande fall om det t.ex. finns risk för allvarlig 
skada eller för säkerhetshöjande åtgärder vid damm, se 
26 kap. 9 § 4 st. MB.
18 MÖD 2012:26, MÖD 2012:27 och MÖD 2012:28. Läns-
styrelsen hade förelagt om förbud att bedriva verksam-
het, vilket ansågs för ingripande. Domstolen uttryckte att 
länsstyrelsen istället skulle, med stöd av 26 kap. 9 § MB, 
förelägga verksamhetsutövaren att ansöka om tillstånd 
för verksamheten. Urminnes hävd och privilegiebrev 
kan med andra ord enligt domarna inte likställas med 
tillstånd enligt miljöbalken.
19 Ett flertal författare har diskuterat frågan. Se bland an-
nat Strömberg (2014). Urminnes hävd och vattenrätten 
– några synpunkter. Nordisk Miljörättslig Tidskrift, 2014:2, 
s. 95–99, Olsen Lund (2013). Tvenne gånger tvenne rutt-
na gärdesgårdar – Om urminnes hävd och vattenkraft. 
Nordisk Miljörättslig Tidskrift, 2013:2, s. 85–108 samt Lind-
qvist (2013). Privilegiebrev och urminnes hävd – Vilken 
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I tillsynsansansvaret ingår också att pröva 
om villkor i tillstånd till vattenverksamheter är 
tillräckliga eller inte.20 Myndigheten ska ta upp 
frågan om att ändra eller upphäva villkor.21 
Förutsättningar för när detta är möjligt finns 
i 24 kap. 5 §. En av grunderna för att ompröva 
tillstånd samt ändra eller upphäva villkor är att 
verksamheten med någon betydelse medverkar 
till att en miljökvalitetsnorm inte följs.22 Det räck-
er i detta fall inte med enbart en risk för att en 
miljökvalitetsnorm inte följs.23 En omprövning 
får emellertid inte medföra att verksamheten inte 
längre kan bedrivas eller avsevärt försvåras.24 I 
så fall måste bestämmelserna om återkallelse i 
24 kap. 3 § användas, t.ex. när detta krävs för att 
förpliktelser som följer av Ramvattendirektivet 
ska kunna efterlevas, om verksamheten upp-
hört (t.ex. övergivna markavvattningsföretag el-
ler vattenkraftverk) eller om underhållet av en 
vatten anläggning har försummats allvarligt.25 
Länsstyrelsen ska också föra talan i ansöknings-
mål för att tillvarata miljöintressen och andra all-
männa intressen, när så behövs.26
2.2 Genomförandet av åtgärd 28
Av myndigheternas återrapportering mellan 
2010 och 2013 framgår vad länsstyrelserna själva 
rapporterat om sitt arbete med genomförandet 
ställning har de enligt miljöbalken? Nordisk Miljörättslig 
Tidskrift, 2013:1, s. 39–50.
20 26 kap. 1 § 2 st. och 26 kap. 2 § 2 st. MB. Vad som är till-
räckligt ska bedömas med utgångspunkt i miljöbalkens 
mål och allmänna hänsynsregler, se prop. 2001/02:65, 
s. 85. 
21 26 kap. 2 § 2 st. MB. 
22 24 kap. 5 § p. 2 MB.
23 Denna samt övriga grunder kan användas innan tio 
år förflutit. När tio år förflutit behövs ingen av de speci-
fika grunderna vara uppfyllda (se p. 1). 
24 24 kap. 5 § 5 st. MB. Det finns också en begränsning 
i hur stor förlust en vattenverksamhetsutövare ska tåla. 
Som huvudregel ligger denna på 5 procent. 
25 24 kap. 3 § MB, se punkterna 5, 7 och 8. 
26 22 kap 6 § MB. 
av åtgärd 28.27 Sammanfattningsvis kan konsta-
teras att de flesta länsstyrelserna över åren på 
olika sätt arbetat med den översyn av vatten-
verksamheter som ska genomföras enligt åtgärd 
28, men att den faktiska tillsynen och ompröv-
ningarna är begränsade. Rapporteringarna visar 
på en ökad omfattning av tillsynsarbetet med 
vattenkraftverk, dammar och regleringar under 
2012. Av återrapporteringarna framgår att detta 
var en konsekvens av ett särskilt regleringsbrev. 
I praktiken sker dock endast en liten del av till-
synen på eget initiativ.28 Rapporteringarna visar 
också att allt fler länsstyrelser börjar tillämpa ett 
avrinningsperspektiv i tillsynen av vattenverk-
samheter mot slutet av förvaltningsperioden, 
bland annat genom ökat samarbete mellan olika 
länsstyrelser. Även i detta fall fanns ett särskilt 
regleringsbrev om detta enligt återrapportering-
arna. Resursbrist och tidskrävande juridiska 
processer, utan tydlig praxis och vägledning, tas 
upp som orsaker till att få konkreta åtgärder har 
genomförts under tidsperioden. Även otydlighet 
i ansvaret i vattenförvaltningen anses motverka 
genomförandet av åtgärd 28.
Det bristande genomförandet av konkreta 
åtgärder, t.ex. vad gäller omprövningar, som kan 
utläsas av myndigheternas egna rapporteringar, 
framgår också av andra studier. I en studie av 
länsstyrelsen i Värmland från 2012 framgår att 
endast ca 2,4 % (ca 90 av 3 700) av tillståndsgiv-
na vattenkraftverk och dammar har omprövats 
27 Det finns ingen återrapportering för 2014. 
28 I mailkonversation med handläggare på länsstyrelsen 
i Kalmar framgår t.ex. att länsstyrelsen i Kalmar i dags-
läget inte har någon planerad egeninitierad tillsyn. Se 
även Sportfiskarna (2013). Undersökning av tillsyn av vat-
tenverksamheter. Rapport 2013:01. Studien visar att 11 av 
16 länsstyrelser till största del arbetar med inkommande 
anmälningar och 4 av 16 enbart med inkommande an-
mälningar. 
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med hänsyn till fisk- och naturvård.29 Flest om-
prövningar skedde under perioden mellan 1996 
och 2005, d.v.s. långt innan åtgärdsprogrammen 
trädde ikraft. I vattenverksamhetsutredningens 
senaste betänkande anges att Kammarkollegiet 
utför merparten av de omprövningar som sker 
(i genomsnitt 4,5 tillstånd per år).30 Kammar-
kollegiet har inget utpekat ansvar för ompröv-
ningar i åtgärdsprogrammen. 
Sammantaget visar återrapporteringen 
att det finns ett stort behov av tillsyn och om-
prövningar och att det finns mycket kvar att 
göra. Återrapporteringarna talar för att över-
synen av vattenverksamheter är en konsekvens 
av åtgärdsprogrammen. När det däremot gäl-
ler konkreta åtgärder visar återrapporteringen 
att det är en rad andra faktor som får betydelse 
för genomförandet, inte minst resurstillgång, 
instruktioner samt regleringsbrev. Det faktum 
att Kammarkollegiet, som inte har något utpekat 
ansvar enligt åtgärdsprogrammen att ompröva 
vattenverksamheter, är mest aktiv i att initiera 
omprövningar visar också att andra faktorer än 
åtgärdsprogrammen i sig (hittills) haft större 
inverkan på myndigheternas arbete. Slutsatsen 
om åtgärdsprogrammens begränsade funktion 
är emellertid inte oväntad givet programmens 
vaga utformning och bristen på vägledning, i 
kombination med att länsstyrelserna uppfattar 
ansvarsfördelningen som otydlig, de juridiska 
prövningarna som komplexa och resurserna som 
är alltför knappa.31 
29 Se Länsstyrelsen Värmland (2012), Omprövning av vat-
tendomar – Möjlig indikator för miljömålet Levande sjöar och 
vattendrag, 2012:13. De flesta omprövningarna har ge-
nomförts inom Västerhavets vattendistrikt.
30 Mellan 2007 och 2011 ansökte Kammarkollegiet om 
omprövning i 22 ärenden. Se SOU 2014:35, I vått och torrt 
– förslag till ändrade vattenrättsliga regler, s. 270. 
31 Se kommissionens kritik av Sveriges åtgärdsprogram 
i bl.a. Kommissionen (2012). Rapport från Kommissionen 
till Europaparlamentet och Rådet om genomförandet av ram-
direktivet för vatten (2000/60/EG). Förvaltningsplaner för 
avrinningsdistrikten. KOM(2012) 670 final samt Kommis-
2.3 Tillsynsplaner 
Ytterligare ett sätt analysera åtgärdsprogram-
mens betydelse för länsstyrelsernas tillsynsarbe-
te är att undersöka i vilken utsträckning åtgärds-
programmen nämns som viktiga styrdokument 
i länsstyrelsernas tillsynsplaner för arbetet med 
vattenverksamheter. Av denna anledning har till-
synsplanerna för Östergötlands län (2014–2016), 
Västmanlands län (2015–2017), Västra Götalands 
län (2014–2016) och Jönköpings län (2015–2017) 
granskats.32 
Sammanfattningsvis kan konstateras att åt-
gärdsprogrammen endast utgör ett av många 
styrande (eller vägledande) dokument som 
nämns i de granskade tillsynsplanerna. I en av 
planerna nämns programmen inte alls,33 i andra 
fall nämns bara det aktuella åtgärdsprogrammet 
och/eller de åtgärder för vilka länsstyrelserna an-
svar för utan några förtydliganden.34 Åtgärds-
programmen nämns oftare och mer utförligt i 




Markavvattning, däribland olika former av dik-
ningar, är en vattenverksamhet som kan påverka 
vattenkvaliteten negativt. I Sverige har mark-
avvattningen under de senaste 100 åren varit 
omfattande, vilket har lett till att viktiga ekolo-
sionen (2015). Meddelande från Kommissionen till Europa-
parlamentet och Rådet. Ramdirektivet för vatten och översväm-
ningsdirektivet: åtgärder för att nå ”god status” för EU:s vatten 
och minska översvämningsriskerna. KOM(2015) 120 final. 
32 Urvalet har avgränsats till de tillsynsplaner som har 
hittats via länsstyrelsernas websidor under hösten 2015.
33 Detta gäller Östergötlands läns tillsynsplan. Här 
nämns endast miljökvalitetsnormer i samband med 
miljö farlig verksamhet som påverkar normer för vatten 
som riskerar att inte följas. Tillsyn av utsläpp ska priori-
teras enligt planen. 
34 Se t.ex. Västmanlands och Västra Götalands läns till-
synsplaner. 
35 Se t.ex. i Jönköpings läns tillsynsplan. 
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giska och vattenhushållande funktioner försäm-
rats eller helt försvunnit, inte minst genom att 
våtmarker minskat kraftigt.36 Markavvattning, 
men också, som huvudregel icke tillståndsplik-
tiga dikesrensningar, kan t.ex. leda till en ökad 
transport av näringsämnen, att olika djur- och 
växtarters reproduktionsplatser förstörs eller att 
vandringshinder för fisk- och andra vattenlevan-
de arter uppstår. Effekten kvarstår normalt under 
mycket lång tid. Markavvattning kan med andra 
ord leda till och förvärra problem med bland an-
nat övergödning och fysiska förändringar och 
därmed hindra eller försvåra att olika miljömål 
och miljökvalitetsnormer nås, däribland normer 
om en god ekologisk status. Markavvattning är 
därmed en av de vattenverksamheter som faller 
in under åtgärd 28 i åtgärdsprogrammen.37 
3.2 Reglerna om tillstånds- och dispens-
prövning av markavvattning 
Enligt miljöbalken avses med markavvattning en 
åtgärd med syfte att varaktig öka markens lämp-
lighet för ett visst ändamål.38 Dikning för att öka 
produktiviteten inom jord- eller skogsbruket är 
36 Se mer om bakgrund, motiv samt miljöpåverkan av 
markavvattning i t.ex. SOU 2014:35, I vått och torrt – förslag 
till ändrade vattenrättsliga regler, s. 319–321 samt 335–338, 
Naturvårdsverket (2009), Markavvattning och rensning. En 
handbok för tillämpning av bestämmelserna i 11 kapitlet miljö-
balken (Handbok 2009:5), s. 51–52 och Naturvårdsverket 
(2012), Steg på vägen – Fördjupad utvärdering av miljömålen 
2012, s. 387.
37 I åtgärdsprogrammen från 2009 nämns markavvatt-
ning och dikning som ett problem när det gäller både 
övergödning och fysiska förändringar. Se Åtgärds-
programmet för Norra Östersjöns vattendistrikt (s. 15 och 
46), Södra Östersjöns vattendistrikt (s. 25, 34 och 38–39), Åt-
gärdsprogram Bottenvikens vattendistrikt (s. 22 och 38–39), 
Åtgärdsprogrammet för Bottenhavets vattendistrikt (s. 43) och 
Åtgärdsprogrammet för Västerhavets vattendistrikt (s. 42). 
38 11 kap. 2 § 4 p. MB. I Naturvårdsverkets handbok 
(2009) föreslås vilka typer av åtgärder som bör och inte 
betraktas som markavvattning enligt miljöbalken (s. 12–
13).
ett exempel.39 När en åtgärd är att betrakta som 
markavvattning i miljöbalkens mening krävs 
alltid tillstånd.40 Ansökan om tillstånd till mark-
avvattning prövas av länsstyrelsen,41 som också 
har det operativa tillsynsansvaret för mark-
avvattning.42 Undantagsregeln om att tillstånd 
inte behövs om det är uppenbart att varken all-
männa eller enskilda intressen skadas, gäller inte 
markavvattning.43
Regeringen får även förbjuda tillståndsplik-
tig markavvattning ”i områden där det är särskilt 
angeläget att våtmarkerna bevaras”.44 Så har ock-
så skett i vissa delar av landet (detta gäller bland 
annat i södra och mellersta Sverige). I dessa fall 
måste dispens sökas hos länsstyrelsen, som en-
dast får meddelas om ”särskilda skäl” förelig-
ger.45 Enligt förarbetena ska dispensen utnyttjas 
restriktivt och bedömning av vad som utgör 
särskilda skäl ska ske mot bakgrund av intres-
set att bevara de återstående våtmarkerna inom 
det aktuella området.46 Om länsstyrelsen beviljar 
dispens, ska tillstånd enligt 11 kap. 9 § miljöbal-
ken sökas.47 Med anledning av markavvattning-
39 Enligt SOU 2009:24 Vattenverksamhet, är dikningar 
inom jord- och skogsbruket vanligast (s. 126). 
40 11 kap. 13 § MB. För täckdikning med dräneringsrör 
som har en största diameter av 300 millimeter krävs dock 
endast tillstånd om det är sannolikt att allmänna eller 
enskilda intressen skadas genom verksamheten enligt 
2 st. Tillståndsplikten omfattar inte s.k. skyddsdikningar 
inom skogsbruket. Samråd kan dock krävas och även 
 dikesrensningar inom skogsmark som kan påverka fiske 
omfattas av anmälningsplikten i miljöbalken (se nedan).
41 11 kap. 9b § MB. Ansökan om tillstånd till markavvatt-
ning prövas av länsstyrelsen, om den inte skall prövas 
av mark- och miljödomstolen enligt 7 kap. 19 eller 20 § 
lagen (1998:812) med särskilda bestämmelser om vatten-
verksamhet.
42 2 kap. 29 § p. 2 MB (se avsnitt 2). Naturvårdsverket 
har tillsynsvägledningsansvaret för markavvattning en-
ligt 3 kap. 2 och 5 §§ miljötillsynsförordningen.
43 11 kap. 12 § 2 st. MB. 
44 11 kap. 14 § MB. 
45 11 kap. 14 § MB.
46 Prop. 1997/98:45, s. 136. 
47 11 kap. 14 § 3 st. MB. 
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ens negativa miljöpåverkan är med andra ord 
idag markavvattning tillståndspliktig eller som 
huvudregel förbjuden. Ett stor antal diken har 
dock aldrig prövats enligt miljöbalkens regler.48
Från tillståndsplikten är dock dikesrensning-
ar undantagna, så länge som rensningar sker för 
att ”bibehålla vattnets djup eller läge eller ome-
delbart återställa ett vattendrag som har vikit sig 
från sitt förra läge eller som på något annat sätt 
har förändrat sitt lopp”,49 trots att rensning kan 
få långtgående effekter på miljön.50 En fråga som 
uppstår är därför vilket djup och läge som ska 
utgöra det tillåtliga, utan att tillstånd krävs. I en 
dom från mark- och miljödomstolen anger dom-
stolen att bedömningen ska utgå från vad som 
var den senaste lagliga nivån.51 Om ett tillstånd 
anger ett visst djup och läge men rensning sedan 
inneburit en laglig fördjupning (som inte krävde 
tillstånd) är det den senare (djupare) nivån som 
utgör den till vilken rensning kan ske utan att till-
ståndsplikten aktualiseras. Om rensningen kan 
leda till skada på fisket,52 i diket eller nedströms, 
ska en anmälan om de planerade arbetena gö-
ras till länsstyrelsen innan arbetena påbörjas.53 
48 SOU 2014:35, I vått och torrt – förslag till ändrade vatten-
rättsliga regler, s. 321. 
49 11 kap. 15 § 1 st. MB. Bestämmelsen härstammar från 
2 kap. 36 § ÄVL och 4 kap. 3 § VL.
50 Rensningar kan t.ex. leda till grumling av vatten (även 
efter rensningen), att hårdbottnar som är viktiga för bot-
tenfauna och fisk grävs bort och att den naturliga varia-
tionen av livsmiljöer minskar i diket. Ytterligare nega-
tiva effekter kan uppstå om rensningen också innebär 
att skuggande träd och buskar i strandkanten tas bort. 
Se t.ex. Naturvårdsverket (2004), Miljöhänsyn vid dikes-
rensningar, s. 1.
51 Se mark- och miljödomstolens mål M 857-08, 2008-
10-06.
52 Med fiske avses såväl fiske i enskilt som allmänt 
vatten samt fritidsfiske som yrkesmässigt fiske. Prop. 
1997/98:45, del 2, s. 138.
53 11 kap. 15 § 3 st. MB. Anmälningsskyldigheten gäl-
ler även vid utförandet av de underhållsåtgärder man 
är skyldig att genomföra. Sep prop. 1981/82:130, s. 432ff. 
Länsstyrelsen kan då förelägga om försiktighets-
mått.54 
Om ett s.k. ”nytt naturtillstånd” inträtt kan 
tillstånd för rensningen ändock behövas.55 Ett nytt 
naturtillstånd kan inträda om lång tid förflutit 
mellan rensningarna och flora och fauna föränd-
rats i diket eller det område diket avvattnar.56Av 
rättspraxis följer att ett nytt naturtillstånd som 
huvudregel innebär att det krävs tillstånd för 
markavvattning när anläggningen inte har till-
ståndsprövats. I sådana fall kan också länssty-
relsen förelägga om förbud mot rensningen för 
att skydda det nya naturtillståndet. Däremot har 
rätten att rensa ansetts kvarstå trots att ett nytt 
naturtillstånd har uppträtt om anläggningen är 
tillståndsprövad, så länge som rätten inte har 
återkallats eller kan anses ha förfallit.57 
54 Se ovan. Länsstyrelsen ger också ut råd för dikesrens-
ningar. 
55 I förarbetena till miljöbalken anges att om en föränd-
ring har fått bestående karaktär krävs normalt tillstånd 
för rensningen, om inte annat följer av 12 §. Se prop. 
1997/98:45, del 2, s. 137. 
56 I förarbetena förs en diskussion om hur lång tid som 
får ha förflutit mellan rensningarna utan att ett tillstånd 
behöver inhämtas. Se dock not 58.
57 I MÖD 2007:32 prövades en anmälan av rensning av 
ett sänkningsföretag som ville utföra underhållsrensning 
av en å för att förbättra vattenavledningsförmågan hos de 
närliggande markerna. Sänkningsföretaget hade tillstånd 
enligt 1879 års lag om dikning och annan avledning av 
vatten och tillståndet var därmed att jämställa med ett till-
stånd enligt miljöbalken (se 5 § miljöbalkens promulga-
tionslag). Länsstyrelsen menade att ett nytt naturtillstånd 
hade inträtt och att sänkningsföretaget var övergivet (det 
hade inte skett några rensningar under 80 år) och förbjöd 
rensningen. Miljödomstolen bedömde i likhet med läns-
styrelsen att mot bakgrund av den långa tidsperioden 
utan rensningsarbeten att ett nytt naturtillstånd hade in-
trätt och att tillstånd därför krävdes. Miljööverdomstolen 
uttalade emellertid att den omständigheten att lång tid 
förflutit utan att rensningsarbeten förekommit inte ensamt 
är avgörande för frågan om företaget ska anses övergi-
vet. Även behovet av rensning måste vägas in liksom hur 
lång tid som förflutit sedan sådant behov uppstått. Dom-
stolen resonerade också kring rättskraften och uttryckte 
att 24 kap. 1 § MB (som också omfattar markavvattning) 
innebär att en dom eller ett beslut som avser tillstånd till 
en verksamhet och som vunnit laga kraft gäller mot alla, 
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Även andra regler än 11 kap. miljöbalken 
kan bli tillämpliga, här ges några exempel. Det 
krävs t.ex. dispens om det finns fridlysta arter i 
diket eller i vattendraget (exempelvis tjockska-
liga målarmusslor) eller skyddade biotoper.58 Ett 
öppet dike utgör vidare en s.k. A-biotop som ska 
skyddas enligt 7 kap. 11 § 1 st. p. 1 miljöbalken.59 
Länsstyrelsen får meddela dispens om särskilda 
skäl föreligger.60 Särskilda regler kan gälla inom 
skyddade områden och tillstånd kan behövas en-
ligt 7 kap. 28 a § miljöbalken om dikesrensningen 
på ett betydande sätt, ensamt eller tillsammans 
med andra verksamheter, kan påverka ett Na-




I det följande sammanfattas resultatet av fall-
studierna som har omfattat tillstånds- och dis-
pensprövningar av markavvattning samt anmäl-
”om inte tillståndet inskränkts genom föreskrifter för sär-
skilda skyddsområden eller återkallats eller ändrats efter 
ansökan hos miljödomstol”. Tillståndet till sänknings-
företaget hade inte återkallats eller omprövats. Dom-
stolen menade därför att tillståndsplikt för rensningar 
endast kunde aktualiseras om tillståndet enligt allmänna 
rättsgrundsatser kan anses ha förfallit på grund av att 
sänkningsföretaget sedan länge är övergivet och att detta 
är en förutsättning för att länsstyrelserna ska kunna för-
bjuda rensningen. Då miljödomstolen inte hade prövat 
frågan om sänkningsföretaget skulle betraktas som över-
givet återförvisades målet till miljödomstolen.
58 Se 7 kap. 11 § och 8 kap. MB samt artskyddsförord-
ning (2007:845). 
59 Se förordning (1998:1252) om områdesskydd enligt 
miljöbalken m.m., 5 § samt bilaga 1, p. 5. Det är med 
andra ord frågan om ett generellt skydd som inte kräver 
något utpekande i det särskilda fallet. 
60 7 kap. 11 § 2 st. 
61 Grävning kan leda till utsläpp och förorening som 
omfattas av 9 kap. 1 § MB. Därutöver finns vissa regler 
kring markavvattning i lag (19998:812) med särskilda be-
stämmelser om vattenverksamhet. Se t.ex. om hantering 
av rensningsmassor i 2 kap. 6 §.
ningar och samråd om dikesrensningar.62 Syftet 
har alltså varit att granska om besluten nämner 
åtgärdsprogrammen och/eller miljökvalitetsnor-
mer och om dessa i så fall har påverkat besluts-
fattandet. Analysen har avgränsats till mark-
avvattning som sker för jordbruksändamål (t.ex. 
för att omvandla skogsmark till åkermark eller 
för att höja produktivitet på befintlig jordbruks-
mark) och till tre län, nämligen Gotland, Öster-
götland och Norrbotten under tidsperioden 2010 
till 2014.63 Även anmälningar och samråd om 
rensningar under denna tidsperiod har inklude-
rats.64 Innan resultaten beskrivs närmare ges en 
bakgrundsbeskrivning för respektive län.65
3.3.2 Gotlands län
Få vattendrag eller kustvatten uppnår en god 
ekologisk status. För sjöar är situationen dock 
bättre.66 Många av vattendragen är kraftigt modi-
fierade genom utdikningen. Fysiska förändringar 
i form av rätning och kanalisering av vattendrag 
samt förändringar i vattenflöden är omfattande. 
Under senare tid har underhållsarbeten av diken 
och kanaler ökat kraftigt. Dikning och rensning 
utgör med andra ord ett omfattande miljöpro-
blem på Gotland, inte minst genom läckage av 
62 Se även Sjödahl (2012). Hur miljökvalitetsnormer och 
åtgärdsprogram tillämpas i handläggningen av markavvatt-
ningsärenden. Examensarbete vid Juridiska Fakulteten, 
Uppsala Universitet. Uppsatsen visar att miljökvalitets-
normer och åtgärdsprogram inte haft någon betydelse 
i prövningar av markavvattning i de granskade länen. 
63 I de fall det inte framgår av beslutet om åtgärderna 
sker för jordbruksändamål har ärendena inkluderats. 
64 Ärendena har tagits fram, kopierats och skickats av 
arkivarierna på respektive länsstyrelse. 
65 Informationen är hämtat från Naturvårdsverkets 
miljömålsportal om inte annat anges. Se http://www.
miljomal.se/sv/Miljomalen/Regionala/?eqo=7&t=Lan 
(2015-09-27). 
66 För en detaljerad information om olika vattenföre-
komsters status och miljöproblem, se VISS (vatteninfor-
mationssystem Sverige), http://www.viss.lansstyrelsen.
se/. 
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näringsämnen och fysiska förändringar. Gotland 
är också ett län med stor åkerareal och det enda 
länet i Sverige där åkerarealen ökat efter 1990.
Inom hela Gotland råder markavvattnings-
förbud.67 Detta innebär att såväl dispens som till-
stånd krävs för nya markavvattningar. Dispensen 
ska som beskrivits tidigare utnyttjas restriktivt 
och bedömning ske mot bakgrund av intresset 
att bevara de återstående våtmarkerna inom det 
aktuella området.68 Trots det har alla granskade 
ansökningar om dispenser och tillstånd beviljats 
förutom i ett fall då begärda kompletteringar inte 
inkommit (ärendet avskrevs).69 
Inget av de granskade besluten nämner vat-
tenförvaltningens åtgärdsprogram eller miljö-
kvalitetsnormer. Det finns inget i besluten som 
tyder på att åtgärdsprogrammen har haft nå-
gon inverkan på besluten. Det finns inte heller 
något som tyder på att miljökvalitetsnormer tas 
i beaktande. Besluten nämner inte ens om och 
hur olika vattenförekomster och miljökvalitets-
normer kan komma att beröras av markavvatt-
ningarna och inte heller vilken status eventuella 
närliggande vattenförekomsten har. I endast ett 
av de granskade besluten anges att åtgärden inte 
kommer ”att leda till några förändringar i vat-
tensituationen upp- eller nedströms”. I ett beslut 
gällande breddning av ett dike för att återställa 
markens lämplighet för jordbruksändamål,70 
ställdes villkor om försiktighetsåtgärder med 
syfte att minska transporten av näringsämnen 
och minska erosion, d.v.s. att minska den nega-
67 4 § förordning (1998:1388) om vattenverksamhet m.m. 
68 Markavvattningen ska som sagt i princip sakna bety-
delse från naturskyddssynpunkt. Prop. 1997/98:45, s. 136. 
69 I det fall som avskrevs hade komplettering avseende 
information krävts om bl.a. djup och bredd på ansökta 
dikena samt uppgifter om befintliga diken och deras 
djup och bredd. Vilka ärenden som har granskats fram-
går av referenslistan.
70 Åtgärden bedömdes dock inte utgöra markavvattning 
eftersom syftet varit att återställa. 
tiva påverkan på vattenmiljön.71 Miljökvalitets-
normer och åtgärdsprogram nämns dock inte 
heller i detta beslut. 
Besluten berör oftast enbart frågan om ”hög-
re naturvärden” på området eller runt omkring.72 
Naturreservat nämns exempelvis och villkor 
ställs upp i vissa beslut för att inte skada värden 
i närliggande naturreservat. Villkoren handlar 
framför allt om djup, bredd och längd, hur gräv-
ningsmassor ska hanteras och att arbetet ska av-
brytas om fornlämning påträffas.73
3.3.3 Östergötlands län
En majoritet (90 procent) av länets vattenföre-
komster uppnår inte en god ekologiskt status. De 
största miljöproblemen är fysisk påverkan, miljö-
gifter och övergödning. I länet har en kartlägg-
ning av 80 mil vattendrag visat att över 40 mil 
är kraftigt påverkade genom omgrävning eller 
rensning. Många våtmarker har försvunnit un-
der senare århundraden till följd av omfattande 
markavvattning. 
Inom hela Östergötland råder markavvatt-
ningsförbud.74 Även här krävs därför såväl dis-
pens som tillstånd för nya markavvattningar och 
att dispensen ska nyttjas restriktivt. De granska-
de besluten avser dikesrensningar (anmälningar, 
samråd, tillsyn),75 vilka så länge de inte går längre 
71 Enligt föreläggandet skulle breddningen ske genom 
ett s.k. tvåstegsdike. Grävningen skulle också ske när vat-
tenflödet är lågt för att minska transporten av sediment. 
Diket fick dock inte fördjupas (eftersom detta bedömdes 
påverka naturvärden i ett naturreservat uppströms ne-
gativt).
72 Se om höga naturvärden i Naturvårdsverket (2009), 
s. 39. 
73 Med tanke på att en stor del av markavvattnings-
besluten som har granskats avser markavvattning nära 
kusten och en stor del av Gotlands kustvatten inte upp-
når en god ekologisk status kan man i alla fall ställa sig 
frågan om en bedömning av markavvattningens påver-
kan på kustvattnet inte borde ingå i besluten.
74 4 § förordning (1998:1388) om vattenverksamhet m.m. 
75 Vilka ärenden som har granskats framgår av referens-
listan.
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än ursprungligt djup och läge som huvudregel 
inte kräver tillstånd enligt 11 kap. 13 § miljö-
balken.76 
De granskade besluten innehåller avsnitt 
som berör naturmiljön. Här tas t.ex. förekom-
sten av våtmarker, betade strandängar, häckan-
de fåglar, förekomsten av fisk och fridlysta arter 
(t.ex. musslor) upp. Olika områdesskydd, t.ex. 
naturreservat, Natura 2000-områden och bio-
topskyddsområden, nämns också. Många olika 
naturvärden beaktas därmed i ärendena. 
Däremot nämns aldrig åtgärdsprogram eller 
miljökvalitetsnormer, trots att vissa av besluten 
gäller markavvattning som sker vid eller nära 
vattenförekomster där statusen har klassificerats 
som otillfredsställande eller måttlig. I flera fall 
tas emellertid grumling upp som ett problem 
till följd av dikesrensning och upplysningar el-
ler föreläggande om försiktighetsmått anger ofta 
att rensning ska inriktas till en period med låga 
vattenflöden och att rensning ska påbörjas upp-
ströms. Andra upplysningar gäller bland annat 
försiktighet med slänter och hantering av mas-
sorna. I ett beslut angavs också att grävningen 
ska stoppas vid kraftig nederbörd som ökar vat-
tenmängden i bäcken väsentligt, eftersom detta 
riskerar att öka transporten av slam. 
3.3.4 Norrbottens län 
I Norrbotten har cirka 60 procent av vattenföre-
komsterna minst god ekologisk status, vilket är 
en relativt hög andel ur ett nationellt perspektiv. 
Fysiska förändringar utgör dock ett stort problem 
i länet. Sådana orsakas av bland annat dikningar, 
brist på skyddande kantzoner och vandrings-
hinder. Dikningar och dikesrensning men också 
gamla övergivna diken orsakar även läckage av 
näringsämnen och skador på våt marker.
76 Se också ovan om vad som gäller om nytt naturtill-
stånd inträtt.
I Norrbotten råder inte markavvattnings-
förbud generellt inom hela länet, däremot inom 
vissa områden.77 De granskade besluten gäller 
prövningar av tillstånd till markavvattning.78 I 
ett av besluten beviljades inte tillstånd, eftersom 
påverkan på ett vattendrag där miljökvalitetsnor-
men god ekologisk status inte var uppfylld (bland 
annat p.g.a. morfologiska förändringar), bedöm-
des bli för stor med de skyddsåtgärder verksam-
hetsutövaren föreslagit.79 Efter ny ansökan med 
ytterligare förslag angående försiktighetsåtgär-
der mot grumling och sedimenttransport beviljas 
tillståndet. I ett annat ärende beviljas tillstånd, 
bland annat efter en bedömning av länsstyrelsen 
att verksamheten inte medverkar till att en miljö-
kvalitetsnorm överträds. Däremot nämns inte åt-
gärdsprogrammen i något av besluten. 
3.3.5 Sammanfattande kommentarer 
Trots att en stor andel av de granskade länens 
vattenförekomster inte uppnår en god status 
och problemen med övergödning och fysiska 
förändringar, inte minst på grund av dikning, 
är omfattande, har majoriteten av de granskade 
markavvattningsbesluten beviljats. Inget av de 
granskade besluten i de tre länen nämner heller 
åtgärdsprogrammen. I Norrbotten beaktas emel-
lertid miljökvalitetsnormer, vilket inte gäller de 
två övriga länen (eller det framgår i vart fall inte 
av besluten). 
Däremot finns i en stor del av besluten upp-
lysningar och/eller villkor som avser grumling 
och läckage av näringsämnen. Sådana upplys-
77 Se 4 c § p. 5 förordningen om vattenverksamhet m.m.
78 Vilka ärenden som har granskats framgår av referens-
listan. 
79 Av beslutet framgår att markavvattningen kommer att 
ytterligare påverka morfologiska kvalitetsfaktorer i det 
aktuella vattendraget. De skyddsåtgärder som föreslås 
ansågs inte vara tillräckliga för att fånga upp fin kornigt 
sediment. Även risk för försurning till följd av friläggan-
det av sulfidhaltiga sediment togs upp. 
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ningar och villkor kopplas dock aldrig till aktu-
ell vattenstatus och miljökvalitetsnormer, inte 
ens i de fall det tydligt framgår att t.ex. utlopp 
av ett visst dike sker i en vattenförekomst med 
måttlig eller otillfredsställande ekologisk status, 
t.ex. p.g.a. för höga näringsämnen. Det är alltså 
oklart om villkoren syftar till att minimera ne-
gativa effekter på vattenkvaliteten i sig eller om 
syftet snarare är att minska negativ påverkan på 
de arter (t.ex. fisk och musslor) som lever i vat-
tendraget. 
Det kan naturligtvis vara så att länsstyrel-
serna i de andra två länen har bedömt att inga 
miljökvalitetsnormer kan komma att påverkas av 
markavvattningen i de granskade besluten och 
att detta ingår i bedömningen av ”naturvärden” 
eller i ”miljöpåverkan”. Att varken miljökvali-
tetsnormer eller åtgärdsprogram nämns, att en 
majoritet av besluten inte ens anger om det finns 
några risker för negativ påverkan på vattenföre-
komster uppströms eller nedströms eller hur 
statusen i närliggande vattenförekomster ser ut, 
tyder dock snarare på att de inte har betydelse 
för beslutsfattandet. Besluten anger inte ens att 
någon miljökvalitetsnorm inte berörs. 
Studien visar vidare att få anmälningar om 
dikesrensningar och ansökningar om samråd 
har gjorts samt att det finns få tillsynsärenden 
under den granskade tidsperioden i två av lä-
nen (Gotland och Norrbotten).80 Samtidigt sker 
förmodligen omfattande dikesrensningar inom 
bland annat jordbruks- och skogsbrukslandskap 
även i dessa län som kan ha negativ påverkan på 
vattenkvaliteten (och andra naturvärden).81 
80 I Norrbotten fanns inga anmälningar av dikesrens-
ningar överhuvudtaget. Däremot fanns tillsynsärenden 
om att lägga igen olagliga diken. Uppgifter från arkivarie 
Anna Lindblom vid länsstyrelsen i Norrbotten den 19 
september 2014 och den 9 oktober 2015. 
81 Det har uppskattats att ca 6 000 km diken bara i jord-
bruksmark rensas varje år i Sverige. Se Naturvårdsverket 
(2004).
Ändamålsenligheten i att dikesrensningar 
är undantagna från tillståndsplikten kan därför 
diskuteras. Bland annat innebär detta undantag 
att viktig information inte inkommer till läns-
styrelserna men också en risk för att villkoren 
för undantagen överträds, något som kan vara 
svårt att visa i efterhand (inte minst eftersom 
ett stort antal markavvattningar saknar tillstånd 
där tillåtet djup och bredd har dokumenterats).82 
Undantaget innebär med andra ord en risk att 
nödvändiga försiktighetsmått i många fall inte 
kommer att föreskrivas samt att ansökningar om 
tillstånd och ev. dispens uteblir trots att åtgärden 
är att betrakta som markavvattning som kräver 
tillstånd och ev. dispens.83 En anmälningsplikt 
gällande all dikesrensning skulle åtminstone 
innebära en ökad kunskap hos länsstyrelserna 
om de dikesrensningar som faktiskt sker och där-
med en betydligt större möjlighet att meddela 
nödvändiga förelägganden om försiktighets-
mått. En anmälningsplikt för rensning föreslås 
också i vattenverksamhetsutredningen.84
Ett annat alternativ för att minska miljöbe-
lastningen av såväl markavvattning som dikes-
rensningar är att utfärda generella föreskrifter. 
Att införa generella föreskrifter för rensningar 
82 I en studie från länsstyrelsen i Skåne hade 92 procent 
av alla kontrollerade dikesrensningar (37 dikesföretag) 
överträtt vad som var tillåtet vad gäller djup och läge 
på diket. En sammanfattning av studien av Länsstyrel-




16.pdf (2014-05-26). Studier visar också att kunskapen 
om dikesrensningars miljöeffekter är mycket bristfällig. 
83 Därutöver kan diskuteras hur skyldigheten att under-
hålla vattenanläggningar så att allmänna eller enskilda 
intressen inte skadas skulle kunna utformas när det gäl-
ler grävda diken. En sådan skyldighet kan innebära att 
rensningar sker rutinmässigt och inte enbart när så verk-
ligen behövs och därmed orsaka större skador på miljön 
än nödvändigt. 
84 Se SOU 2014:35, I vått och torrt – förslag till ändrade vat-
tenrättsliga regler, s. 431–437. Därutöver föreslås också en 
definition av rensning. 
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föreslås även i vattenverksamhetsutredningen.85 
Motivet till förslaget är att omprövningar uti-
från dagens miljökrav på det stora antalet mark-
avvattningar och antal markägare som berörs 
skulle innebära en oerhört stor arbetsbörda.86 
Enligt utredningen skulle generella föreskrifter 
kunna gälla utsläppskrav, t.ex. vad gäller kväve 
och fosfor, krav på dokumentation av ursprung-
ligt djup och läge samt åtgärder som ska vidtas 
för att minska den negativa effekten på miljön. 
Utredningen gör dock inte någon närmare ana-
lys utan föreslår att Naturvårdsverket, i samråd 
med Havs- och vattenmyndigheten, Jordbruks-
verket och Skogsstyrelsen, ska bedöma om det 
är möjligt att fastställa generellt tillämpbara fö-
reskrifter om försiktighetsmått vid rensning och 
om så, utarbeta förslag till föreskrifter.87 
Denna studie bekräftar att en utredning 
och förändrade regler behövs, särskilt vad gäl-
ler hur genomförandet av åtgärdsprogrammen 
och miljökvalitetsnormer ska säkerställas vid 
 dikesrensningar men också vid prövningar av 
tillståndspliktiga markavvattningar. I detta ar-
bete bör även en översyn och uppdatering av 
Naturvårdsverkets handbok om markavvattning 
och dikesrensningar ingå. 
Givet att markavvattning är en verksamhet 
som, bland annat enligt åtgärdsprogrammen, 
påverkar vattenförekomster negativt, och till-
komsten av nydikningar samt rensningar utan 
tillräckliga villkor kan komma att förvärra den 
redan otillfredsställande ekologiska statusen i 
länen, är det anmärkningsvärt att åtgärdspro-
gram inte alls nämns och att miljökvalitetsnor-
mer endast nämns och beaktas i ett av länen. Om 
85 Se SOU 2009:42, Vattenverksamhet, s. 250–251 samt SOU 
2014:35, I vått och torrt – förslag till ändrade vattenrättsliga 
regler, s. 440–442.
86 Se SOU 2009:42, Vattenverksamhet, s. 250–251.
87 Se SOU 2009:42, Vattenverksamhet, s. 250–251 samt SOU 
2014:35, I vått och torrt – förslag till ändrade vattenrättsliga 
regler, s. 440–442.
de beviljade besluten om markavvattning inne-
bär att den ekologiska statusen försämras gör 
sig Sverige skyldig till fördragsbrott genom att 
meddela tillstånd utan tillräckliga villkor för att 
förhindra försämringen om så är möjligt. Enligt 
domstolen utgör artikel 4(1)(a)(i och ii) rättsligt 
bindande skyldigheter för medlemsstaterna att 
dels skydda, förbättra och återställa alla ytvatten-
förekomster (om inte något av undantagen är 
tillämpliga) dels förebygga varje försämring och 
att skyldigheterna måste iakttas i samband med 
godkännandet av enskilda projekt.88 Detta föl-
jer av såväl en bokstavstolkning av artikel 4(1)
(a) som av en ändamålsenlig tolkning. Domsto-
len anger vidare att skyldigheten att förebygga 
försämring gäller varje kvalitetsfaktor (i direk-
tivets bilaga V), även om denna försämring inte 
leder till en försämring av klassificeringen av 
ytvatten förekomsten som helhet.89 Om en vat-
tenverksamhet innebär att miljökvalitetsnormen 
god status inte uppnås ska med andra ord inte 
tillstånd meddelas.90 Om vattnet är i lägsta klass 
räcker det med att en parameter försämras.91
88 C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland 
eV mot Bundesrespublik Deutschland (förhandsavgörande), 
p. 31 och 33.  
89 C-461/13, p. 65. Domstolen argumenterar med andra 
ord mot den s.k. ”statusklassteorin”, vilken innebär att 
försämring av statusen inträder först om ytvattenföre-
komstens status hamnar i en lägre klass och för ”status 
quo-teorin” som innebär att varje försämring även inom 
en klass är en försämring rättsligt sett. För en utförlig 
analys av domen, se Michanek (2015). Tillstånd får inte 
ges om aktuell ytvattenstatus försämras eller om upp-
nåendet av god ytvattenstatus äventyras. Analys av EU-
domstolens förhandsavgörande C-461/13. JP miljönet 
(artikel i tryck).
90 Se domstolens uttalande i målet ovan om att struk-
turen hos de kategorier av undantag som föreskrivits i 
Ramvattendirektivet talar för att de inte enbart innehåller 
principiella skyldigheter utan också omfattar enskilda 
projekt (se p. 47). 
91 Se ovan nämnda dom samt analys av denna i Micha-
nek (2015).
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4. Förslag till nya åtgärdsprogram 
Nyligen har förslag till nya åtgärdsprogram 
lagts fram av vattenmyndigheterna.92 De nya 
programmen utgör emellertid fortfarande fem 
i stort sett identiska dokument utan något tyd-
ligt avrinningsperspektiv i åtgärderna. Åtgärd 
28 har överförts utan någon större förändring 
(se åtgärd 1 för länsstyrelserna i förslaget till nya 
program).93 En skillnad är att åtgärden delats in 
i två delar (a och b) med syfte att underlätta upp-
följningen. De kommer med andra ord, om pro-
grammen antas, att ge lika lite vägledning som 
de nu gällande programmen i detta avseende. 
Den viktigaste skillnaden mellan de nu gäl-
lande och förslaget till de nya programmen finns 
enligt min mening i bilagorna till programmen. 
I dessa bilagor har områdesspecifika åtgärder 
för ett stort antal åtgärdsområden föreslagits. 
Åtgärdsområdena är många och kan omfatta 
såväl flera kommuner som län. I stor utsträck-
ning sammanfaller de med Sveriges huvudavrin-
ningsområden, men detta är inte alltid fallet.94 
Förslagen om åtgärdsområdesspecifika åtgär-
der innebär att graden av precision är betydligt 
högre än tidigare. I vissa åtgärdsområden pekas 
till exempel åtgärder för att komma tillrätta med 
problem avseende markavvattning och dikes-
92 Programmen har dock överlämnats av Vattenmyndig-
heterna för överprövning av regeringen i enlighet med 
6 kap. 4 § vattenförvaltningsförordningen. I skrivandes 
stund har inget beslut angående programmen tagits av 
regeringen.
93 Se Vattenmyndigheten Bottenhavet (2015). Förslag 
på åtgärdsprogrammet för Bottenhavets vattendistrikt 2015–
2021, Vattenmyndigheten Bottenviken (2015). Förslag 
på åtgärdsprogrammet för Bottenvikens vattendistrikt 2015–
2021, Vattenmyndigheten Norra Östersjön (2015). Förslag 
på åtgärdsprogrammet för Norra Östersjöns vattendistrikt 
2015–2021, Vattenmyndigheten Södra Östersjön (2015). 
Förslag på åtgärdsprogrammet för Södra Östersjöns vatten-
distrikt 2015–2021 och Vattenmyndigheten Västerhavet 
(2015). Förslag på åtgärdsprogrammet för Västerhavets vatten-
distrikt 2015–2021. 
94 Det framgår inte av programmen på vilka grunder 
åtgärdsområden har bestämts. 
rensningar ut, medan det i andra områden är fo-
kus på vandringshinder till följd av vattenkraft. 
Förslag på åtgärder kan t.ex. vara biotopvård av 
uträtade och rensade diken. 
Även om myndigheter och kommuner har 
möjlighet att vidta andra åtgärder än de som 
har specificerats i åtgärdsområdesbilagorna, om 
det finns uppgifter som visar att andra åtgärder 
är mer kostnadseffektiva, ger den ökade preci-
sionen en betydligt större vägledning än de nu 
gällande programmen. Detta främjar genom-
förandet men också uppföljningen av åtgärder-
nas mål- och kostnadseffektivitet. Dock kvarstår 
problematiken med bristande resurser och kom-
plexa juridiska prövningar (åtminstone till dess 
att vattenverksamhetsutredningens förslag ge-
nomförs). Dessutom finns inte någon överpröv-
ningsmyndighet som vid passivitet kan tvinga 
länsstyrelser (eller andra myndigheter och kom-
muner) att genomföra de åtgärder som har for-
mulerats i programmen. Det saknas också krav 
på att fysiska planer, t.ex. detaljplaner, som stri-
der mot åtgärdsprogram ska överprövas. För-
utom själva utformningen av åtgärdsprogram-
men är det därför som nämnts tidigare viktigt att 
genomföra ett flertal förändringar i regelverket 
kring vattenverksamheter. 
5. Diskussion
För att genomföra Ramvattendirektivets syfte 
att uppnå en god vattenstatus ska medlemssta-
terna utforma och genomföra åtgärdsprogram. 
De första åtgärdsprogrammen i Sverige trädde 
ikraft 2009. Trots detta uppnås inte en god sta-
tus i en majoritet av landets vattenförekomster. 
En förklaring till detta kan vara ett bristande ge-
nomförande av de åtgärder som har fastställts i 
programmen. 
Den här studien har visat att det konkreta 
genomförandet under den första förvaltnings-
perioden av åtgärd 28 är bristfälligt. Få ompröv-
ningar av vattenverksamheter har exempelvis 
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genomförts och den egeninitierade operativa 
tillsynen utgör endast en liten del av myndighe-
tens tillsynsarbete med vattenverksamheter. Av 
de tillsynsplaner som har granskats framgår att 
åtgärdsprogrammen endast utgör ett av många 
styrande dokument och att det ofta endast sker 
en upprepning av vad som redan framgår av åt-
gärdsprogrammen utan någon konkretisering 
utifrån regionala förhållanden. Fallstudien om 
markavvattningsbeslut visar också att åtgärds-
programmen inte haft någon styrande effekt på 
länsstyrelsernas arbete med markavvattning, 
trots att markavvattning och dikesrensningar 
kan påverka vattenkvaliteten negativt på flera 
olika sätt och också har identifierats som ett om-
fattande problem i åtgärdsprogrammen. I de 
fall vattenförvaltningen nämns i besluten om 
markavvattning i ett av länen handlar det om 
miljökvalitetsnormer och inte åtgärdsprogram-
men i sig. 
Resultaten är emellertid inte förvånande. 
Åtgärdsprogrammen är för det första vagt utfor-
made. Åtgärd 28 anger i stort sett endast vad som 
redan omfattas av länsstyrelsernas ansvarsom-
råde, utan någon närmare vägledning om hur 
länsstyrelserna ska prioritera i sitt arbete med 
undantag att vattenförekomster som inte uppnår 
en god status ska prioriteras. Eftersom ett stort 
antal vattenförekomster inte uppnår en god sta-
tus ger detta dock lite vägledning. Inte ens på av-
rinningsområdesnivå finns någon vägledning då 
åtgärden är densamma i alla fem program, trots 
att syftet med att utforma ett åtgärdsprogram för 
varje avrinningsdistrikt är att skapa en grund för 
avrinningsområdes-baserad vattenförvaltning. 
Vagt formulerade åtgärder innebär en risk att 
genomförandet blir beroende av subjektiva fak-
torer, såsom länsstyrelsernas finansiella resurser, 
omfattningen av andra ansvarsuppgifter eller en-
skilda handläggares drivkrafter. 
När det gäller markavvattning saknas också 
annan tydlig nationell styrning och vägledning 
(både i förarbeten, praxis och i handböcker) 
som säkerställer att hänsyn till miljökvalitets-
normer och åtgärdsprogram tas vid olika be-
slut om markavvattning och dikesrensningar. 
Detta syns också tydligt i besluten där normalt 
sett endast ”högre naturvärden” nämns. Tradi-
tionella skyddsinstrument som områdesskydd 
och artskydd tas ofta upp, men sällan miljökvali-
tetsnormer och aldrig åtgärdsprogrammen i sig. 
En länsstyrelse uttryckte till och med explicit att 
höga naturvärden, men inte miljökvalitetsnormer, 
prioriteras i arbetet med genomförandet av åt-
gärd 28, trots att syftet med åtgärdsprogram är 
just att genomföra miljökvalitetsnormer. 
Åtgärdsprogrammen har också antagits i en 
befintlig rättslig kontext som på flera olika sätt 
motverkar ett effektivt genomförande av åtgär-
derna. Dels handlar det om den nivå åtgärds-
programmen antas på och det otraditionella 
angreppssättet att en regional myndighet styr 
nationella eller andra regionala myndigheter. 
Dels handlar det om att vattenförvaltningen har 
införts i en redan befintlig rättslig kontext som 
inte har anpassats tillräckligt efter de nya miljö-
kraven. Detta gäller inte minst reglerna om att 
ansöka och bedriva omprövningsmål av vat-
tenverksamheter som saknar moderna tillstånd, 
men också t.ex. undantaget från tillståndsplikten 
för dikesrensningar. Undantagen innebär en risk 
att dikesrensningar sker utan att länsstyrelsen får 
kunskap om detta, något som försvårar tillsynen 
och möjligheten att förelägga verksamhetsutöva-
re om nödvändiga försiktighetsmått eller förbud. 
Det bör därför, såsom också föreslagits i vatten-
verksamhetsutredningen, övervägas om anmäl-
ningsplikt bör införas för dikesrensningar. Där-
utöver bör övervägas om rensningar men också 
andra delar av åtgärdsprogrammen istället bör 
regleras med generellt tillämpliga föreskrifter. 
Mot ett effektivt genomförande av åtgärder 
och uppnående av en god status verkar också 
dagens formulering av 2 kap. 7 §. Eftersom mer 
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långtgående krav än vad som är rimligt (enligt 
2 kap. 7 § 1 st.) inte kan ställas för andra normer 
än s.k. gränsvärdesnormer (p. 1-normer) (enligt 
2 kap. 7 § 2 st.) kan med andra ord verksamheter 
tillåtas även om verksamheten medverkar till att 
en god ekologisk status inte uppnås. Kraven ska 
vara rimliga enligt 1 st. Av EU-domstolens dom 
C-467/13 följer dock att detta inte är en korrekt 
implementering av Ramvattendirektivet. Enligt 
EU-domstolen utgör som sagt artikel 4 i Ram-
vattendirektivet en rättsligt bindande skyldighet 
som måste iakttas även i samband med godkän-
nandet av enskilda projekt, såsom vid tillstånds-
prövning av markavvattning. Bedömningen av 
om en försämring har skett kräver vidare inte 
enligt domstolen att ytvattenförekomstens status 
sänks. Det räcker nämligen med att en kvalitets-
faktor, eller en paramter om vattnet är i lägsta 
klass, påverkas negativt för att skyldigheten att 
förhindra försämringen ska uppstå. För att EU-
rätten ska efterlevas krävs därför en ändring av 
de svenska reglerna. Domen bör dock få bety-
delse för den svenska rättstillämpningen även 
innan en sådan lagändring träder ikraft, anting-
en genom direkt effekt eller en direktivkonform 
tolkning.95
Därutöver kan ändamålsenligheten i formu-
leringen i 2 kap. 7 § 3 st. p. 1, givet åtgärdspro-
grammens utformning diskuteras. Tillstånd eller 
dispens kan t.ex. meddelas även om verksam-
heten eller åtgärden på ett inte obetydligt sätt 
medverkar till att en miljökvalitetsnorm (p. 1 
norm) inte följs, om verksamheten eller åtgär-
den ”är förenlig med ett åtgärdsprogram som 
har fastställts för att följa normen”. En verksam-
het kan således tillåtas även om den medför en 
95 Detta diskuteras mer utförligt i Michanek (2015), av-
snitt 6. Michanek menar att försämringsförbudet, efter 
preciseringen av dess innebörd genom domen, är ovill-
korlig och tillräckligt tydlig och precis för att ha direkt 
effekt. Om så inte är fallet bör domen ändå få genomslag 
i svensk rätt genom fördragsenlig tolkning.
icke obetydlig försämring för miljön och trots de 
begränsningar som finns att i efterhand ändra 
tillståndsvillkor eller återkalla rättskraftiga till-
stånd.96 Givet detta samt programmens vaga 
utformning och bristen på rättsliga funktioner 
som säkerställer att åtgärderna i programmen 
faktiskt genomförs bör denna regel antingen tas 
bort, ändras eller tolkas restriktivt. Annars finns 
risk att miljökvalitetsnormer förlorar sin funk-
tion och att EU-rätten inte efterlevs.
Såsom har diskuterats tidigare i både utred-
ningar och i den juridiska doktrinen bör även 
övervägas om åtgärdsprogrammen, eller vissa 
delar av dessa, bör utformas som (överklagba-
ra) förvaltningsbeslut som är direkt bindande 
för enskilda.97 Program som är direkt bindande 
för enskilda skulle kunna minska den långa och 
tidskrävande implementeringskedjan. När pro-
grammen är direkt bindande för enskilda kan 
också mer konkreta åtgärder formuleras, vilket i 
sin tur kan bidra till att åtgärderna blir lättare att 
följa upp. Att kunna följa upp åtgärder är nöd-
vändigt om vattenförvaltningen på lång sikt ska 
bli mål- och kostnadseffektiv. De nya förslagna 
programmen utgör ett viktigt steg i denna rikt-
ning. Inte heller de nya åtgärdsprogrammen är 
dock bindande för enskilda.
Sist kan också nämnas att en tydligare an-
svarsfördelning mellan myndigheter är önsk-
värd. En tydlig ansvarsfördelning minskar ris-
ken för att en åtgärd hamnar ”mellan stolarna”. 
Det bör också införas tydliga kopplingar mellan 
miljö balken och relevanta sektorslagstiftningar 
som innebär att beslut också enligt annan lag-
stiftning (t.ex. plan- och bygglagen eller skogs-
vårdslagen) är förenliga med åtgärdsprogram-
men. Därutöver bör också ett överprövningsan-
svar införas. Ett sådant ansvar skulle exempelvis 
96 För en mer utförlig beskrivning samt kritik av regeln, 
se Michanek och Zetterberg (2012), s. 166–167. 
97 Se t.ex. SOU 2005:113, Åtgärdsprogram för miljökvali-
tetsnormer.
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kunna innebära att myndigheten kontinuerligt 
är skyldig att granska och överpröva beslutens 
förenlighet med åtgärdsprogrammen, men också 
en möjlighet att tvinga passiva myndigheter eller 
kommuner att vidta de åtgärder som har formu-
lerats i programmen.98
Sammantaget visar denna studie att det 
finns ett antal brister i den nationella lagstiftning-
en som orsakar ett genomförandeunderskott. 
Dessa brister måste åtgärdas om en god status 
ska uppnås och Sveriges förpliktelser enligt EU:s 
Ramvattendirektiv efterlevas. 
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The Impact of the Water Framework Directive on Diffuse  
Pollution Control: the Case of Ditch Network Maintenance  
in Finnish Forests
Minna Pappila & Lea Halonen*
Water Framework Directive1 (hereinafter WFD) 
and diffuse pollution control. 
The WFD principally determines the water 
policy in the EU nowadays. The directive adopts 
a holistic approach to water protection and puts 
ecosystem stability at the centre of water policies.2 
The WFD represents a radical shift in water man-
agement within the EU by governing waters on a 
river basin basis. The WFD establishes environ-
mental objectives of which the most important 
is the aim to achieve and maintain the good status 
of surface and ground water by 2015 (article 4). 
‘Good status’ includes both ‘good ecological sta-
tus’ and ‘good chemical status’. The objective of 
preventing further deterioration of the status of 
a body of surface water is binding on authorities 
and must be applied while considering the per-
missibility of a single project: an authority shall 
not grant a permit if the project could lead to the 
deterioration of the status of the water.3
1 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a frame-
work for community action in the field of water policy.
2 Jans & Vedder (2012): European Environmental Law: 
After Lisbon, 4th edition, Europa Law Publishing, p. 392, 
Lee, M. (2009): Law and Governance of Water Protection 
Policy. In Scott, J. (ed): Environmental Protection, European 
Law and Governance, Vol. XVII/3, 27–55, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, p. 29. 
3 Court of Justice of the European Union states in the 
Weser dredging case (C-461/13) that Member States are 
required — unless a derogation is granted — to refuse 
authorisation for an individual project where it may 
cause a deterioration of the status of a body of surface 
water or where it jeopardises the attainment of good sur-
Abstract 
The Water Framework Directive sets the aim to 
achieve and maintain the good status of surface and 
ground water by 2015. In general the water quality 
has improved in Finland during the last centuries 
but especially diffuse pollution is still a problem. 
Ditch network maintenance is a typical example 
of a source of diffuse pollution where cumulative 
 effects of several projects are the main cause of 
 water pollution. This article examines Finnish regu-
lation concerning ditch network maintenance and 
evaluates how well it meets the aim of achieving 
and maintaining the good quality of surface  waters. 
The article highlights that while Finnish legislation 
seems to work relatively well for individual proj-
ects, there are flaws in the law and in practice that 
do not enable authorities to take cumulative effects 
properly into account. The results suggest that 
the Water Framework Directive has not yet been 
quite comprehensively implemented into Finnish 
legislation. 
1. Introduction
1.1 The aim and the method
Finland is one of the swampiest countries in the 
world and extensive ditching has considerably 
changed our water systems during the last fifty 
years. In this article we will scrutinize Finnish 
regulation on ditching from the viewpoint of the 
* Postdoctoral researcher Minna Pappila and PhD can-
didate Lea Halonen, both at Law School, University of 
Eastern Finland.
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The holistic environmental objectives and 
the requirement to prevent deterioration also 
apply to diffuse pollution.4 In Finland, ditch 
network maintenance is a typical example of a 
source of diffuse pollution: pollutants flow from 
a relatively large area as a result of several DNM 
and other projects. Diffuse pollution is typically 
governed by a variety of means – often by also 
using instruments other than binding rules or 
permits.5 In Finland the governance of ditching 
consists of both statutes and soft law instruments, 
thus combining the typical point-source pollu-
tion approach (legally binding regulations such 
as permits) and the diffuse pollution approach 
(mainly soft law). However, the WFD and its ob-
ligations concern activities that require a permit 
and others that do not.
The aim of this article is to scrutinise the in-
strument mix of Finnish water protection regula-
tion of forest ditching. We analyse the instrument 
mix from the viewpoint of one of the main objec-
tives of the WFD: to achieve and maintain the 
good status of surface water.6 We will therefore 
face water status or good ecological potential and good 
surface water chemical status by the date laid down by 
the directive.
4 Diffuse pollution means pollution which is caused 
by the release of pollutants from a range of activities on 
land that individually may have little effect on the water 
environment, but cumulatively can have a significant im-
pact across a (river) catchment.’ SEPA (Scottish Environ-
ment Protection Agency) (2014): The Water Environment 
(Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 (as 
amended), A Practical Guide, Version 7.1, 2014, p. 9. 
5 Usually it is burdensome to control the impacts of dif-
fuse pollutants by command and control instruments. 
See Gunningham, N. & Sinclair, D.: Policy Instrument 
Choice and Diffuse Source Pollution. Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 2005, vol. 17, no. 1, 51–81, p. 52–54. See also 
Howart, W. (2011): Diffuse Water Pollution and  Diffuse 
Environmental Laws Tackling Diffuse Water Pollution in 
England, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor Gen-
eral, HC 186, Session 2010-2011, 6 July 2010. JEL 23:1, 
129–141, p. 130.
6 WFD art. 4(1)(a). We also take into consideration the 
obligation to prevent the deterioration of surface water 
bodies (art. 1).
ask the question: does the current regulation of 
ditch network maintenance enable and obligate 
authorities to ensure good status of surface wa-
ters? Even if the meaning of ‘good status’ is com-
plex and vague, we consider that it is possible to 
use it as a criterion for evaluating legislation, as 
we are only scrutinising the fulfilment of the aim 
on a general level, i.e. the permitting and other 
regulatory instruments.
Our article is part regulatory research and 
part evaluation research: we will first and fore-
most look at regulation7 from the viewpoint of 
potential effectiveness.8 Our starting point for 
this study is that the design of regulation and its 
implementation by public authorities are central 
to ensuring the effectiveness of regulation.9 Thus, 
evaluating potential effectiveness means explor-
ing the regulation for its potential to ensure the 
7 We understand the concept of regulation broadly in 
the sense of the ‘‘sustained and focused attempt to alter 
the behavior of others according to defined standards or 
purposes.’’ See Black, J.: Critical reflections on regulation. 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy. 27/2002, 1–35, 
p. 20. The concept of regulation thus contains not only 
the activities of state intervention but also private regula-
tions, i.e. self-regulation. 
8 There are multiple meanings of effectiveness and it is 
defined in various ways for different purposes. Effec-
tiveness is typically understood as the extent to which 
the policy goals associated with the body of legislation 
are achieved. McGrath C. (2010), Does Environmental 
Law Work? How to Evaluate the Effectiveness of an En-
vironmental Legal System (Lambert Academic Publish-
ing, Saarbrücken, p. 45–46.) In terms of the main lines of 
regulatory research in Finland, see Kokko, K. T.: Methods 
of Environmental Law in Finland. Scandinavian Studies 
in Law 59 (2014), 285–319, p. 300.
9 We do not intend to deprecate the potential impact of 
self-regulation, such as voluntary forest certification sys-
tems on water quality. However, when there is need to 
ensure that sufficient water protection methods are in 
use in a DNM project, an authority must have the op-
portunity to forbid a project or to require more efficient 
water protection methods. A voluntary forest certifica-
tion standard is of no help in such cases. In addition, the 
most widely used forest certification system in Finland, 
PEFC, does not add anything new to water protection 
requirements regarding DNM projects.
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set targets. We look at the whole water protection 
instrument mix of DNM projects.10 This article 
will contribute to the discourse on the regulation 
of diffuse pollution and cumulative effects. Our 
conclusions will also bring some of the flaws in 
Finnish legislation related to the implementation 
of the WFD to the discussion.
As research material we have used legisla-
tion and other regulation, research literature, 
river basin management plans (RBMPs) and 
programmes of measures (POMs), and a sample 
of drainage notifications from three regional en-
vironmental authorities. We also sent an enquiry 
by e-mail to all Centres for Economic Develop-
ment, Transport and the Environment (herein-
after ELY Centres)11 supervising DNM projects.12 
In part two we shall first introduce the Finn-
ish legislation and soft law concerning DNM. In 
part three, relevant water protection instruments 
will be analysed from the perspective of their po-
tential effectiveness in ensuring the good status 
of surface waters. The relevance of river basin 
management plans (RBMP) and programmes of 
measures will be scrutinised in particular. Part 
10 By also scrutinising non-state regulation we employ a 
polycentric view of law. The Finnish regulation of DNM 
is clearly polycentric and pluralistic. See Halonen, L. 
(2013): Ojitusilmoitusvelvollisuus metsäojitusten vesien-
suojelun hallinnan keinona (The Duty to Notify on For-
est Ditching as an Administrative Control Mechanism of 
Water Protection). Ympäristöjuridiikka 2/2013, 30–61 and 
Halonen, L. (2015): Metsätalouden vesiensuojelusuo-
situkset metsäojitusten sääntelykeinona (Silvicultural 
 Water Protection Guidelines as a Regulatory Instrument). 
Oikeus 2/2015, 177–201.
11 ELY Centres (Elinkeino-, liikenne- ja ympäristökeskus in 
Finnish) also act as supervisory authorities for water and 
environmental protection permits. Read more about ELY 
Centres here: http://www.ely-keskus.fi/en/web/ely-en/
environment. 
12 Inquiry/ELY Centres 2015. An inquiry concerning e.g. 
notifications, cumulative effects and utilised databases 
was sent to the officials of ELY Centres responsible for 
ditching notifications. Ten responses from different ELY 
Centres were received in April–May 2015. 
four is for discussion and conclusions. However, 
we shall first describe the research topic from a 
social and environmental viewpoint.
1.2 Finnish forest drainage in a nutshell 
Ditching has a long history in Finland as almost 
one-third of Finland’s land area consists of peat-
lands. Forest ditching started in Finland in the 
early 20th century.13 Due to mechanisation, ac-
tive state policy and subsidies, ditching intensi-
fied in the 1960s and reached its peak in 1969.14 
Now over half of Finland’s peatland, about 4.7 
million hectares, has been drained for forestry.15 
As a whole the drainage has considerably in-
creased the amount of productive forest land and 
the growing stock.16 However, while the  water 
quality in general has improved significantly in 
Finland during the last decades, the quality of 
small water bodies has not improved due to the 
impact of agriculture and forestry.17 Also, many 
small-scale water habitats have become endan-
13 Peatlands are also used for agriculture and peat is har-
vested for different purposes. METLA (Metsäntutkimus-
laitos /The Finnish Forest Research Institute): Finland – 
the Peatland Capital of the World. [http://www.metla.fi/
tutkimus/suotutkimus/tausta-en.htm] 
14 Pajula, H. (2010): Maankuivatustoiminta ja sen kehit-
tämistarpeet. (Drainage operations and the need to de-
velop them) Suomen ympäristökeskuksen raportteja 15/2010. 
[https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/39778/
SYKEra_15_2010.pdf?sequence=1], p. 8.
15 METLA (n 13). 
16 METLA (Metsäntutkimuslaitos/Finnish Forest Re-
search Institute): State of Finland’s Forests 2012. Based 
on the Criteria and Indicators of Sustainable Forest Man-
agement. [http://www.metla.fi/metinfo/sustainability/].
17 HE 120/2004 vp. Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laik-
si vesienhoidon järjestämisestä, laiksi ympäristönsuojelu-
lain muuttamisesta ja laiksi vesilain muuttamisesta sekä 
maasta toiseen ulottuvien vesistöjen sekä kansainvälisten 
järvien suojelusta ja käytöstä tehdyn vuoden 1992 yleis-
sopimuksen vesivaroja ja terveyttä koskevan pöytäkirjan 
hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuu-
luvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta (Government 
Bill (draft law) on the Act on Water Resources Manage-
ment), p. 8.
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gered in Finland, largely due to forestry and for-
est ditching.18
Forest ditching has been a significant part 
of the state’s forest policy and the stable wood 
supply in Finland. Currently, the state pro-
vides subsidies for private forest owners to in-
crease the willingness to conduct ditch network 
maintenance.19 The maintenance operations are 
needed to sustain the drainage capacity. Ditch 
network maintenance is normally done every 
20–40 years.20 Typically, ditch network mainte-
nance is conducted annually on about 50–60 000 
hectares.21 
Ditch network maintenance may cause harm 
to the ecological but also the chemical status of 
water bodies. DNM is a typical example of dif-
fuse pollution: the effects of a single project will 
not usually deteriorate the waters. However, the 
cumulative effects from forestry and DNM can 
be considerable and especially vital on otherwise 
18 Raunio, A., Schulman, A. & Kontula, T. (2008): Suo-
men luontotyyppien uhanalaisuus – Osa 1: Tulokset ja 
arvioinnin perusteet (Assessment of threatened habitat 
types in Finland – Part 1: Results and basis for assess-
ment). Suomen ympäristö 8/2008. https://helda.helsinki.
fi/handle/10138/37930, p. 64–66. In Southern Finland 
67.6 % of the habitat types of inland waters and shores 
are threatened. Id., p. 258–259. 
19 The state financial support for new ditches ended in 
the 1990s. Since then pristine peatlands have hardly been 
drained for forestry purposes.
20 Äijälä O., Koistinen A., Sved J., Vanhatalo K. & Väisä-
nen p. (toim.) (2014): Hyvän metsänhoidon suositukset 
– Metsänhoito (Best practice guidelines – Forest manage-
ment). Publications of Metsätalouden kehittämiskeskus 
Tapio, p. 175.
21 In 2012 ditch network maintenance was conducted 
on 52,000 hectares. See METLA (Metsäntutkimuslaitos/
Finnish Forest Research Institute) (2013): Metsätilastolli-
nen vuosikirja 2013 (Finnish Statistical Yearbook of Forestry 
2013). http://www.metla.fi/julkaisut/metsatilastollinen-
vsk/tilastovsk-sisalto.htm, p. 104, Nieminen, M., Ahti, 
E., Koivusalo, H., Mattsson, T., Sarkkola, S. & Laurén, 
A. (2010): Export of suspended solids and dissolved ele-
ments from peatland areas after ditch network mainte-
nance in south-central Finland. Silva Fennica 44(1): 39–49. 
http://www.metla.fi/silvafennica/full/sf44/sf441039.pdf, 
p. 40.
clean headwaters such as streams, springs, ponds 
and small lakes.22 Strain on the water system is 
the main side effect; the load of suspended solids, 
increase in nutrition levels (the concentrations of 
Mn, Ca, Mg) and acidity in stream waters may 
occur due to ditching.23 The load of suspended 
solids (sediment) in the water and the bottom of 
lakes, rivers and smaller waterways is the most 
harmful environmental effect of ditch network 
maintenance.24 Suspended solids may make wa-
ter turbid or cause silting of the bottom, which 
has negative impacts on species composition.25 
The release of nutrients is usually highest during 
the first one to three years after ditch network 
maintenance operations, but on the whole, nega-
tive effects may continue for over twenty years.26 
In Finland the environmental effects of DNM cre-
ates a risk with regard to the aim of achieving and 
maintaining the good quality of surface waters.27
22 Hiltunen, T., Jämsén, J., Joensuu, S., Heikkinen, K. 
& Vuollekoski, M. (2014): Opas metsätalouden vesien-
suojelun suunnitteluun valuma-aluetasolla (A guide for 
river basin-level planning of water protection in forestry). 
Jyväskylä 2014, p. 8.
23 Åström, M., Aaltonen, E.–K. & Koivusaari, J. (2002): 
Impact of forest ditching on nutrient loadings of a small 
stream—a paired catchment study in Kronoby, W. Fin-
land. Science of The Total Environment, Volume 297, Issues 
1–3, 127–140, p. 128.
24 Nieminen and others (n 21), p. 48.
25 Past drainage has permanently changed a number of 
streams and deteriorated spawning places of fish. Sutela 
T., Olin, M., Vehanen, T. & Rask, M. (2007): Hajakuormi-
tuksen vaikutukset järvien ja jokien kalastoon ja ekolo-
giseen tilaan (The effect of diffuse pollution on the fish 
stock and ecological state of lakes and rivers). Kala- ja 
riistaraportteja nro 411. Finnish Game and Fisheries Re-
search Institute. Helsinki. [http://www.rktl.fi/www/up-
loads/pdf/raportti411.pdf].
26 Joensuu J. & Rissanen K. (2002): Vanhojen uudisojitus-
ten aiheuttamat vesistövaikutukset. Selvitys Metsähalli-
tuksen vuosina 1979–1980 ja 1989–1990 toteuttamista uu-
disojituksista (The effects of old drainage projects on wa-
ters. Report on the first-time ditching by Metsähallitus in 
1979–1980 and 1989–1990). Metsähallituksen metsätalouden 
julkaisuja 44, p. 69. 
27 Various water protection methods have been devel-
oped to decrease the harmful effects of DNM. See Joen-
suu & Rissanen (n 26), p. 65. There are no statistics on 
Minna Pappila and Lea Halonen: The Impact of the Water Framework Directive on Diffuse  
Pollution Control: the Case of Ditch Network Maintenance in Finnish Forests
81
2. Regulation of water protection in  
DNM projects
2.1 Permits, notifications and subsidies
The Water Act (587/2011) regulates various con-
struction projects in water bodies but also water 
as a natural resource. It includes general rules of 
ditching, and it also regulates ditching projects in 
the case of pollution in water areas (generally the 
Environmental Protection Act (527/2014) regu-
lates water pollution control). The Act on Water 
Resources Management (1299/2004) in turn is the 
main Act regulating the plans, programmes and 
procedures required by the WFD (see figure 1).
The Water Act applies to ditching and the 
use and maintenance of ditches (Water Act 5:1). 
A ditching project is called into question if the 
project includes either digging new ditches or 
making old ditches deeper or wider than they 
were originally.28 The maintenance of ditches 
only refers to projects including measures that 
aim at restoring the status after original ditch-
ing.29 
the realisation of concrete water protection measures. 
See Ympäristöministeriö (Ministry of the Environ-
ment) (2013): Vesienhoidon toimenpiteiden suunnittelu 
vuosille 2016–2021. Metsätalous (Planning of water man-
agement measures for 2016–2021. Forestry.). 10.6.2013. 
Metsätalous- ja turvetuotantotiimi. http://www.ym-
paristo.fi/vesienhoito/opas, p. 12. It seems that at least 
some water protection measures are carried out on 
most of the ditch maintenance areas. See Metsäkeskus 
(Finnish Forest Centre) (2014): Talousmetsien luonnon-
hoidon  laadunseuranta – raportti. (Quality control of 
nature management in commercial forests – a report). 
http://www.metsakeskus.fi/sites/default/files/luontolaa-
tu_2013.pdf, p. 6.
28 In addition, if draining is otherwise made more effec-
tive than it was originally when the ditches were first 
made, or ditches have evolved into natural-like state. 
 Halonen 2013 (n 10), p. 42.
29 As a judicial concept, ‘‘the maintenance of ditches’’ 
only includes activities which do not exceed the rights 
obtained for original ditching activities (otherwise the 
activity in juridical sense should be considered as ditch 
drainage). As a silvicultural concept, ‘‘the maintenance of 
ditches’’ includes all activities needed to restore the hy-
drological status suitable for timber growth (i.e. digging 
According to chapter 5 of the Water Act, 
either a permit or prior notification is required 
for ditch drainage projects. For ‘minor ditch 
drainage’, neither is necessary.30 Ditching, or the 
use and maintenance of ditches, are subject to a 
permit if it may cause environmental pollution in 
a water area (Water Act 5:3).31 Basically, changes 
caused by the project should always be consid-
ered environmental pollution, if the changes 
would result in the deterioration of a water body 
as defined in the WFD.32 Permits are issued by 
Regional Administrative Agencies.33 The per-
missibility of the project is typically assessed by 
using the ‘weighing of interests’ method: section 
4, chapter 3 of the Water Act prohibits allowing a 
new ditches or making old ditches deeper or wider). The 
silvicultural meaning of ditch network maintenance is 
thus broader than its judicial meaning. In this article the 
abbreviation of DNM (ditch network maintenance) refers 
to the silvicultural meaning.
30 There are no clear rules what ‘‘minor ditch drain-
age’’ is. The government bill concerning the Water Act 
refers to a small surface area of drainage, be it drainage 
of a field plot or a smallish forest patch. HE 277/2009 
vp. Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle vesilainsäädännön 
uudistamiseksi (Government bill for revising the water 
legislation), p. 93. Halonen, however, notes that within 
the framework of the Water Act, the need for a permit 
must be evaluated according to the effects of a project. A 
smallish ditch network area, of course, indicates but is 
not a guarantee of minor environmental effects. Halonen 
2013 (n 10), p. 41. 
31 A permit is also needed in the case of structural 
changes in a water body; e.g. lowering the water level or 
affecting the water stream. 
32 The Weser dredging case (C–461/13) states that unless 
a derogation is granted, deterioration is relevant if the 
status of at least one of the quality elements falls by one 
class, even if it does not result in a drop in classification of 
the body of surface water as a whole. For a more detailed 
discussion of the case see, Jääskinen, N. (2014): Advocate 
General’s Opinion 23 October 2014, Case C-461/13, Bund 
für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e. V. v Ger-
many. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FI/TXT/HT
ML/?uri=CELEX:62013CC0461&rid=4.
33 The State Regional Administrative Agency (Aluehal-
lintovirasto in Finnish) makes decisions on permits pur-
suant to the Environmental Protection Act and the Water 
Act. Environmental protection authorities of municipali-
ties issue environmental permits for smaller projects.
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permit for a project causing more harm than ben-
efit.34 In practice, a single DNM project hardly 
ever exceeds the permit threshold.35 Therefore, in 
reality DNM projects are not actively governed 
directly by permits.36 
A duty to make a prior notification to a super-
visory authority37 applies to all but minor ditch 
drainage projects (Water Act 5:6).38 Notifications 
34 Weighing of interests means that before allowing the 
permit, the benefits and harms of a single project are iden-
tified, valued and weighed. This means that when con-
ducting weighing of interests, the environmental effects 
of a project may result in prohibiting the permit if they 
are weighed more substantial than the benefits (e.g. mon-
etary value). See Soininen, Niko: Ympäristöoikeudellisen 
intressivertailun systematisointia (Systematisation of En-
vironmental Comparison of Interests). Lakimies 1/2012, 
102–124, p. 105–109. About the legal status of RBMPs in 
weighing of interests within the decision-making of the 
State Regional Administrative Agency see also Kauppila, 
J. (2014): Vesienhoitosuunnitelma ja lupaharkinta – Osa 
II: Lupakäytäntöä neljältä toimintasektorilta (River Ba-
sin Management Plan and Permit Consideration – Part 
II: Practice With Regard to Four Sectors of Activity). 
Ympäristöjuridiikka 3–4/2014, 69–116, p. 95–96. 
35 No permits on drainage projects were issued by State 
Regional Administrative Agencies between 2011 and 
2014. In recent decades there have been a few cases where 
ditch drainage projects have been licensed. This is mostly 
due to the fact that ditch maintenance projects are de-
liberately conducted not to exceed the permit threshold.
36 This also means that currently the public has no 
opportunities to take part in decision-making concern-
ing single DNM projects because permits are rarely 
required and therefore the opportunities to participate 
included in a permission procedure do not come about. 
Ympäristöministeriö (n 27), p. 4.
37 Notifications are also being increasingly used in the 
field of environmental protection regulated by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Act. For example, a growing field 
of activities that previously required an environmental 
permit is now being supervised by means of notifications 
(i.e. registration).
38 According to the report of the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment, it was not considered sensible to extend com-
pulsory notification to all ditch network maintenance 
cases. See Ympäristöministeriö (Ministry of the Envi-
ronment) (2012): Uudistunut vesilaki 2011. Keskeinen 
sisältö ja tärkeimmät muutokset. (The new Water Act. 
The core of the Act and the most relevant reforms). 
 Ympäristöministeriön raportteja 1/2012 [http://www.ym.
fi/download/noname/%7BD53693D8-3926-4EB6-8897-
C323928D5E21%7D/32131], p. 46. Therefore the obliga-
must be sent to ELY Centres39 no later than 60 
days prior to undertaking a ditch drainage proj-
ect.40 The notification must include a description 
of the project and its environmental impacts.41 
An ELY Centre has to advise the project leader to 
apply for a permit if need be. Ditching notifica-
tions do not result in an administrative decision. 
In practice, if deficits are noticed, the supervisory 
authority contacts the project leader with a writ-
ten statement and urges them either to improve 
the water protection measures or to apply for a 
permit. If a permit is needed, all necessary water 
protection measures are defined in permit con-
ditions.42 Even if permits are in fact hardly ever 
required, the potential need for a permit (Water 
Act 3:2) is in practice being used as a way to im-
pose water protection measures in every DNM 
project.43 
Finnish water legislation does not include 
specific standards on best available practices or 
techniques that would set the necessary water 
protection measures for ditching. The Water Act 
only includes a general obligation to minimise 
tion to send a ditch notification does not apply to ditch 
maintenance projects (in the judicial sense). According 
to the notifications that we scrutinised, about half of all 
DNM projects include digging new ditches. In almost all 
projects, ditches are made deeper and/or wider and more 
effective than they were originally. Therefore, ditching 
notification is compulsory in most cases. See also sub-
note 30.
39 ELY Centres (Elinkeino-, liikenne- ja ympäristökeskus 
in Finnish) act as supervisory authorities for the Water 
and Environmental Protection Act. Read more about ELY 
Centres here: http://www.ely-keskus.fi/en/web/ely-en/
environment. 
40 After receiving the notification, an ELY Centre has 60 
days to investigate the notification. If an ELY Centre does 
not react in 60 days, the ditching project may be initiated.
41 Environmental impacts refer at minimum to the im-
pacts supervised by the Water Act (i.e. pollution of water 
bodies or structural chances of water systems). In practice 
this concept is interpreted in a broader sense to refer also 
to impacts on biodiversity in general. See Halonen 2013 
(n 10), p. 48–49.
42 The Water Act 3:10. 
43 Inquiry/ELY Centres 2015. 
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the negative effects of projects affecting water 
areas if it does not incur unreasonable costs (Wa-
ter Act 2:7).44 This provision sets a general duty 
to minimise harmful effects and to use all reason-
able water protection measures.45 The wording 
of the aforementioned general duty is, however, 
open to various interpretations.46 While legisla-
tion offers flexible phrasing, soft law instruments 
provide more concrete guidance for water pro-
tection in case of ditch network maintenance 
projects.
Soft law includes, among other things, for-
est certification schemes47 and the best practice 
44 This provision also applies to projects that do not re-
quire a permit, yet the provision is not suited for utilising 
administrative compulsion and therefore its role in pre-
venting water pollution is more guiding than imperative. 
Halonen 2013 (n 10), p. 46–47.
45 Most of the water protection measures (e.g. silt pits 
and sedimentation pools) generally used in DNM are 
very cheap and thus expenses should not become unrea-
sonable in typical DNM cases.
46 Vihervuori points out that in order to become binding 
this stipulation should be concretised in a permit process 
by permit conditions. Vihervuori, P.: Vesitaloushank-
keet. (Water management projects) In Kuusiniemi (ed.): 
Ympäristöoikeus (Environmental law). Juva 2001, 785–915, 
p. 832.
47 The predominant voluntary forest certification system 
in the country, the Finnish PEFC, requires water protec-
tion measures to be taken as part of ditch network man-
agement work. The PEFC requires that a protection plan 
must be drawn up and sent to regional environmental 
authorities (i.e. the ELY Centre). The Finnish FSC – an-
other forest certification system – has somewhat more 
stringent requirements for water protection, but the FSC 
does not cover large areas in Finland and its influence in 
terms of practical DNM is therefore limited. Metsähalli-
tus has its own guidelines for water protection in state-
owned forests (Metsähallitus is a state-owned enterprise 
that operates in the administrative sector of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry. It governs both nature pro-
tection areas and state-owned forests. See more at: http://
www.metsa.fi/web/en/managementandadministration-
system). All the above-mentioned instruments have in 
general somewhat higher standards than legislation, 
but PEFC does not have any special criteria concern-
ing water protection of DNM projects (see criterion 18). 
See Finnish PEFC group certification standard PEFC FI 
1002:2009. Ryhmäsertifioinnin kriteerit metsäkeskuksen 
tai metsänhoitoyhdistyksen toimialueen tasolla. [http://
guidelines developed by Forestry Development 
Centre Tapio (Tapio hereinafter).48 Tapio’s best 
practice guidelines for water protection include 
more specific instructions on water protection 
measures and techniques.49 While the Water Act 
does not include any standards on best available 
techniques or practices of water protection, the 
guidelines also provide concrete guidance (soft 
law) for authorities applying the law.50 Legally 
non-binding guidelines possess a rather strong 




09112009.pdf]. The role of forest certification is not ana-
lysed in more detail, because they are not relevant from 
the viewpoint of this article which scrutinises the possi-
bilities and duties of authorities to ensure the good status 
of surface waters.
48 The best practice guidelines of Tapio strongly define 
the concept of sustainable forest management in Finland. 
Developing and updating the guidelines has continued 
for decades. In 1994, environmental aspects were intro-
duced to the guidelines for the first time. These national 
guidelines are made in close cooperation with research 
institutes and other stakeholders such as forest owners, 
the forest industry and NGOs. Äijälä and others (n 20) 
p. 8.
49 Joensuu S., Kauppila M., Lindén M. & Tenhola T. 
(eds.) (2013): Hyvän metsänhoidon suositukset – Vesien-
suojelu (Best practice guidelines for forestry – Water pro-
tection). Publications of Metsätalouden kehittämiskeskus 
Tapio. Guidelines disseminate information of best availa-
ble techniques and measures of water protection and are 
chiefly aimed at forest professionals who plan ditch net-
work maintenance projects for forest owners. Along with 
guidelines introducing the best practices and measures of 
water protection, there are also guidelines introducing 
the practices of planning the silvicultural activities in a 
river basin area. Hiltunen and others (n 22). 
50 Määttä has conducted a detailed analysis of the status 
of soft law documents in Finland. See Määttä, T. (2005): 
Soft law kansallisen oikeuden oikeuslähteenä. Tutkimus 
oikeudellisen ratkaisun normipremissin muodostamisen 
perusteista ympäristöoikeudessa (Soft Law as a Source 
of Law in National Legal Decision-making: A Study in 
Formulating the Norm Premise in Environmental Legal 
Decision-Making). Oikeustiede – Jurisprudentia XXXVIII, 
337–459. 
51 Hujala, T., Pykälä, J. & Tikkanen, J. (2007): Decision-
making among Finnish non-industrial private forest 
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In addition to binding regulations, there are 
also economic incentives (state subsidies) within 
the regulatory instrument mix of silviculture.52 
State-based incentives chiefly encourage forest 
owners to undertake certain silvicultural activi-
ties, such as ditching and forest road construc-
tion.53 State subsidies are targeted at private for-
est owners.54 Subsidised activities are considered 
important for the Finnish economy, as they aim 
to secure a stable wood supply for the Finnish 
forest industry. 
owners: the role of professional opinion and desire to 
learn. Scandinavian Journal of Forest Research, vol. 22, issue 
5, 454–463. Until the 1990s the environmental recommen-
dations of Tapio were largely neglected, but their status is 
nowadays relatively high among forest professionals. At-
titudes have changed mostly because of changes in Finn-
ish forest legislation, education and the general opin-
ion towards more biodiversity-friendly forestry, which 
were in turn partly due to international and local NGO 
campaigns, raising awareness of declining bio diversity, 
and joining the EU. Keto-Tokoi, p. (2006): Varhaiset 
luonnonhoitosuositukset eivät toteutuneet käytännön 
metsätaloudessa (The early recommendations for nature 
management have not be fulfilled in forest practices). 
In Jalonen R. et al. (eds.): Uusi metsäkirja (New Book on 
 Forests), Gaudeamus, Helsinki, 102–106, p. 102, 106. See 
also Halonen 2015 (n 10), p. 197–198. 
52 In 2014, EUR 59 million was used for measures 
safeguarding wood production (such as DNM, build-
ing or maintaining forest roads) in private forests. 
See [http://stat.luke.fi/mets%C3%A4nhoito-ja-mets% 
C3%A4nparannusty%C3%B6t-kustannukset-2014_fi].
53 Subsidies may be considered problematic from the 
point of view of the ‘polluter pays’ principle. However, 
the Finnish system of subsidies has been established ac-
cording to the European Union Guidelines for state aid 
in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas 
2014 to 2020 (2014/C 204/01). Subsidies guarantee that 
project leaders (i.e. private forest owners, usually) use 
professional planners. This is likely to lead to a more en-
vironmentally friendly result. Most of the subsidies go 
towards planning costs. See [http://www.metsakeskus.
fi/tuki-kunnostusojitukseen#.VRveYGOGd3s].
54 State owns 24 %, firms 8 %, municipalities 2 % and 
parishes 1 % of forests. The remaining 65 % of Finnish 
forests are owned by private individuals. See [http://
www.metla.fi/tiedotteet/metsatilastotiedotteet/2013/met-
samaan_omistus2011.htm ]
Financial support can be granted if the proj-
ect meets the requirements set in the Temporary 
Act on the Financing of Sustainable Forestry 
(34/2015, also Temporary Act). The Act stipulates 
that the best available and affordable water protec-
tion methods and constructions must be used in 
financed DNM projects. However, it seems that 
this stipulation does not exceed the conditions set 
in the Water Act (art. 2:7), but it clarifies and con-
cretises article 2:7 of the Water Act as it concerns 
ditch network maintenance. The Temporary Act 
also requires that the work should be done ac-
cording to the best professional practices, which 
means, according to the preparatory materials 
of the Act, Tapio’s best practice guidelines, for 
example.55 The Finnish Forest Centre (the For-
est Centre hereinafter) grants the subsidies and 
supervises the subsidised projects via the noti-
fications of completed, subsidised forest work. 
As a result, legislation on state subsidies at least 
strengthens the role of soft law in forest gover-
nance, and in this case, also in water governance. 
The legislation of state subsidies also strengthens 
the supervision of DNM projects, but appears 
not to bring about higher standards for water 
protection of DNM projects. The Forest Act does 
not include any stipulations on water protection 
of ditching projects.56 
55 HE 138/2014 vp. Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle kes-
tävän metsätalouden määräaikaiseksi rahoituslaiksi sekä 
laeiksi kestävän metsätalouden rahoituksesta annetun 
lain ja kiinteistön yhteisomistajien osallistumisesta met-
sätalouden rahoituslainsäädännössä tarkoitettuun toi-
menpiteeseen annetun lain kumoamisesta sekä kestävän 
metsätalouden rahoituslain kumoamisesta (Government 
Bill on the Temporary Act on the Financing of Sustainable 
Forestry), p. 31. 
56 The main objective of the Forest Act is to regulate for-
est logging. Apart from key forest habitat stipulations, 
forest legislation does not require any water or other 
environmental protection measures. The Forest Act also 
includes a regulation on timberline forests in Lapland 
and a disused provision on delineating protection zones 
in erosion-prone areas.
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2.2 The role of RBMPs and POMs
The WFD sets the objectives for water quality but 
it also includes a river basin planning system, as 
regional river basin management plans (RBMPs) 
and programmes of measures (POMs) are an in-
tegral part of the WFD.57 The fundamental idea 
behind the WFD is to look at the whole river ba-
sin area in terms of water management planning 
(including cumulative effects); therefore, it could 
also be a potential instrument to govern diffuse 
pollution. The WFD does not directly regulate 
ditch drainage, but RBMPs and POMs include 
desirable measures for drainage and DNM.
The WFD requires the establishment of cer-
tain regulatory instruments as mandatory and 
calls them ‘basic measures’.58 In Finland the ba-
57 Lee (n 2), p. 29–30. See also Grimeaud, D. (2004): The 
EC Water Framework Directive – An Instrument for In-
tegrating Water Policy. RECIEL 13 (1), 27–39, and Futter 
M. N. and others (2011): Forests, Forestry and the Water 
Framework Directive in Sweden: A Trans-Disciplinary 
Commentary. Forests 2, 261–282, p. 262. 
58 Article 11(2).
sic measures set in POMs are those required by 
Finnish legislation.59 In the case of ditch drain-
age, the basic measures of water protection in-
clude measures and techniques put into practice 
at the level of single projects. 
The WFD also enables the use of supple-
mentary measures. Article 11 states that supple-
mentary measures must be included in the pro-
grammes if the basic measures are not sufficient 
in order to meet the established environmental 
objectives. The use of supplementary measures 
is only optional to the extent that the environ-
mental objectives are likely to be met by the ba-
sic measures.60 The supplementary measures for 
water protection in ditch network maintenance 
include water protection structures on a river 
basin scale (e.g. overflow wetland areas).61 The 
59 The POMs provide an overview of the specific mea-
sures to be taken, in order to contribute to the achieve-
ment of the environmental objectives (art. 11).
60 Article 13(2) and (4). See also Howart (n 5), p. 132–133.
61 In current RBMPs and POMs, basic water protection 
measures regarding DNM projects are confusingly listed 
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planning of silvicultural activities on river basin 
scale, which aims at recognising sensitive areas 
and planning measures needed to limit the load-
ing of harmful substances from the catchment62, 
is also listed as a supplementary measure. Plan-
ning on the river basin scale may improve water 
protection measures in vulnerable areas and it 
helps to take cumulative effects of various forest 
management projects into account. River basin-
scale planning is currently governed by soft law 
and it is an entirely voluntary activity and still 
relatively rare. The plans are usually drawn up 
by the Forest Centre.63 These plans are not bind-
ing and the authorities do not have the power 
to implement river basin planning without the 
consent of land owners.64
A closer look at the RBMPs and POMs in 
Finland shows that they include many desir-
able measures and activities concerning DNM.65 
The measures mainly consist of actions such as 
further developing guidelines and forest certifi-
under the title ‘‘supplementary measures’’. This is, how-
ever, due to terminological confusion as in the first Finn-
ish RBMPs and POMs, terminologies were not consist-
ent with the WFD. In the proposals for new POMs, basic 
water protection measures of DNM projects are already 
labelled as basic measures, including slit pits, sedimen-
tation pools and small scale overland-flow, for example. 
See e.g. Ehdotus Isojoen- Teuvanjoen alueen vesienhoi-
don toimenpideohjelmaksi vuoteen 2021 (A proposal for 
a POM in the Isojoki-Teuvanjoki region), 72; Luonnos 
Kyrönjoen vesistöalueen vesienhoidon toimenpideoh-
jelmaksi vuoteen 2021 (A draft of a POM for Kyrönjoki 





62 Hiltunen and others (n 22), p. 4
63 Hiltunen and others (n 22).
64 Nevertheless, as mentioned, the status of authority-
based soft law – such as the best practice forest manage-
ment guidelines of Tapio – is strong. 
65 The measures for achieving good water status are 
similar to the RBMPs of different river basins. Plans 
are available here: [http://www.ymparisto.fi/fi-FI/Vesi/
Vesiensuojelu/Vesienhoidon_suunnittelu_ja_yhteistyo/
Vesienhoitoalueet].
cation standards, increasing advice and educa-
tion, enhancing water protection planning of var-
ious projects, and improving the implementation 
of existing standards such as PEFC. In addition, 
there are concrete regional targets for various 
water protection measures: e.g. 300 water pro-
tection structures, intensified water protection 
planning on 28,000 hectares, and advising 4 200 
forest owners annually. In RBMPs there are also 
desirable numbers of water protection measures 
for different waterways.66
From a legal perspective, RBMPs and POMs 
do not oblige any measures to be taken per se.67 
They only introduce potential instruments for 
governance on catchment areas. The legal status 
(i.e. legal force) of RBMPs and POMs in Finland is 
regulated generally in the Act on Water Resources 
Management. It stipulates that state and munici-
pal authorities shall give due consideration in their 
operations to the water resources management 
plans approved by the government, as appropri-
ate.68 Sectoral legislation includes more accurate 
provisions of the legal relevance of RBMPs. Both 
the Water Act and the Environmental Protection 
Act require that a permitting  authority must take 
RBMPs into account in the permit consideration 
process. As POMs are treated as a part of the 
RBMPs in Finland, their legal status is consistent 
66 See e.g. Kymijoen-Suomenlahden vesienhoitoalueen 
vesienhoitosuunnitelma vuoteen 2015 (the RBMP of the 
Kymijoki-Suomenlahti region). Ibid.
67 , HE 120/2004 vp (n 17), p. 50.
68 Section 28 of the Act on Water Resources Management. 
For more on the legal status of the RBMPs and POMs 
in Scandinavian countries, see Baaner (Baaner, L.: Pro-
grammes of Measures under the Water Framework Di-
rective - A Comparative Case Study, 2011:1, 31–52, p. 35) 
and Ekelund-Entson & Gipperth (Ekelund-Entson, M. & 
Gipperth, L. (2010): Mot samma mål? – Implementering-
en av EU:s ramdirektiv för vatten i Skandinavien. Ju-
ridiska institutionens skriftserie Handelshögskolan vid 
Göteborgs universitet, Skrift 6. http://www.vattenmyn-
digheterna.se/Sv/nyheter/2011/Pages/mot-samma-mal.
aspx).
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with the legal status of RBMPs.69 The legal rel-
evance of RBMPs has, however, been growing in 
the national legal praxis lately.70
3. Evaluation of water protection 
 instruments 
As for water protection, the effects of a single 
ditch network maintenance project are rarely so 
severe that the status of water quality in a surface 
water body would deteriorate. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned in the introduction, the cumulative 
effects of several DNM projects in the same area 
may lead to the deterioration of water quality, es-
pecially the status of a small water body or area, 
such as a spring, rivulet, pond or lake. There are, 
however, legislative flaws that make the evalua-
tion of cumulative effects vague or ineffective.71 
The permit threshold and conditions of the 
Water Act always concerns a single project. It is 
not possible to obligate several projects to apply 
for a permit together.72 The other projects or the 
effects of other projects can only be taken into 
consideration through the condition of the re-
ceiving water body or area. This means that only 
the project that is expected to exceed the thresh-
old limit of pollution can be required to apply 
for a permit. While the exceeding of the permit 
threshold is estimated through the condition of 
the receiving water body, it is possible to take the 
cumulative effects into account in the permit con-
69 Section 12 of the Act on Water Resources Manage-
ment.
70 See e.g. KHO 2014:176 (A decision of the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court) and KHO 20.8.2010/1869. The Weser 
dredging case (C–461/13) will increasingly raise the legal 
status of RBMPs.
71 The need for considering cumulative effects has also 
been recognised in the government bill on the Water 
Act. According to the preparatory materials, appropri-
ate evaluation (of the negative effects of DNM) would 
require the evaluation of the effects of drainage togeth-
er with other projects within the same river basin. HE 
277/2009 vp (n 30), p. 93. 
72 Ibid. 
sideration process of a single project. However, 
in practice it is hard to show and legally prove 
which project exceeds the threshold limit if there 
are several projects planned or going on in the 
same river basin area.73 This may result in cumu-
lative effects not being taken into consideration 
in the permit consideration process.
The declarative nature of ditching notifica-
tions means that notifications are not suitable for 
supervising the cumulative effects, either. No-
tification enables the supervisory authority to 
get information about single DNM projects for 
further supervision74 but it does not lead to an 
administrative decision.75 This means that the su-
pervisory authority does not have the powers to 
prohibit someone’s project or to oblige someone 
to apply for a permit on the basis of other notifi-
cations in the same river basin area.76 Moreover, 
notifications do not include a binding time limit 
for carrying out the notified DNM work.77 The 
flexible time limit hinders the supervision of the 
effects of single projects, as well as the cumula-
tive effects of various projects in particular. ELY 
Centres may only try to negotiate and persuade 
the project leaders to carry out their projects in 
a way that negative cumulative effects will be 
minimised.78 
The sectoral environmental legislation with 
the separate supervisory responsibilities also 
makes the assessment of cumulative effects prob-
lematic. For instance, ELY Centres do not get in-
formation on forest loggings as they are not the 
supervisory authorities of forest management, 
and the Forest Centre does not have the com-
petence to consider water protection measures 
73 Halonen (n 10) 2013, p. 55–56.
74 HE 277/2009 vp (n 30), p. 55–56.
75 Due to their declarative nature, authorities have no 
powers to set direct obligations.
76 Halonen (n 10) 2013, p. 54.
77 Usually it is written in a notification that the work will 
be completed within two years, e.g. 2016–2017.
78 HE 277/2009 vp (n 30), p. 57.
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while overseeing forest loggings because forest 
legislation does not include stipulations on water 
protection.79 
The granting of state subsidies for forestry 
and DNM projects does not take the problem of 
several concurrent or consecutive projects into 
consideration, either. The granting of state sub-
sidies has a single project point of view and the 
Temporary Act on the Financing of Sustainable 
Forestry only emphasises the best water protection 
methods instead of water quality.80 As a result, it is 
not the task of the Forest Centre to supervise wa-
ter quality; its responsibility is only the quality of 
proposed water protection measures of a single 
DNM project. 
Along with the legislative flaws, the techni-
cal systems for identifying the problematic cumu-
lative effects are still inadequate and not in use 
in all ELY Centres.81 Currently there is no com-
prehensive database (geographical information 
system, GIS) that would enable the ELY Centres 
to efficiently evaluate the effects of two or more 
DNM projects and other projects such as extrac-
tion of peat.82 Some ELY Centres use the VESTY 
79 According to a Swedish estimate, clear cuts should not 
exceed 30 % of the total forest land so as not to cause 
 negative effects of nitrogen leakage to water courses. 
Ring, E., Löfgren, S., Sandin, L., Högbom, L. & Goed-
koop, W. (2008): Skogsbruk och vatten. En kunskaps-
översikt. Skogforsk, redogörelse nr 3, 2008. http://www.
skogforsk.se/PageFiles/73616/Redog%C3%B6relse%20
3-2008-low.pdf, p. 40.
80 The system of state subsidies neither includes incen-
tives for taking the effects of several projects into account 
nor encourages river-basin level planning, for example. 
The only rule is that the minimum area that can be 
awarded the maximum amount of compensation (75 % 
of costs) is five hectares. This is the only stipulation that 
could be considered an incentive towards slightly larger 
ditching units and may lead to the planning of larger 
areas at a time, thus enhancing the planning of the most 
cost-effective water protection measures.
81 Inquiry/ELY Centres 2015. 
82 As supervisory authorities of environmental permits 
of peat extraction, ELY Centres do know about peat pro-
duction areas, but without a GIS, information may be 
scattered.
water project database (vesistötyötietojärjestelmä), 
but it only includes certain kinds of information 
concerning changing water environment (ditch-
ing, building dams, etc.) – it does not incorporate 
other polluting projects. It would also require 
further development in order to properly serve 
the surveillance of cumulative effects.83 There 
have been plans to facilitate the situation by 
creating a new geographic information system 
and also by using the existing systems more ef-
ficiently.84 Currently there is no comprehensive 
GIS that could be used nationwide for mapping 
and controlling water polluting projects.
It seems clear that Finnish water legislation 
does not sufficiently enable authorities to take 
cumulative effects into account while aiming at 
maintaining the good water status. This justi-
fies the question whether Finnish legislation is 
consistent with the obligations of the WFD. It 
can be concluded that the Water Act succeeds in 
setting a broad framework for water protection 
regulations of ditching projects. The prior noti-
fication is a sensible instrument for supervising 
single DNM projects, but the Water Act fails in 
setting concrete norms or detailed rules of water 
protection for DNM projects while they are typi-
cally not governed by permits.85 This is a typi-
cal challenge of regulating diffuse pollution by 
command and control instruments.86 Economic 
instruments and soft law do not help the authori-
ties to take the cumulative effects into account 
either. The WFD and the RBMPs, and especially 
POMs, which include concrete measures for wa-
ter protection, could improve the water protec-
83 Inquiry/ELY Centres 2015. 
84 Ympäristöministeriö (n 27), p. 15–16. 
85 While there is no prevalent practice of permitting 
ditching projects, (judicial) challenges may come along 
to specify and concretise the rate of environmental pro-
tection (i.e. water pollution) necessary in a concrete case.
86 E.g. Gunningham and Sinclair (n 5), Gunningham, N. 
& Grabosky, P.: Smart Regulation. Designing Environ-
mental Policy. Oxford University Press 2004.
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tion of diffuse pollution. But it seems that there 
are certain flaws that make it difficult to take the 
obligations of RBMPs (and POMs) into consider-
ation if DNM projects are considered.
According to Finnish law, the obligation to 
take RBMPs (and POMs) into consideration only 
concerns administrative activities. The actual 
obligations of a single project must be based on 
legal norms of e.g. the Water Act or the Environ-
mental Protection Act.87 The aims and measures 
mentioned in RBMPs (and POMs) are thus not 
directly binding on authorities. They are partly 
guidelines and they partly – as with water quali-
fications – serve as evidence of water quality. All 
in all, the practice of taking RBMPs into account 
has not yet become established. This might partly 
be due to the somewhat unclear implementation 
of article 4 of the WFD into Finnish legislation.88 
The question arises as to what the range of 
activities of authorities concerning DNM projects 
falling within the term ‘shall give due consider-
ation in their operations to the RBMPs’ or within 
the legal relevance of RBMPs laid down in sec-
toral legislation is.89 The Water Act stipulates that 
the permitting authority must take RBMPs into 
account in the permit consideration process, but 
as we have already mentioned, ditching projects 
are rarely governed by permits.90 The obligation 
87 HE 120/2004 vp. (n 17), p. 50.
88 Nevertheless, the Finnish authorities are obliged to 
prevent the deterioration of water bodies and the nation-
al provisions of the Environmental Protection Act and 
the Water Act should be interpreted in the light of the 
WFD.
89 As Baaner (n 69, p. 36) points out, ‘the question seems 
not only to be the degree to which the programmes as 
such are binding for the authorities, in the way that non-
compliance with its measures can be legally reviewed 
and sanctioned. It seems just as relevant to consider what 
kinds of activities or decisions can be bound by or guided 
within the established national legal frameworks.’ 
90 Nevertheless, the water quality objectives should im-
pact the consideration of the permit threshold. When an 
ELY Centre receives a ditching notification, it considers 
whether a permit is needed or not. The potential prob-
to take RBMPs into consideration is also ‘bind-
ing’ in the ruling of state subsidies according to 
the Temporary Act on the Financing of Sustain-
able Forestry91, while the Act on Water Resources 
Management stipulates that state authorities 
shall give due consideration in their operations 
to the RBMPs approved by the government, as 
appropriate. All in all, the vague formulations 
“due consideration” and “into account” are 
questionable in the light of the WFD.
Based on the requirements of the Temporary 
Act, the Forest Centre should always call for the 
water protection measures, which are considered 
basic measures in WFD.92 But could the Forest 
Centre also require supplementary measures of 
POMs, if there is a risk of deterioration of the 
status class of a surface water body? The legisla-
tion of state subsidies does not include special 
provisions when taking the RBMPs and POMs 
into account in the ruling of state subsidies. The 
decision-making of an authority must be based 
on the Temporary Act, whereas POMs should 
merely be ‘taken into account’. The Forest Centre 
always considers a single project at a time. As a 
result, there is a great risk that the Forest Centre 
does not and cannot require supplementary mea-
sures defined in POMs when ruling on a subsidy 
of a single project.93 In addition the Forest Centre 
lem is, as described earlier, that the ELY Centre does not 
have the powers to estimate the cumulative effects when 
supervising the DNM projects.
91 According to law, the state subsidy can be granted if 
the preconditions of water protection set in the Tempo-
rary Act on the Financing of Sustainable forestry are met.
92 According to the Temporary Act (article 15), the best 
available and affordable water protection methods and con-
structions must be used in financed DNM projects. The 
financed projects have to be in accordance with other 
regulations such as the stipulations in the Water Act 
(article 6).
93 It seems that the Forest Centre does not have powers 
to require supplementary measures, e.g. creating new 
wetlands or intensified planning unless the criteria of 
best available practice are met, which are single project-
based water protection measures. 
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does not supervise water quality – it only moni-
tors the sufficiency of proposed water protection 
measures of a single DNM project according to 
the stipulations of the Temporary Act.94
In Finland, it is possible to receive state fi-
nancing for water protection measures, e.g. for 
wetlands serving water protection in the river 
basin.95 However, it is apparent that Finnish for-
est authorities do not have the legal authority to 
call for supplementary water protection mea-
sures defined in POMs, even in cases where a 
risk of deterioration in the status class of surface 
waters occurs,96 if the costs of a supplementary 
measure would not be “affordable” for a single 
DNM project.
It should also be taken into account that in 
Finland the classification of water bodies accord-
ing to the requirements of the WFD currently in-
cludes only larger water bodies.97 The European 
94 This includes overseeing that the notification has been 
sent to the ELY Centre, which in turn takes water quality 
into account. HE 138/2014 vp (n 68), p. 31. 
95 The state subsidies can be granted for establishing 
 water protection structures for DNM which serve a river 
basin area (article 21 of Temporary Act on the Financ-
ing of Sustainable Forestry). However, the state subsidy 
system of the Temporary Act does not cover the costs of 
intensified ditch network planning. The planning costs 
may be covered by Metsähallitus. Hiltunen and others 
(n 22), p. 9
96 The supplementary water protection measures cannot 
be required by the Water Act either, if the costs would be 
unreasonable for a single DNM project. If a single proj-
ect requires a permit, it is possible to forbid the project 
altogether.
97 See e.g. Toimenpideohjelma/Häme, Etelä-Savon pin-
tavesien hoidon toimenpideohjelma 2010–2015. Accord-
ing to the guidance document of the European Commis-
sion, ‘Member States have flexibility to decide whether 
the purposes of the Directive, which apply to all sur-
face waters, can be achieved without the identification 
of  every minor but discrete and significant element of 
surface water as a water body.’ (European Commission 
(2003): Common Implementation Strategy for the Water 
Framework Directive. Guidance Document No. 2, Iden-
tification of Water Bodies. Produced by Working Group 
on Water Bodies. Directorate General Environment of 
the European Commission, Brussels. https://circabc.eu-
ropa.eu/sd/a/655e3e31-3b5d-4053-be19-15bd22b15ba9/
Commission points out that Finland has ‘set 
relatively high size thresholds for the delinea-
tion of water bodies, excluding a large number 
of water bodies. Finnish authorities have clari-
fied that areal coverage of water bodies is 86 % 
for all Finnish lakes and about 90 % for rivers and 
100 % for coastal waters.’ In addition, the Com-
mission notes that ‘it is not clear how the cur-
rent size thresholds have been set to ensure the 
fulfilment of the WFD, i.e. if the excluded water 
bodies are effectively protected and how.’98 The 
intention is to widen the scrutiny at a later date 
to smaller lakes and rivers in future plans, but 
due to the huge number of headwaters and small 
forest streams, it will probably never be possible 
to include all headwaters into RBMPs and POMs. 
The effects of forest management typically arise 
in headwaters and smaller water bodies. 
If a water body does not have a status class 
and an objective in a RBMP – as is often the case 
with small water bodies affected by DNM – the 
relevance of RBMP may be, in practice, smaller 
as there is no defined status or objective which 
should be taken into account. Even in these cases 
the obligation of the WFD to prevent further de-
Guidance%20No%202%20-%20Identification%20of%20
water%20bodies.pdf, p. 12.) According to the Commis-
sion, recognising even small headwaters as surface wa-
ter bodies in RBMPs and POMs could cause too much 
of an administrative burden. Still, if a ‘small element’ of 
surface water is significant for achieving the aims of the 
WFD, it must be taken into consideration. According to 
Lassaletta and others (Lasseletta L., García-Gómez H., 
Gimeno B.S. & Rovira, J.V. (2010): Headwater streams: 
neglected ecosystems in the EU Water Framework Direc-
tive. Implications for nitrogen pollution control. Environ-
mental Science and Policy 13 (2010) 423–433, p. 431), due 
to this discretion of Member States, too little attention is 
currently paid to headwater streams.
98 European Commission (2012): Report from the Com-
mission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Implementation of the Water Framework Directive 
(2000/60/EC) River Basin Management Plans. Member 
State: Finland. Brussels 14.11.2012, SWD (2012) 379 final. 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-frame-
work/pdf/CWD-2012-379_EN-Vol3_FI.pdf, p. 9. 
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terioration remains.99 This obligation, however, 
is not considered as binding and restricting as a 
determined water quality status in an RBMP in 
practice.100 This practice should be reconsidered, 
particularly following the decision of the Court 
of Justice stating that ‘the obligation to prevent 
deterioration of the status of bodies of surface 
water remains binding at each stage of imple-
mentation of Directive 2000/60 and is applicable 
to every surface water body type and status for 
which a management plan has or should have 
been adopted.’101 Thus the lack of quality status 
should not result in neglecting the obligation to 
prevent deterioration in the status of waters.
4. Conclusions 
DNM projects are prima facie regulated as a point-
source project; either a permit or a ditching noti-
fication to environmental authorities is required. 
However, a significant part of the Finnish water 
protection regulation of DNM is a mix of various 
non-binding instruments, as was shown above. 
This is typical for the regulation of diffuse pollu-
tion. The most relevant substantial regulations of 
DNM consist of voluntary guidelines and state 
subsidies. However, the effectiveness of these 
soft law and financial instruments require that 
legislation sets out a clear framework for super-
vising (notifications) and steering (the potential 
need of a permit and the obligation to minimise 
negative effects) DNM projects. 
Based on the analysis of legislation and other 
99 At the moment the obligation is not implemented in 
Finnish legislation, per se. But the permit threshold of 
Water Act (article 5:3) has to be interpreted according to 
the WFD and the obligations of the article 4.
100 Kauppila 2014 (n 34), p. 69. Kauppila has scrutinised 
the role of RBMPs in granting environmental permits. 
According to this research on permit-granting in differ-
ent sectors, the status class and the objective are more 
binding. 
101 The Weser dredging case (C-461/13). See also sub-
notes 3 and 33.
sources, it seems that the environmental and for-
est authorities run into challenges when taking 
the effects of several concurrent or consecutive 
projects on water quality into account. Based on 
the scrutinising of existing regulation and exam-
ined notifications, it seems that current legisla-
tion does enable and oblige authorities to require 
water protection measures of a single project to 
some extent. 
In general, Finnish legislation seems to work 
relatively well for individual DNM projects in 
areas where other diffuse pollution is not high or 
where the receiving water body is not especially 
sensitive. As a rule, a single project will adhere to 
Tapio’s guidelines and its environmental effects 
will normally not be excessive. Nevertheless, 
flaws in the law (e.g. the difficulty to take the 
cumulative effects into account in the permit con-
sideration process, the vague status of notifica-
tions, the weak legal status of RBMPs and POMs) 
and in practice (e.g. the lack of a comprehensive 
GIS) do not enable authorities to take cumulative 
effects properly into account. Legislation does 
not adequately enable the authorities to protect 
water quality if there are a) several DNM projects, 
b) a DNM project and other forestry projects (log-
ging, ploughing, fertilising) or c) a DNM project 
and other kinds of water polluting activities such 
as peat production within the river basin area. 
Therefore, we return to the typical problem of dif-
fuse pollution: accumulation. The consequences 
in the light of the obligations and objectives of 
WPD might be undesirable, especially if several 
DNM projects are carried out in the same river 
basin within the space of a few years. 
It seems that in Finland the implementation 
of the obligation to prevent deterioration and the 
aim to maintain good water status (article 4 of 
the WFD) has been executed via legislation (e.g. 
conditions for permit consideration) and RMDPs 
and POMs, yet the functionality of both means 
is questionable in the case of cumulative effects 
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of several DNM projects. Supplementary mea-
sures of POMs are practically optional in the 
case of DNM, but there could be a need for the 
obligation to carry out these measures in order 
to prevent the deterioration of surface waters in 
vulnerable areas, for example. As a result, the 
implementation of WFD has not yet helped to in-
corporate a truly holistic view that would enable 
and demand the consideration of the cumulative 
effects of diffuse pollution. The WFD has the 
greatest impact in cases where the water qual-
ity standards have been set in a RBMP. When a 
water body has not been classified, the effect of 
the WFD is much smaller.102 
Relatively light-touch monitoring of DNM 
projects are unavoidable, as every ELY Centre 
receives hundreds of ditching notifications every 
year. However, there should be a requirement 
and a possibility to take cumulative effects into 
account even in cases where a single DNM project 
would not harm the environment. One possible 
solution to emphasising the river basin approach 
could be to strengthen the role of the Temporary 
Act on the Financing of Sustainable Forestry. The 
state subsidies on forestry could be targeted at 
river basin planning instead of emphasising the 
numerous economic aims of the Temporary Act, 
for example.103 A more detailed local river basin 
plan could specify the requirement of a POM.
Part of the above-mentioned governance 
problems could be eased by developing a com-
prehensive nationwide geographical informa-
tion system where all water polluting projects 
102 Kauppila 2014 (n 34), p. 69.
103 The Temporary Act could be amended to require the 
river basin-based water protection measures when they 
are deemed necessary in a POM.
would be marked.104 Other remedies are needed, 
too. The number of employees in the ELY Centres 
has been cut in recent years and currently all ELY 
Centres have insufficient staff to mark the notifi-
cations into a GIS and to go through notifications 
thoroughly.105 An electronic ditching notification 
could help with the checking of notifications, 
and possibly more coordinated collaboration 
between the ELY Centres and the Forest Centre 
could be beneficial as both authorities check the 
same DNM projects, even though they do it from 
different viewpoints.
It is evident that the consideration of the 
effects of several concurrent projects on water 
quality is not addressed well enough in cur-
rent national legislation, even if the problem has 
been acknowledged. This may lead to the dete-
rioration of the quality of especially small water 
bodies and accelerate the decline of endangered 
water habitats and species.
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Överfiske är idag ett allvarligt hot mot de ma-
rina ekosystemen.1 Ett alltför omfattande fiske 
kan nämligen innebära att inte bara fiskebestånd 
minskar eller helt försvinner, utan också att and-
ra djur- och växtarter i den marina näringsväven 
påverkas negativt.2 Ett alltför omfattande fiske 
kan till och med leda till att vattenkvaliteten per 
se försämras (exempelvis genom att påverka 
ekosystemets närsalter).3 Därutöver kan vissa 
fiskeredskap ge upphov till bifångster, fysiskt 
skada bottenfauna och frigöra miljögifter i vatt-
net.4 Fiske kan med andra ord på flera olika sätt 
försvåra uppnående av olika miljömål, däribland 
målet om en god miljöstatus, ett mål som följer 
1 Enligt en rapport av IUCN (2015) är 90 procent av 
Europas fiskarter utrotningshotade och enligt FAO är 
75 procent av världens fiskbestånd utfiskade, överfiskade 
eller fiskade till biologisk maxgräns. IUCN (2015). Euro-
pean Red List of Marine Fishes. 
2 S.k. trofiska kaskader kan t.ex. uppstå när omfattande 
fiske sker på fiskarter med en strukturerande roll i eko-
systemen (vanligen rovdjursfiskar). Se t.ex. Eriksson et 
al. (2011). Effects of altered offshore food webs on coast-
al ecosystems emphasizes the need for cross-ecosystem 
management. Ambio, 40, s. 786–797 och Casini et al. 
(2009). Trophic cascades promote threshold-like shifts 
in pelagic marine ecosystems. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the USA, 106, s. 196–202. Se även 
om detta i SOU 2008:48, En utvecklad havsförvaltning, s. 73. 
3 Se t.ex. Eriksson et al. (2009). Declines in predatory fish 
promote bloom-forming macroalgae. In Ecological Appli-
cations 19(8), s. 1975–1988.
4 Se t.ex. Tjensvoll (2014). Sediment resuspension. Impacts 
and extent of human disturbances. Akademisk doktors-
avhandling. Stockholms Universitet. 
Abstract
This study analyses the Swedish implementation of 
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) 
in relation to fisheries. The study shows a lack of 
integration between fisheries and environmental 
legislation with several loopholes and deficits im-
peding the achievement of a good status of marine 
ecosystems. There are e.g. no obligations for re-
sponsible authorities to secure that fisheries mea-
sures according to the Fisheries Act are coherent 
with environmental quality standards. There are 
moreover few situations when fisheries are tried 
under the Environmental Code, limits in the bind-
ing force of environmental quality standards and 
few proposed fisheries measures, where none of 
them are to be applied outside the coastal trawl-
ing prohibited areas, despite the delegated compe-
tence to, under certain conditions, take measures 
in the whole exclusive economic zone according 
to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). There are 
thus several deficits in the Swedish legislation and 
the implementation of the MSFD when it comes to 
hindering the negative effects of fisheries on marine 
ecosystems. 
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institutet, Göteborgs Universitet. Artikeln utgör ett del-
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av det s.k. Havsmiljödirektivet,5 som implemen-
terats i svensk rätt genom havsmiljöförordning-
en (2010:1341) samt tillhörande föreskrifter.6 
För att hantera sådana ekosystemsamband 
och uppnå det övergripande målet om en god 
miljöstatus ska medlemsstater enligt direktivet 
förvalta haven med en ekosystembaserad och 
adaptiv förvaltningsmetod, där också fiske-
bestånd och fiskets påverkan på havsmiljön 
ingår.7 I detta ingår bland annat att fastställa 
miljömål liksom att fastställa och genomföra åt-
gärder mot fiske för att säkerställa att normerna 
följs. Samtidigt finns (både på EU-nivå och i den 
svenska rättsordningen) särskilda regelverk för 
fiske, något som riskerar att motverka en integre-
rad och ekosystembaserad havsmiljöförvaltning 
och därmed att uppsatta mål inte nås.
Det övergripande syftet med denna artikel 
är därför att diskutera möjligheter och hinder 
att genomföra en ekosystembaserad förvaltning 
där också fiske ingår. Diskussionen avgränsas 
framför allt till frågan om i vilken utsträckning 
miljökvalitetsnormer för en god miljöstatus kan 
genomföras mot yrkesmässigt fiske i svenska 
vatten. I detta ingår också att analysera vilken 
rättsverkan miljökvalitetsnormerna bör ha en-
ligt direktivet samt hur krav mot fiske i svenska 
vatten kan genomföras givet parallella regelverk 
samt EU:s exklusiva kompetens inom den ge-
mensamma fiskeripolitiken. Inledningsvis ges 
en bakgrundsbeskrivning av direktivet och den 
svenska implementeringen.
5 Europaparlamentets och Rådets direktiv 2008/56/EG av 
den 17 juni 2008 om upprättande av en ram för gemenskapens 
åtgärder på havsmiljöpolitikens område (Ramdirektiv om en 
marin strategi), nedan ”Havsmiljödirektivet”.
6 Se Havs- och vattenmyndighetens föreskrifter om vad som 
kännetecknar god miljöstatus samt miljökvalitetsnormer med 
indikatorer för Nordsjön och Östersjön (HVMFS 2012:18).
7 Artikel 1.3. Se mer om detta i avsnitt 2. 
2. Havsmiljöförvaltning
2.1 Kort om Havsmiljödirektivet 
Genom antagandet av Havsmiljödirektivet fick 
den Europeiska Unionens havspolitik en miljö-
pelare med det övergripande syftet att uppnå el-
ler upprätthålla en god miljöstatus i Unionens 
marina vatten senast år 2020.8 Denna målsättning 
innebär att de marina ekosystemens strukturer, 
funktioner, processer och återhämtningsförmåga 
(s.k. resiliens) ska bevaras och skyddas, att förlust 
av biologisk mångfald ska förhindras samt att 
mänsklig användning av de marina ekosystemen 
ska vara långsiktigt hållbar.9 
Målsättningen ska nås genom att varje med-
lemsstat utarbetar och genomför s.k. ”marina 
strategier”.10 Detta innebär att medlemsstaterna 
ska, i cykler om sex år;11
a) Genomföra en inledande bedömning 
b) Fastställa en god miljöstatus 
c) Fastställa miljömål med indikatorer 
d) Anta övervakningsprogram 
e) Anta åtgärdsprogram
I de marina strategierna ska en ekosystembase-
rad metod tillämpas, vilket bland annat innebär 
att det samlade trycket av mänskliga aktiviteter 
hålls inom nivåer som är förenliga med en god 
miljöstatus.12 
Direktivet ställer vidare upp 11 s.k. deskrip-
torer som medlemsstaterna ska utgå ifrån vid 
fastställandet av en god miljöstatus (bilaga 1).13 
Dessa utgör övergripande kvalitativa beskriv-
ningar av en god miljöstatus. Av särskild rele-
vans för fiske är deskriptorerna om ”biologisk 
8 Artikel 1. För en närmare beskrivning se Michanek 
och Christiernsson (2014). “Adaptive Management of EU 
Marine Ecosystems – About Time to Include Fishery.” 
Scandinavian Studies in Law. Volume 59, p. 228–234.
9 Artikel 3.5(a-b).
10 Artikel 1.2. 
11 Artiklarna 5 samt 8–13. 
12 Artikel 1.3. 
13 Artikel 9.1 samt bilaga I. 
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mångfald”,14 ”kommersiellt nyttjade fiskar och 
skaldjur”,15 ”marina näringsvävar”16 och ”havs-
bottnens integritet”.17
Ytterligare vägledning för fastställande av 
vad som kännetecknar en god miljöstatus finns 
i bilaga III till direktivet.18 Av denna följer bland 
annat att fastställandet ska ske både utifrån 
biologiska förhållanden (t.ex. fiskebeståndens 
 ålders- och storleksstruktur)19 och för belastning 
och påverkan (t.ex. selektivt uttag av arter, bland 
annat oavsiktliga bifångster, eller påverkan på 
havsbottnen genom fiske).20 När det gäller fast-
ställandet av miljömål ska hänsyn tas till de fak-
torer som har med påverkan och belastning att 
göras.21 Målen ska vara förenliga med andra re-
levanta kvalitetskrav för havet som fastställts på 
nationell nivå, gemenskapsnivå eller internatio-
nell nivå.22 Med syfte att öka samstämmig heten 
och samordningen mellan medlemsstaterna 
har Kommissionen också tagit fram ett doku-
ment med gemensamma kriterier och metod-
standarder.23 
14 ”Biologisk mångfald bevaras. Livsmiljöernas kvalitet 
och förekomst samt arternas fördelning och abundans 
överensstämmer med rådande geomorfologiska och kli-
matiska villkor.” Deskriptor 1. 
15 ”Populationerna av alla kommersiellt nyttjade fiskar 
och skaldjur håller sig inom säkra biologiska gränser och 
uppvisar en ålders- och storleksfördelning som vittnar 
om ett friskt bestånden.” Deskriptor 3. 
16 ”Alla delar av de marina näringsvävarna, i den mån 
de är kända, förekommer i normal omfattning och mång-
fald på nivåer som är tillräckliga för att arternas lång-
siktiga bestånd ska kunna säkerställas och deras fulla 
reproduktiva kapacitet behållas.” Deskriptor 4. 
17 ”Havbottnens integritet håller sig på en nivå som 
innebär att ekosystemens struktur och funktioner kan 
tryggas och att i synnerhet de bentiska ekosystemen inte 
påverkas negativt.” Deskriptor 6. 
18 Artikel 9.2–3. 
19 Tabell 1 i bilaga III. 
20 Tabell 2 i bilaga III.
21 Tabell 2 i bilaga III. Se artikel 10.1.
22 Artikel 10.2. 
23 Kommissionens beslut av den 1 september 2010om 
kriterier och metodstandarder för god miljöstatus i ma-
rina vatten (2010/477/EU) samt artikel 9.3. Det finns också 
2.2 Det nationella genomförandet
Direktivets målsättning samt bestämmelser om 
den ekosystembaserade och adaptiva förvalt-
ningsmetoden har implementerats i stort sett 
ordagrant i den svenska rättsordningen.24 Hän-
visningar till direktivets bilagor samt Kommis-
sionens beslut om kriterier och metodstandarder 
med krav på att hänsyn ska tas till dessa i de olika 
förvaltningsstegen har införts. De yttre ramarna 
för havsmiljöförvaltningen framgår därmed tyd-
ligt av de svenska reglerna.25
För varje deskriptor har vidare nationella 
beskrivningar av en god miljöstatus med indi-
katorer formulerats.26 Dessa anger övergripande 
kvalitativa målsättningar för såväl miljökvalite-
ten som mänsklig påverkan på havsmiljön.27 När 
det t.ex. gäller ”Kommersiellt nyttjade fiskar och 
skaldjur” föreligger en god miljöstatus enligt de 
nationella föreskrifterna när;
• Fiskeverksamheten ligger under en nivå som 
garanterar ett maximalt hållbart uttag (FMSY) 
av alla kommersiella fiskarter.28
krav på att medlemsstater ska samarbeta i de olika de-
larna av förvaltningen (artikel 8.3, 10.1 2 st. och 11.3).
24 Enligt havsmiljöförordningen (2010:1341) är det över-
gripande målet att upprätthålla eller nå en god miljö-
status i Sveriges havsområden Nordsjön och Östersjön, 
1 och 6 §§. 
25 För en mer utförlig beskrivning av implementeringen 
av Havsmiljödirektivet, se förslag till genomförandet 
av Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2008/56/EG 
av den 17 juni 2008 om upprättandet av en ram för ge-
menskapens åtgärder på havsmiljöpolitikens område”, 
miljö departementets promemoria om ramdirektivet om 
en marin strategi (2010-07-09).
26 Havsmiljöförordningen (2010:1341), 18 § samt 
HVMFS 2012:18, 4 § samt bilaga 2. Se även Havs- och 
vattenmyndigheten (2012b). God Havsmiljö 2020 Marin 
strategi för Nordsjön och Östersjön. Del 2: God miljöstatus 
och miljökvalitetsnormer. Havs- och vattenmyndighetens 
rapport 2012:20, Göteborg.
27 God miljöstatus är en norm enligt 5 kap. 2 § 1 st. p. 4 
MB. Havsmiljöförordningen (2010:1341), 17 § 2 st.
28 HVMFS 2012:18, bilaga 2, del A, 3.1. Med FMSY avses 
”den nivå på fiskeridödlighet som möjliggör ett maxi-
malt hållbart uttag (MSY)” enligt HVMFS 2012:18, 3 §. 
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• Fiskenivån inte har en negativ påverkan på 
ekosystemets strukturer och funktion.29 
• Reproduktionskapacitet och ålders- och stor-
leksstruktur i fiskebestånden garanterar lång-
siktig produktivitet.30 
Därutöver har ett antal miljökvalitetsnormer 
med indikatorer fastställts med syfte att genom-
föra en god status och bidra, i den utsträckning 
det är möjligt, ”till att betydande och negativa 
gränsöverskridande effekter kan hindras”.31 
Normerna gäller i hela det svenska havsterrito-
riet.32 Samtliga normer utom en är normer enligt 
5 kap. 2 § 1 st. p. 4 MB, d.v.s. de övriga krav på 
miljökvaliteten som följer av EU.33 Miljökvalitets-
normer som följer av Sveriges medlemskap i EU 
får enligt miljöbalken, efter bemyndigande av 
regeringen, föreskrivas av myndighet.34 När det 
gäller miljökvalitetsnormer som går längre än 
vad som följer av EU-rätten krävs dock att dessa 
antas av regeringen. Detta följer av ordalydelsen 
i 5 kap. 1 § 2 st. som anger att bemyndigandet 
gäller normer ”som följer av” Sveriges medlem-
skap i Europeiska unionen.35
Ett exempel på en miljökvalitetsnorm som 
kan påverkas av fiskeverksamhet (t.ex. genom att 
selektivt avlägsna biomassa och stora individer) 
är normen C.3. Denna anger att;36
29 HVMFS 2012:18, bilaga 2, del A, 3.2.
30 HVMFS 2012:18, bilaga 2, del A, 3.3. 
31 Havsmiljöförordningen (2010:1341), 9 § 3 p. och 19 § 
samt HVMFS 2012:18, bilaga 3. 
32 Genom fastställandet av indikatorer och bedömnings-
områden kan dock bedömningarna avgränsas geogra-
fiskt. Indelningen av svenska vatten i havsbassänger samt 
kust- och utsjövatten följer av HVMFS 2012:18,  bilaga 1.
33 Endast miljökvalitetsnormen B.1 är en s.k. gränsvär-
desnorm, HVMFS 2012:18, 6 §. 
34 5 kap. 1 § 2 st. MB. Ett sådant bemyndigande till 
Havs- och vattenmyndigheten finns i havsmiljöförord-
ningen (2010:1341), 20 § 1 st.
35 Se även prop. 1997/98:45, Miljöbalk, del 1, s. 251ff och 
del 2, s. 41ff.
36 Inledningsvis fastställdes inga miljökvalitetsnormer 
för fisk trots att fiske hade bedömts utgöra ett av de 
”Populationerna av alla naturligt förekom-
mande fiskarter och skaldjur som påverkas 
av fiske har en ålders- och storleksstruktur 
samt beståndsstorlek som garanterar deras 
långsiktiga hållbarhet.” 
Normen anger därmed i kvalitativa termer den 
miljökvalitet som ska uppnås för alla naturligt 
förekommande fiskbestånd37 (d.v.s. inte enbart 
kommersiella arter).38 Förutom populationer-
nas storlek omfattas beståndens ålders- och 
storleksstruktur. En annan miljökvalitetsnorm 
som kan påverkas av fiske (t.ex. genom trofiska 
kaskader)39 är normen C.4 som anger att;
”Förekomst, artsammansättning och stor-
leksfördelning hos fisksamhället ska möjlig-
göra att viktiga funktioner i näringsväven 
upprätthålls.”40
För att möjliggöra den praktiska bedömningen 
har (i den mån kunskapen har bedömts till-
räcklig) indikatorer med rikt- och gränsvärden41 
fastställts för såväl påverkansfaktorer (t.ex. 
fiskeridödlighet)42 som miljökvalitet (t.ex. lek-
biomassa).43 God status för fiskeridödlighet (F) 
huvudsakliga hoten mot de marina ekosystemen. Efter 
kritik antogs normer för fisk. Havs- och vattenmyndig-
heten (2012c). Samråd om förslag till ändring av Havs- och 
vattenmyndighetsens föreskrifter (HVMFS 2012:18) angående 
införandet av miljökvalitetsnormer för fisk m.m. Dnr 783-12 
(2012-09-04). 
37 Med fisk avses i det följande även skaldjur. Se även 
definitionen 4 § Fiskelag (1993:787) som anger att begrep-
pet fisk också omfattar vattenlevande blötdjur och vatten-
levande kräftdjur. 
38 Jämför formuleringen av förhållanden för god status i 
HVMFS 2012:18, bilaga 2, del A, 3.1–3-3 samt deskriptor 
3, Havsmiljödirektivet, bilaga 1. 
39 Se avsnitt 1, not 2. 
40 Därutöver har miljökvalitetsnormer för havsbottnens 
integritet (D.1 och D.2) formulerats. Se HVMFS 2012:18, 
bilaga 3, D.1. och D.2.
41 Se mer om detta i avsnitt 3. 
42 Se definition av fiskeridödlighet (F) i HVMFS 2012:18, 
3 §. 
43 Se definition av lekbiomassa (SSB) och BMSY-trigger i 
HVMFS 2012:18, 3 §. Denna är en bedömningsgrund för 
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uppnås exempelvis när denna är lägre än den 
nivå som ger upphov till maximal hållbar avkast-
ning (MSY), d.v.s. när F < FMSY.44 God status för 
lekbiomassa (SSB) uppnås när lekbiomassan är 
större än den nivå då ytterligare förvaltnings-
åtgärder krävs för att säkerställa ett hållbart 
nyttjande, d.v.s. när SSB > BMSY-trigger.45 Bedöm-
ningsskalan är med andra ord tvågradig, d.v.s. 
utfallet kan vara antingen ”god status” eller ”ej 
god status” för respektive indikator.46 
I det sista förvaltningssteget har ett förslag 
till åtgärdsprogram lagts fram.47 Åtgärdspro-
gram ska upprättas om det behövs för att följa 
en miljökvalitetsnorm.48 Detta förslag innehåller 
ett fåtal åtgärder som riktar sig mot fiske. Endast 
tre konkreta åtgärder om utfärdandet av fiske-
bestämmelser föreslås.49 Dessa regler föreslås 
gälla endast innanför trålgränsen.
att bedöma om beståndens reproduktiva kapacitet är för-
enlig med en god status. 
44 HVMFS 2012:18, bilaga 4, 3.1A. Indikatorn omfattar 
de bestånd för vilka det finns en analytisk bedömning 
och en FMSY-nivå i enlighet med ICES bedömning. 
45 HVMFS 2012:18, bilaga 4, 3.2A. ICES aktuella rådgiv-
ning ska gälla. 
46 För övriga fastställda indikatorer och värden för god 
status, se HVMFS 2012:18 bilaga 2 (del B), 3 och 4.
47 Havsmiljöförordningen (2010:1341), 24 §. Se förslag 
till åtgärdsprogram i Havs- och vattenmyndigheten 
(2015). God Havsmiljö 2020 Marin strategi för Nordsjön och 
Östersjön. Del 4: Åtgärdsprogram för havsmiljön. Havs- och 
vattenmyndighetens remissversion 2015-02-01, Göte-
borg. Beslut om åtgärdsprogrammet ska ta senast den 
31 december 2015.
48 5 kap. 4 § 1 st. MB. För en beskrivning av statusbedöm-
ningar i svenska havsområden, se Havs- och vattenmyn-
digheten (2015) samt Havs- och vattenmyndigheten 
(2012a). God Havsmiljö 2020 Marin strategi för Nordsjön och 
Östersjön. Del 1: Inledande bedömning av miljötillstånd och 
socioekonomisk analys. Rapport 2012:19, Göteborg.
49 Två av åtgärderna är av utredningskaraktär och en 
 annan handlar om anpassning fiskeflottans kapacitet 




Som beskrivningen ovan visar har nationella 
målsättningar och miljökvalitetsnormer för en 
god miljöstatus i svenska havsområden fast-
ställts i enlighet med den adaptiva planeringen 
som direktivet föreskriver. Dock kvarstår en hel 
del arbete med implementeringen, bland annat 
vad gäller fastställandet av bedömningsområ-
den samt rikt- eller gränsvärden för god status.50 
Huruvida en god status och direktivets resultat 
kan nås eller inte beror emellertid inte enbart på 
hur mål och normer för god status formuleras. 
Normer och åtgärder måste också kunna ge-
nomföras, även mot fiske. I de följande avsnitten 
diskuteras därför normernas rättsverkan samt 
möjligheter och eventuella hinder som finns att 
genomdriva krav mot fiskeverksamhetsutövare 
givet de parallella regelverken samt EU:s exklu-
siva kompetens inom fiskeripolitiken. 
3.2 Är miljökvalitetsnormer för en god 
 miljöstatus rättsligt bindande?
I Sverige har som ovan beskrivits miljökvalitets-
normer formulerats för att genomföra direkti-
vets krav om att uppnå eller upprätthålla en god 
status. Dessa miljökvalitetsnormer är som sagt 
s.k. ”övriga normer” (punkt 4-normer).51 Av lag-
texten i denna regel framgår med andra ord inte 
normtypen eller dess rättsverkan. Av Havs- och 
vattenmyndighetens föreskrifter framgår emel-
lertid att det är möjligt att fastställa såväl rikt- 
som gränsvärden för god status för respektive 
indikator. Detta i kombination med formule-
ringen i 7 § i föreskrifterna talar för att normer 
50 För de indikatorer där ICES rådgivning ska följas gäl-
ler ICES bedömningsområden. 
51 För en analys av punkt-4-normers rättsliga status och 
det svenska genomförandet av en god ekologisk status, 
se Olsen Lundh (2014). Four points on point four. Imple-
menting environmental quality standards in Sweden. 
Scandinavian Studies in Law, 59, s. 319–349.
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med bindande rättsverkan ska kunna fastställas. 
Bestämmelsen anger att;
”Miljökvalitetsnormer enligt 6 § följs då god 
miljöstatus för respektive indikator är upp-
fylld inom angivet bedömningsområde… 
(författarens kursiveringar).”52 
Att varje indikator ska vara uppfylld för att en 
norm ska följas kan också tolkas som att sam-
manvägda bedömningar inte heller är möjliga 
när gränsvärden har slagits fast. Miljökvalitets-
normen C.3 skulle därmed inte följas om t.ex. 
gränsvärdet för fiskeridödlighet överskrids, oav-
sett hur förhållanden (t.ex. reproduktionskapaci-
tet) ser ut i övrigt.53 En bindande rättsverkan bör 
då innebära att fiske som påverkar den relevanta 
fiskeridödligheten inte kan tillåtas (förutsatt att 
något undantag inte är gällande). 
Samtidigt framgår motsatsvis av 2 kap. 7 § 
2 st. att de mer långtgående kraven som kan stäl-
las på enskilda med stöd av 2 kapitlet miljö balken 
inte gäller.54 Detta kan med andra ord innebära 
att tillstånd till en verksamhet kan ges även om 
den innebär att normerna inte följs om kraven an-
nars blir orimliga för den enskilde verksamhets-
utövaren enligt skälighetsavvägningen. Av EU-
52 HVMFS 2012:18, 7 §. 
53 Annorlunda uttryckt räcker det då med att en av de 
fastställda indikatorerna inte når en god status för att nor-
men inte ska följas. De har därmed lika vikt (angrepps-
sättet brukar benämnas ”sämst-styr”, ”one-out-all-out 
aggregation rule” eller “assessment by worst case”). Se 
om olika sammanvägda bedömningar i Moksnes et al. 
(2012).
54 De mer långtgående kraven kan endast ställas för att 
genomföra s.k. gränsvärdesnormer, d.v.s. p. 1-normer. 
2 kap. 7 § 2 st. MB. Se även prop. 2009/10:184, Åtgärds-
program och tillämpningen av miljökvalitetsnormer, s. 45–48, 
MÖD 2013:12 samt Mark- och miljööverdomstolens dom 
2012-09-13 i mål nr M 10108-11. Mark- och miljödomsto-
len uttalade att vid en individuell tillståndsprövning 
ska miljökvalitetsnormer som inte är gränsvärdsnormer 
beaktas genom tillämpning av de grundläggande hän-
synsreglerna i 2 kap. miljöbalken. Endast 2 kap. 7 § 1 st. 
men inte 2 och 3 st. ska tillämpas när det är fråga om en 
vattenförekomsts ekologiska status.
domstolens praxis följer dock att även normer för 
en god ekologisk status kan utgöra gränsvärdes-
normer enligt Ram vattendirektivet.55 Domstolen 
uttrycker nämligen att medlems staters skyldig-
heter att dels förebygga försämring, dels skydda, 
förbättra och återställa alla ytvattenförekomster 
för att uppnå en god ytvattenstatus innebär en 
rättsligt bindande skyldighet som måste iakt-
tas i samband med godkännandet av enskilda 
projekt.56 Artikel 4 i Ramvattendirektivet anger 
därmed en skyldighet för medlemsstater att inte 
meddela tillstånd till enskilda projekt om pro-
jektet t.ex. innebär att uppnåendet av en god yt-
vattenstatus äventyras (om inte något undantag 
är uppfyllt). Därutöver uttrycker EU-domstolen 
att varje försämring av en enskild kvalitetsfak-
tor (som anges i Ramvattendirektivets bilaga 
V) är en försämring rättsligt sett som är förbju-
den, även om ytvattenförekomstens status inte 
hamnar i en lägre klass.57 För att EU-rätten ska 
efterlevas krävs därför en ändring av de svenska 
reglerna. Domen bör dock få betydelse för den 
svenska rättstillämpningen även innan en sådan 
lagändring träder ikraft, antingen genom direkt 
55 Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2000/60/EG av 
den 23 oktober 2000 om upprättande av en ram för gemen-
skapens åtgärder på vattenpolitikens område (”Ramvatten-
direktivet”).
56 C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland 
eV mot Bundesrespublik Deutschland (förhands avgörande), 
p. 31 och 33. Detta följer enligt domstolen av såväl en 
bokstavstolkning av artikel 4(1)(a) som av en ändamåls-
enlig tolkning. 
57 C-461/13, p. 65. Domstolen argumenterar med andra 
ord mot den s.k. ”statusklassteorin”, vilken innebär att 
försämring av statusen inträder först om ytvattenföre-
komstens status hamnar i en lägre klass och för ”status 
quo-teorin” som innebär att varje försämring även inom 
en klass är en försämring rättsligt sett. Om vattnet är i 
lägsta klass räcker det med att en parameter försämras. 
För en utförlig analys av domen, se Michanek (2015). Till-
stånd får inte ges om aktuell ytvattenstatus försämras 
eller om uppnåendet av god ytvattenstatus äventyras. 
Analys av EU-domstolens förhandsavgörande C-461/13. 
JP miljönet (artikel i tryck).
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effekt eller en direktivkonform tolkning.58 En 
fråga som uppstår är därför om även Havsmiljö-
direktivet föreskriver en sådan tvingande skyl-
dighet som också ska beaktas i enskilda ärenden. 
Detta diskuteras i nästa avsnitt.
3.3 Kräver direktivet att rättsligt bindande 
normer för en god miljöstatus fastställs?
Inledningsvis kan konstateras att direktiv, enligt 
fördraget, ska implementeras så att direktivets 
resultat nås men att medlemsstater själva får 
bestämma form och tillvägagångssätt.59 Detta 
utrymme har dock begränsats genom EU-dom-
stolens praxis. Av rättspraxis följer bland annat 
att medlemsstater ska vidta alla nödvändiga åt-
gärder som krävs för att säkerställa direktivets 
fulla rättsverkan och att rättsläget ska vara klart 
och precist.60 Direktivbestämmelsernas art och 
utformning avgör närmare vad som är en till-
räcklig implementering.61 När det är frågan om 
ett minimidirektiv kan dessutom som nämndes 
tidigare medlemsstater vidta mer långtgående 
åtgärder än vad direktivet kräver så länge detta 
är förenligt med EU-rätten i övrigt (t.ex. den ge-
mensamma fiskeripolitiken).62
58 För en analys av hur domen påverkar den svenska 
rättstillämpningen, se Michanek (2015). Michanek menar 
att försämringsförbudet, efter preciseringen av dess inne-
börd genom domen, är ovillkorlig och tillräckligt tydlig 
och precis för att ha direkt effekt. Om så inte är fallet bör 
domen ändå få genomslag i svensk rätt genom fördrags-
enlig tolkning (se avsnitt 6). 
59 Artikel 288 3 st. Fördraget om Europeiska Unionens 
Funktionssätt (FEUF).
60 Se t.ex. Kommissionen mot Frankrike, p. 77 och C-159/99, 
Kommissionen mot Italien, p. 1, C-32/05, Kommissionen mot 
Luxemburg, p. 34, mål 29/84, Kommissionen mot Tyskland, 
p. 22 och 23 och C-217/97, Kommissionen mot Tyskland, 
p. 31 och 32. Det följer även av lojalitetsförpliktelsen att 
medlemsstater ska vidta alla nödvändiga åtgärder för att 
fullgöra de förpliktelser som följer av fördragen och de 
åtgärder som vidtas av EU:s institutioner.
61 Se t.ex. C-32/05, Kommissionen mot Luxemburg, p. 37–
40 samt där angivna rättsfall samt C-461/13, p. 34. 
62 Direktivet har antagits med stöd i artikel 191 FEUF.
Havsmiljödirektivet kan knappast, givet 
dess utformning med betydande skönsmässigt 
utrymme för medlemsstater att fastställa detal-
jerna, anses syfta till någon total harmonisering 
av medlemsstaternas lagstiftningar om förvalt-
ningen av marina vatten.63 Direktivet överlämnar 
med andra ord i hög grad till medlemsstater att 
bestämma vilka åtgärder som ska vidtas.64 Sam-
tidigt ska direktivets resultat nås. Målsättningen 
om en god status ska uppnås eller upprätthål-
las och medlemsstater ska vidta alla de åtgärder 
som behövs för detta syfte.65 För detta syfte ska 
medlemsstaterna fastställa nationella förhållan-
den för en god status samt miljömål.66 Genom 
Kommissionens beslut om kriterier och metod-
standarder, med syfte att främja en enhetlig och 
jämförbar bedömning av en god status mellan 
medlemsstater, anges i betydligt högre detalj-
grad vilka kriterier som ska ligga till grund för 
bedömningen av en god status. Kriterier som 
anges i beslutet kan emellertid utelämnas natio-
nellt, men detta måste motiveras och rapporteras 
till Kommissionen.67 Däremot anger varken di-
rektivet eller Kommissionens beslut vilken rätts-
verkan fastställda miljömål ska ges och inte heller 
om målen ska vara kvantitativa eller  kvalitativa. 
Av domstolens praxis framgår bland annat 
att innebörden av direktivbestämmelser ska fast-
63 För en analys av direktivet se Michanek och Chris-
tiernsson (2014). 
64 Jämför EU-domstolens uttalande om ”Ramvatten-
direktivet” och dess genomförande. Domstolen har kon-
staterat att detta direktiv, trots att det är betydligt mer 
detaljerat än Havsmiljödirektivet, inte syftar till en total 
harmonisering av medlemsstaternas lagstiftningar om 
vatten. Se C-32/05, p. 41–42.
65 Artikel 1. Att direktivets mål är bindande följer också 
av det faktum att direktivet anger strikta kriterier för un-
dantag. 
66 Artikel 9 och 10. 
67 Alla kriterier med tillhörande indikatorer ska dock 
övervägas. Artikel 1, preambel, p. 1 och 3, i Kommissio-
nens beslut samt artikel 9.3 i direktivet.
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ställas med beaktande av deras ordalydelse.68 Av 
ordalydelsen i artikel 10 följer att medlemsstater 
ska fastställa miljömål med indikatorer, och att 
syftet med miljömålen är att utgöra ”vägledning 
för de framsteg som ska uppnås beträffande en 
god miljöstatus i den marina miljön” (författa-
rens kursivering). Med miljömål avses ett kva-
litativt eller ett kvantitativt påstående ”om det 
eftersträvade tillståndet för olika delar av, och 
belastningar och påverkan på, marina vatten 
för varje marin region eller delregion.”69 Detta 
talar för att miljömål inte alltid måste fastställas 
med gränsvärden med bindande rättsverkan. En 
riktlinje är dock att fastställandet av mål ska in-
kludera ”mätbara mål och tillhörande indikato-
rer som möjliggör övervakning och bedömning” 
(författarens kursivering).70 Till skillnad från arti-
kel 4 i Ramvattendirektivet anger inte artikel 10 i 
sig någon målsättning (den anger med andra ord 
inte vad som uppnås) och den kopplar inte heller 
till alla delar av direktivets genomförande.71 Den 
tvingande skyldighet som följer av ordalydelsen 
i artikel 10 bör därmed vara begränsad till själva 
fastställandet av miljömålen med syfte att nå den 
övergripande målsättningen om en god miljö-
status.72 
68 Se t.ex. C-461/13, p. 30. Se även C-317/12, p. 19, 
C-187/12, p. 24 samt C-114/13, p. 31. 
69 Artikel 3.7. 
70 Havsmiljödirektivets vägledande förteckning för fast-
ställandet av miljömål, bilaga IV, p. 3.b. Även operativa 
mål för konkreta genomförandeåtgärder som kan bidra 
till att miljömålen uppnås föreslås. Se Bilaga IV, p. 3.c.
71 Artikel 4(1)(a) i Ramvattendirektivet anger att med-
lemsstaterna skall genomföra alla åtgärder som är nöd-
vändiga för att förebygga en försämring av statusen i alla 
ytvattenförekomster (i) och skydda, förbättra och åter-
ställa alla ytvattenförekomster i syfte att uppnå en god 
ytvattenstatus (ii). 
72 Jämför EU-domstolen uttalande om artikel 4 i Ram-
vattendirektivet. Domstolen anger att denna bestämmel-
se har karaktären av en tvingande skyldighet som med-
lemsstater är skyldiga att beakta i alla delar av direktivets 
genomförande, även vid enskilda tillståndsprövningar. 
Se C-461/13, se särskilt p. 31 och 43. 
Av domstolens praxis framgår emellertid 
att innebörden av direktivbestämmelser även 
ska fastställas med beaktande av de mål som be-
stämmelsen och ytterst direktivet avser uppnå.73 
Syftet med fastställandet av miljömål (artikel 10) 
är att uppnå det övergripande miljömålet om en 
god status. Detta är ett mål som ska nås. Av artikel 
1 följer att medlemsstater ska vidta de åtgärder 
”som behövs” för att direktivets övergripande 
målsättning om en god miljöstatus i EU:s marina 
regioner ska uppnås eller upprätthållas senast år 
2020. Möjligheterna till undantag är restriktiva.74
Fastställandet och genomförandet av miljö-
mål är en viktig del i detta genomförande. Att 
fastställa miljömål med bindande rättsverkan 
kan vara en sådan åtgärd ”som behövs” för att 
direktivets mål ska nås. Det kan t.ex. handla om 
att med lagstiftning säkerställa att myndigheter 
beaktar miljömålen vid olika beslut och enskilda 
prövningar så att verksamheter som äventyrar 
uppnåendet av miljömålen därmed inte tillåts 
(om inte något undantag är uppfyllt). 
Flera bestämmelser i direktivet talar för att 
miljömål, när de väl har fastställts, ska nås. Inte 
minst bestämmelsen som anger att medlems-
stater under särskilda situationer får identifiera 
fall där ”miljömålen eller god miljöstatus” inte 
kan nås, men också kravet på att åtgärdspro-
grammen ska ange hur åtgärderna bidrar till att 
miljömålen nås.75 Åtgärds- samt övervaknings-
program ska också utformas ”med hänvisning 
till” miljömålen.76 Att det finns ett stort utrymme 
i fastställandet av miljömålen men ett mer be-
73 Se t.ex. C-461/13, p. 30. Se även C-317/12, p. 19, 
C-187/12, p. 24 samt C-114/13, p. 31. 
74 Undantag från detta krav gäller t.ex. för förändringar 
till följd av åtgärder ”vidtagna på grund av ett tvingande 
allmänintresse som uppväger den negativa miljöpåver-
kan, inbegripet allt gränsöverskridande inverkan”. Dock 
ska åtgärder vidtas för att förhindra fortsatt försämring. 
Se artikel 14.
75 Artikel 13.1 p. 7. 
76 Artikel 13.1 2 st. samt artikel 11.1. 
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gränsat utrymme att sedan göra undantag från 
de fastställda målen är rimligt givet att medlems-
staterna genom sitt fastställande av miljömålen 
klargjort att dessa förhållanden utgör väsentliga 
delar i uppnåendet eller upprätthållandet av en 
god miljöstatus.77
Utifrån ett sådant synsätt bör inte heller sam-
manvägningar (eller avvägningar) vara möjliga 
när god status för indikatorer har fastställts med 
gränsvärden. Genom att fastställa gränsvärden 
för enskilda indikatorer har medlemsstater visat 
att det finns nivåer som inte får överskridas om 
målet om en god status ska kunna nås. Givet att 
miljömålen ska nås, skulle med andra ord Sve-
rige vara skyldig att exempelvis inte tillåta fiske 
som innebär att gränsvärdet för fiskeridödlighet 
för det eller de aktuella bestånden överskrids. 
Detta skulle alltså gälla oavsett hur statusen för 
lekbiomassan ser ut. Sammanvägda bedömning-
ar bör dock vara möjliga när riktvärden för god 
status har föreskrivits. 
Som nämnts ovan ger EU-domstolens ut-
talanden om hur målet om en ekologisk status 
ska tolkas enligt Ramvattendirektivet stöd för 
att också ekologiska normer för vattenkvalitet 
kan betraktas som gränsvärden med bindande 
rättsverkan mot enskilda enligt EU-rätten. Dom-
stolen anger också att skyldigheten att förebygga 
försämring gäller varje kvalitetsfaktor, även om 
denna försämring inte leder till en försämring 
77 Jämför t.ex. EU-domstolens uttalande om skillnader i 
medlemstataters handlingsutrymme före och efter skyd-
dade områden enligt Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 
2009/147/EG av den 30 november 2009 om bevarande av vilda 
fåglar (nedan ”Fågeldirektivet”) pekats ut. Domstolen 
uttalar att medlemsstater har ett mer begränsat utrym-
me att göra inskränkningar i ett redan utpekat särskilt 
skyddsområde i jämförelse med det utrymme som finns 
att avgöra vilka områden som ska skyddas. Domstolen 
menade att medlemsstaterna hade klargjort att området 
var det mest lämpade för att skydda fågelarterna och un-
dantag kunde därmed bara godkännas på exceptionella 
grunder som hälsa och säkerhet. Ekonomiska intressen 
ansågs inte vara en acceptabel anledning till inskränk-
ning av skyddet. Se C-57/89, Kommissionen mot Tyskland.
av klassificeringen av ytvattenförekomsten som 
helhet.78 Om en verksamhet innebär att statusen 
försämras, eller att en god ytvattenstatus äventy-
ras, ska med andra ord tillstånd inte meddelas.79 
Liksom artikel 4 i Ramvattendirektivet anger ar-
tikel 10 i Havsmiljödirektivet en tvingande skyl-
dighet, medlemsstater ska fastställa miljömål. 
Bestämmelsen är dock som nämndes ovan inte 
enligt dess ordalydelse kopplad till alla delar 
av genomförandet av direktivet.80 Havsmiljö-
direktivet ger vidare som nämndes ovan be-
tydligt större utrymme för medlemsstaterna att 
fastställa detaljerna kring genomförandet sam-
tidigt som  artikel 10 inte i sig föreskriver vilket 
mål som ska nås. Detta talar för att bestämmelsen 
inte, liksom artikel 4 i Ramvattendirektivet, kan 
anses utgöra en tvingande skyldighet som också 
kan styra beslut i enskilda fall. Däremot anser 
jag att en ändamålsenlig tolkning av bestämmel-
sen ger stöd för att normer som har fastställts 
som gränsvärden nationellt ska betraktas som 
bindande även i enskilda prövningar när så är 
nödvändigt för att direktivets övergripande mål 
ska nås. 
Sammanfattningsvis kan konstateras att di-
rektivet inte explicit kräver att kvantitativa miljö-
mål med bindande rättsverkan ska fastställas. 
Direktivets mål ska dock nås. Hur miljömålen 
bör utformas och vilken rättsverkan de bör ha 
måste därför bedömas med utgångspunkt i det-
ta. Att fastställa rättsligt bindande gränsvärden 
(utan möjligheter till avvägningar) är därmed 
78 C-461/13, p. 65. 
79 Se domstolens uttalande i målet ovan om att struk-
turen hos de kategorier av undantag som föreskrivits i 
Ramvattendirektivet talar för att de inte enbart innehål-
ler principiella skyldigheter utan också omfattar enskilda 
projekt (se p. 47). 
80 Jämför EU-domstolen uttalande om artikel 4 i Ram-
vattendirektivet. Domstolen anger att denna bestämmel-
se har karaktären av en tvingande skyldighet som med-
lemsstater är skyldiga att beakta i alla delar av direktivets 
genomförande, även vid enskilda tillståndsprövningar. 
Se C-461/13, se särskilt p. 31 och 43. 
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inte oförenligt med direktivet, utan kan tvärtom i 
vissa situationer förmodas vara nödvändigt (t.ex. 
för att säkerställa att fiskebestånd eller andra ma-
rina arter inte utrotas). En ändamålsenlig tolk-
ning av artikel 10 talar också för att miljömål, när 
de väl har fastställs, ska följas. Dessutom utgör 
försiktighetsprincipen en av de grundläggande 
principer som EU-rättens miljöpolitik vilar på.81 
Att direktivet utgör ett minimidirektiv innebär 
vidare att medlemsstater kan gå längre än vad 
direktivet kräver, så länge detta är förenligt med 
EU-rätten i övrigt, t.ex. den gemensamma fiskeri-
politiken.82 Som nämndes tidigare krävs dock 
enligt den svenska regleringen att sådana mer 
långtgående normer fastställs av regeringen.83
3.4 Kan normerna genomföras mot 
 fiskeverksamhetsutövare?
Miljökvalitetsnormerna gäller för alla verksam-
heter eller åtgärder som kan påverka normerna, 
däribland fiske. Fiske kan som beskrevs inled-
ningsvis, påverka havsmiljön på flera olika sätt. 
Det framgår också av underlagsmaterialet till 
fastställandet att miljökvalitetsnormerna C.3 
och C.4 har formulerats just med utgångpunkt i 
fiskets påverkan, men också andra normer (där-
ibland normer om havsbottnars integritet) kan 
påverkas av fiske.84 Därutöver kan normerna 
påverkas av annan verksamhet än fiske, t.ex. 
vatten kraft, muddring, utsläpp av näringsämnen 
och miljögifter eller exploatering av strandområ-
den m.m.85 
81 Se artikel 192 FEUF. 
82 Artikel 191 FEUF.
83 Se avsnitt 2.2.
84 Havs- och vattenmyndigheten (2012c), s. 3. Se normer-
na D.1 och D.2, HVMFS 2012:18, bilaga 3.
85 Att miljökvalitetsnormerna som formulerats med ut-
gångspunkt i fiskets påverkan kan påverkas och därmed 
även måste gälla mot andra påverkansfaktorer uttrycks 
också i samrådsunderlaget från Havs- och vattenmyn-
digheten, se Havs- och vattenmyndigheten (2012c), s. 5.
När en verksamhet omfattas av miljöbalken 
kan myndigheter driva igenom olika skydds- 
och försiktighetskrav med stöd av de allmänna 
hänsynsreglerna för att säkerställa att normerna 
följs.86 Detta kan t.ex. ske vid en tillståndspröv-
ning eller vid tillsyn enligt miljöbalken. Detta 
innebär bland annat att verksamhetsutövaren 
är skyldig att visa att val av metod, plats m.m. 
inte innebär att miljökvalitetsnormer riskerar att 
äventyras.87 Kraven som kan ställas på verksam-
hetsutövaren får dock inte vara orimliga enligt 
skälighetsavvägningen i 2 kapitlet miljöbalken.88 
Möjligheten att ställa strängare krav för att sä-
kerställa att normer följs gäller som sagt endast 
gränsvärdesnormer (p. 1-normer).89 Som en följd 
av att rättsläget klargjorts genom EU-domstolens 
dom C-461/13 om medlemsstaternas skyldighe-
ter att uppnå de mål som föreskrivs i artikel 4.1 
i Ramvattendirektivet, bör dock normer för god 
ekologisk status betraktas som gränsvärdes-
normer som inte får överträdas. Bestämmelsen 
bör därmed i första hand ändras, men domen 
bör också få betydelse även innan en lagändring 
 genomförs.90 För de miljömål där gränsvärden 
för god miljöstatus fastställts, bör en sådan änd-
ring av 2 kap. 7 § miljöbalken även omfatta dessa 
miljökvalitetsnormer (se ovan, avsnitt 3.3). 
När det gäller miljökvalitetsnormer och fiske 
finns vidare ett antal genomförandeproblem. 
Även om miljöbalken är tillämplig på yrkesmäs-
sigt fiske i marina vatten och gäller parallellt med 
miljöbalken, regleras fiske framför allt med stöd 
86 Ansvaret för att normerna följs ligger på myndigheter 
och kommuner, t.ex. vid prövningar och tillsyn enligt 
miljöbalken (5 kap. 3 § MB). För en mer utförlig beskriv-
ning av miljökvalitetsnormer samt exempel se Michanek 
och Zetterberg (2012). Den svenska miljörätten. Tredje upp-
lagan, s. 156–184. 
87 Se 2 kap. 1 § MB.
88 2 kap. 7 § 1 st. MB. 
89 Se avsnitt 3.2, vid not 53. 
90 Se Michanek (2015), not 56.
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av fiskelagen.91 Det finns inga särskilda pröv-
ningsregler för fiske i miljöbalken. Tillståndsplikt 
för fiske gäller endast inom vissa geo grafiska 
områden (t.ex. när fiske kan påverka ett Natura 
2000-område eller om så är föreskrivet inom t.ex. 
ett naturreservat).92 Fiske omfattas endast i ett 
begränsat antal fall av reglerna om ”miljö farlig 
verksamhet” (t.ex. när bottentrålning leder till att 
gifter i sedimentet frigörs och sprids i den fria 
vattenmassan).93 Om fisket kan förändra natur-
miljön väsentligt gäller också samrådskrav enligt 
miljöbalken. 
I dessa situationer finns ett utpekat opera-
tionellt tillsynsansvar. Detta omfattar även fis-
ke. Det innebär t.ex. att länsstyrelsen som har 
det operationella tillsynsansvaret för skyddade 
områden också kan förelägga fiskeverksamhets-
utövare att vidta skydds- och försiktighetsmått 
för att förhindra skador på skyddade områden 
eller att söka tillstånd enligt 7 kap. 28 a § MB.94 
Ett annat exempel är när fiske kan anses utgöra 
miljöfarlig verksamhet. Då har kommunerna det 
operativa tillsynsansvaret.95 Miljötillsynsansva-
ret omfattar också att säkerställa att miljökvali-
tetsnormer efterlevs genom att meddela föreläg-
gande och förbud.96
91 Att miljöbalken gäller för fiske parallellt med miljö-
balken följer av 1 kap. 1 och 3 §§ MB. 
92 För en analys av 7 kap. 28 a § MB, se Christiernsson et 
al. (2015). “Marine Natura 2000 and Fishery – The Case 
of Sweden.” Journal for European Environmental and Plan-
ning Law, 12(1), s. 22–49 samt Christiernsson et al. (2014). 
Fiske och Natura 2000. 7 kap. 28 a § miljöbalken I EU-rättslig 
belysning. Havs- och vattenmyndighetens rapport 2014:7. 
93 Se definitionen av miljöfarlig verksamhet i 9 kap. 1 § 
MB. 
94 Miljötillsynsförordningen 2 kap. 8 § och 26 kap. 9 § 
MB. Även när det gäller samråd ligger tillsynsansvaret 
på länsstyrelserna. Miljötillsynsförordningen 2 kap. 8 § 
p. 9.
95 26 kap. 3 § 2 st. MB. 
96 Det finns ett generellt ansvar för myndigheterna och 
kommuner att säkerställa att miljökvalitetsnormer följs 
enligt 5 kap. 3 § MB. I de situationer en fiskeverksamhet 
skulle ha ett tillstånd enligt miljöbalkens 9 kap. kan en 
myndighet även initiera en omprövning om en verksam-
När det saknas ett utpekat operationellt 
tillsynsansvar ligger detta på den tillsynsvägle-
dande myndigheten.97 När det gäller miljökva-
litetsnormer och fiske ligger det operationella 
tillsynsansvaret därmed på Havs- och vatten-
myndigheten (så länge ingen annan myndighet 
har pekats ut).98 Myndigheten kan därmed före-
lägga fiskeverksamhetsutövare att vidta sådana 
försiktighets- och skyddsåtgärder som krävs för 
att en miljökvalitetsnorm ska följas.99 Eftersom 
myndigheten har tillsynsvägledningsansvaret, 
och därmed det operationella ansvaret, för miljö-
kvalitetsnormer ”inom sitt ansvarsområde” bör 
myndigheten också vara skyldig att säkerställa 
normernas efterlevnad vid beslutsfattande en-
ligt fiskelagstiftning trots att detta inte är särskilt 
före skrivet i fiskelagen.100
3.5 Kan åtgärder mot fiske genomföras in hela 
det svenska havsområdet? 
För att normerna och ytterst direktivets målsätt-
ning om en god status ska kunna nås krävs att 
åtgärder kan genomdrivas mot fiske. Givet att 
miljökvalitetsnormer gäller och fiske bedrivs 
inom hela den svenska ekonomiska zonen måste 
åtgärder kunna genomföras inom hela detta om-
råde, även mot andra medlemsstaters fiskefar-
tyg. Det är också ett krav enligt direktivet och de 
nationella reglerna att åtgärdsprogram för havs-
miljön ska innehålla alla de åtgärder som behövs 
för att fastställda miljökvalitetsnormerna ska föl-
jas och målet om en god miljöstatus uppnås eller 
het ”med någon betydelse medverkar till att en miljökva-
litetsnorm överträds”. 24 kap. 5 § 1 st. p. 2 MB.
97 Miljötillsynsförordningen 2 kap. 3 §. 
98 Miljötillsynsförordningen 3 kap. 5 §. 
99 26 kap. 9 § MB.
100 Det kan också tilläggas att de allmänna hänsynsreg-
lerna gäller parallellt med kravet att uppnå miljökva-
litetsnormer. Krav mot fiske med stöd av de allmänna 
hänsynsreglerna kan därför bli aktuella även om inte en 
norm överskrids. 
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upprätthållas.101 I förslagen till åtgärdsprogram 
har dock fiskeåtgärder begränsats till områden 
innanför trålgränsen, d.v.s. till havsområdet in-
nanför 3 respektive 4 nautiska mil.102 
I och med den nya fiskeriförordningen (som 
trädde ikraft 2014) har förtydligats att medlems-
staterna har kompetens att genomföra åtgärder 
mot fiske för att genomföra vissa krav som följer 
av Art- och habitatdirektivet,103 Fågeldirektivet 
och Havsmiljödirektivet i hela den ekonomiska 
zonen.104 Av artikel 11 följer att medlemsstater 
bland annat har kompetens att vidta åtgärder 
mot fiske för att genomföra de förpliktelser som 
följer av artikel 13.4 i Havsmiljödirektivet.105 När 
andra staters fiskefartyg berörs ska särskilda för-
faranden tillämpas.106 
En fråga som uppstår då är vilka åtgärder 
som omfattas av artikel 13.4. Grundförordningen 
för fiske hänvisar inte till hela artikel 13 (om åt-
gärdsprogram) utan endast till den bestämmelse 
som handlar om geografiska skyddsåtgärder för 
att skapa sammanhängande och representativa 
101 Se havsmiljöförordningen (2010:1341), 24 § och Havs-
miljödirektivet, artikel 13.1. Krav på programmens inne-
håll finns också i 5 kap. 6 § 2 st. MB. 
102 När det gäller andra verksamheter än fiske inom 
den ekonomiska zonen och på kontinentalsockeln ligger 
dock i många fall rätten att tillståndspröva och föreskriva 
villkor hos regeringen.
103 Rådets direktiv 92/43/EEG av den 21 maj 1992 om beva-
rande av livsmiljöer samt vilda djur och växter (nedan ”Art- 
och habitatdirektivet”).
104 Artikel 11 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning 
(EU) nr 1380/2013 av den 11 december 2013 om den gemen-
samma fiskeripolitiken (nedan ”grundförordningen för 
fiske”). Se Christiernsson et al. (2015) för en beskrivning 
av rättsreglerna samt analys av förhållandet mellan den 
gemensamma fiskeripolitiken och Art- och habitatdirek-
tivet efter antagandet av den nya Grundförordningen för 
fiske 2014. 
105 Artikel 11 ger även kompetens till medlemsstater att 
vidta åtgärder för att genomföra förpliktelser som föl-
jer av artikel 4 i Fågeldirektivet och artikel 6 i Art- och 
 habitatdirektivet.
106 Olika förfaranden gäller innanför och utanför 12-mils-
gränsen enligt artikel 11 och 20 i Grundförordningen för 
fiske. 
nätverk med marina skyddsområden. Om med-
lemsstaters kompetens att vidta åtgärder endast 
skulle omfatta själva inrättandet av skyddade 
områden men inte genomförandet av skydds- 
och förvaltningsåtgärder för att förhindra ska-
dor till följd av fiske skulle dock inte syftet med 
skyddet kunna nås. Dessutom skulle artikel 11 
vara inkonsekvent då genomförandet av åtgär-
der för att bevara särskilda skydds- och bevaran-
deområden enligt Fågeldirektivet samt Art- och 
habitatdirektivet omfattas av medlemsstaternas 
kompetens.
När det gäller åtgärder för den marina mil-
jön innanför 12-milsgränsen kan även andra 
former av bevarande- och förvaltningsåtgärder 
(även sådana som inte följer av EU-rätten) för att 
bibehålla eller förbättra bevarandestatusen för de 
marina ekosystemen genomföras mot fiske utan 
att stå i konflikt med den exklusiva kompetensen 
inom EU:s gemensamma fiskeripolitik, givet att 
vissa förutsättningar är uppfyllda.107 
4. Avslutande kommentarer
Fiske kan få långtgående konsekvenser för 
fiskbestånden men även för andra djur- och 
växtarter och därmed påverka möjligheterna 
att uppnå miljökvalitetsnormer och ytterst det 
övergripande målet om en god miljöstatus. Av 
denna anledning ska de marina ekosystemen 
förvaltas med en adaptiv och ekosystembase-
rad metod där också fisk och fiske ingår. Detta 
innebär bland annat att miljökvalitetsnormer 
och åtgärder för en god miljöstatus måste kunna 
 genomföras mot fiske. I Sverige, och på EU-nivå, 
regleras dock fiskeverksamheter framför allt ge-
nom sektorslagstiftning, vilket kan försvåra ett 
107 Se artikel 20 i Grundförordningen för fiske. När and-
ra medlemsstaters fartyg berörs (i detta område endast 
grannländer som har särskilda avtal) ska dock särskilda 
förfaranden tillämpas. Det framgår inte av programmet 
om några processer för att genomföra åtgärder med stöd 
av artikel 11 eller artikel 20 har påbörjats eller planerats. 
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sådant genomförande. Denna artikel har därför 
diskuterat miljökvalitetsnormers rättsverkan och 
genomförande mot fiske givet parallella regel-
verk samt EU:s exklusiva kompetens inom den 
gemensamma fiskeripolitiken. 
Sammanfattningsvis visar analysen att mil-
jökvalitetsnormer med bindande rättsverkan, 
också mot fiske, kan föreskrivas och att detta till 
och med kan vara ett krav enligt EU-rätten, om 
bindande rättsverkan krävs för att direktivets 
mål ska nås. Detta innebär att gränser för miljö-
kvaliteteten och fiskets bedrivande kan behöva 
fastställas och genomdrivas. Att allmänt formu-
lerade miljödirektivmål, som preciseras av med-
lemsstaterna med utgångspunkt i gemensamma 
bedömningsgrunder enligt ett särskilt förfaran-
de, kan ge upphov till tvingande skyldigheter 
för medlemsstaterna, som också ska prövas i en-
skilda ärenden, framgår också av EU-domstolens 
praxis. Eftersom Havsmiljödirektivet utgör ett 
minimidirektiv kan Sverige också gå längre än 
vad som krävs av direktivet så länge det är fören-
ligt med EU-rätten i övrigt. 
Den gemensamma fiskeripolitiken ger i och 
med antagandet av den nya grundförordning 
kompetens att under vissa förutsättningar ge-
nomföra skydds- och bevarandeåtgärder för ma-
rina skyddsområden inom hela den ekonomiska 
zonen. Därutöver finns handlingsutrymme att 
under särskilda förutsättningar vidta åtgärder 
innanför 12-milsgränsen för att förbättra eller 
bibehålla de marina ekosystemens bevarande-
status. I båda fallen omfattar som sagt kompe-
tensen även andra staters fiske.
Förslaget till åtgärdsprogram för att ge-
nomföra normer för en god miljöstatus innehål-
ler emellertid ett fåtal konkreta fiskeåtgärder, 
som dessutom föreslås gälla endast innanför 
trålningsgränsen, trots att åtgärdsprogram ska 
innehålla alla de åtgärder som är nödvändiga 
för att normer och det övergripande målet om 
en god status ska nås eller upprätthållas. Samti-
digt är genomförandet av normerna och ytterst 
direktivets mål i stor utsträckning beroende 
av att konkreta åtgärder för fisket föreslås och 
genomförs (t.ex. genom utfärdandet av fiske-
föreskrifter) via åtgärdsprogram. Normernas 
rättsverkan mot fiske är nämligen begränsad. 
För det första prövas normalt inte fiske enligt 
miljöbalken. För det andra saknas tydliga regler 
om det operationella tillsynsansvaret för miljö-
balkens och miljökvalitetsnormernas efterlevnad 
vid fiske. För det tredje saknas krav på att beslut 
enligt fiskelagstiftningen ska vara förenliga med 
miljöbalkens allmänna hänsynsregler och miljö-
kvalitetsnormer. För det fjärde säkerställer inte 
den svenska lagstiftningen att tillräckligt långt-
gående krav kan ställas på enskilda för att uppnå 
normer för en god miljöstatus, trots att detta kan 
vara nödvändigt för att EU-rätten ska efterlevas. 
Sammantaget innebär detta en risk för att fiske i 
svenska vatten även i fortsättningen kommer att 
hindra uppfyllandet av målet om en god miljö-
status i Sveriges havsområden. 
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Investigator Self-Interest  
in the Environmental Process
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activity must demonstrate that he possesses suf-
ficient knowledge to protect the environment 
from detrimental impact.3 The impact assessment 
is meant to establish and describe the planned 
activity’s direct and indirect effects on people, 
animals, plants, land, water, air, the climate, the 
landscape, and the cultural environment, on the 
management of land, water and the physical en-
vironment in general and on other managements 
of materials, raw materials and energy.4 It goes 
without saying that it often takes comprehensive 
scientific expertise and inquiry to make an assess-
ment of this kind. Occasionally, relevant exper-
tise can be found within the organization that ap-
plies for the permit, but quite often the applicant 
will need to appoint external scientific expertise. 
The fact that an expert is appointed by one 
of the parties is commonly regarded as a threat 
to the expert’s impartiality. It is often pointed out 
that there is a risk that the party has hired an ex-
pert whose opinion is “available to the highest 
bidder”, or at least deliberately picked an expert 
whose views support her cause. Even if the par-
ty has not exercised any direct control over the 
expert’s testimony, the payer-provider relation-
ship constitutes a secondary interest which risks 
influencing the expert’s judgment.5 Clearly, the 
3 SEC, chapter 2, sections 1–2. 
4 SEC chapter 6 Section 3.
5 See, for example, Ekelöf, P-O, Edelstam, H., and Heu-
man, L., Rättegång IV, Stockholm 2009, p. 298, Patters-
son, M.R., “Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert Tes-
timony”, William and Mary Law Review, 40.4, 1998–1999, 
p. 1313–1394 and SOU 1926:33, III p. 179.
Abstract
The Swedish Environmental Code states that cer-
tain potentially harmful activities must not be pur-
sued without a permit. When applying for a permit, 
the applicant shall submit an environmental impact 
assessment, which describes the effects that the ac-
tivity might have on the environment. This article 
discusses the risk that investigator self-interest 
 decreases the adequacy of environmental impact 
assessments. The article also presents a newly made 
empirical study of whether and how arguments 
about investigator self-interest are considered and 
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1. Introduction
The Swedish Environmental Code states that cer-
tain potentially harmful activities, such as min-
ing, paper production, and fish farming, must not 
be pursued without a permit.1 When applying for 
a permit, the applicant shall submit an environ-
mental impact assessment, EIA, which describes 
the effects that the activity might have on the en-
vironment.2 This requirement specifies the code’s 
general demand that a person who pursues an 
* Doctoral Candidate in Jurisprudence, Faculty of Law, 
Lund University.
** Associate Senior Lecturer in Jurisprudence, special-
izing in Medical Law, Faculty of Law, Lund University.
1 Swedish Environmental Code (SEC) chapters 9, 11 and 
12, förordning (1998:899) om miljöfarlig verksamhet och 
hälsoskydd, and miljöprövningsförordning (2013:251). 
2 SEC, chapter 6, section 1. 
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risk that secondary interests influence judgment 
is at least as great if the investigator herself is a 
party to the process. It can be noted that many in-
stitutions restrict or exclude the participation of 
advisors with conflicts of interest in the matter at 
hand.6 The fact that Swedish environmental law 
(like many other legal rules) entrusts the appli-
cant and/or her experts with providing a signifi-
cant share of the decision basis, suggests that the 
legislator has assumed either that these conflicts 
of interest are unproblematic, or that they can be 
satisfactorily handled within the permit process. 
This article discusses the adequacy of these as-
sumptions. In section two, we discuss the risk 
that investigator self-interest leads to deficiencies 
in environmental impact assessments. In section 
three, we discuss whether the legal system pro-
vides instruments to manage investigator self-
interest, and whether the legal process can be 
expected to detect the deficiencies that such in-
terests might lead to. In section four, we present 
a newly made empirical study of whether and 
how arguments about investigator self-interest 
are considered and taken on board by the Swed-
ish environmental courts. In section five we make 
some concluding remarks and suggest paths for 
further research. 
2. Conflicts of interest and the risk for 
 deficiencies in the expert’s assessment
Although problems associated with conflicts of 
interest are discussed in many contexts, there is 
no generally accepted definition of the notion. 
6 See e.g. guidelines developed by WHO; “Guidelines 
for Declaration of Interests (WHO Experts)” http://in-
tranetapps.euro.who.int/intranet/documents/HAN/Con-
tracts__Declaration_of_interests.htm (visited 150925), 
and the guidelines developed by seven Swedish authori-
ties, presented in ”Addressing Conflicts of Interest in Ap-
pointing External Experts” http://www.socialstyrelsen.
se/SiteCollectionDocuments/eng-bilaga.pdf (visited 
151209).
According to Dennis Thompson’s often-cited 
definition, a conflict of interest is 
”a set of conditions in which professional 
judgment concerning a primary interest 
(such as a patient’s welfare or the validity of 
research) tends to be unduly influenced by a 
secondary interest (such as financial gain).”7
It is important to note that Thompson’s defini-
tion – like many others – does not require that 
secondary interests have an actual influence on 
the investigator’s judgment; it is sufficient that 
secondary interests create a risk for such influ-
ence, given the current state of knowledge of 
how secondary interests operate. This suggests 
that the risk itself is regarded as a reason for con-
cern, which is a plausible approach, considering 
that concrete influence on an investigator’s judg-
ment can be hard to detect in a particular case.
In permit processes, the primary interest 
can be defined as the interest of obtaining an ad-
equate assessment of the activity’s impact on the 
environment. Essentially, the secondary interest 
could be any other interest that the investigator 
might have, and which tends to unduly influence 
her assessment. Below, we will use the term “self-
interest” to refer to the investigator’s secondary 
interests. To adjust Thompson’s definition to the 
subject matter of this article, we will also replace 
“undue influence” by “unduly increases the risk 
for deficiencies in the investigator’s assessment 
of the activity’s environmental impact”.8 This 
gives us the following definition: 
An investigator has a conflict of interest if the 
investigator has a self-interest, which unduly increas-
7 Thompson, D.F., “Understanding Financial Conflicts 
of Interest”, New England Journal of Medicine, 329(8), 1993, 
p. 573–576. 
8 The term “undue” is non-redundant since some le-
gitimate secondary interests, such as the interest of not 
spending more time on an investigation than paid for, 
can likewise increase the risk for deficiencies in the as-
sessment. 
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es the risk for deficiencies in the investigator’s assess-
ment of the activity’s environmental impact.
Common sense tells us that a person’s self-
interests tend to influence her behavior, and that 
investigator self-interest is a potential problem. 
Several scientific studies on medical research 
and practice support the assumption that self-
interest indeed risks leading to deficiencies in 
the expert’s assessment. For example, it has been 
demonstrated that gifts and economic support 
from industry influence medical practitioners’ 
treatment decisions. Similarly, contacts with in-
dustry have been seen to influence the method-
ological choices that scientists make, as well as 
the conclusions they eventually draw. Hence, re-
searchers funded by pharmaceutical companies 
typically find the drugs they study to be more 
efficient and less associated with detrimental 
side-effects, than research without such fund-
ing.9 Moreover, people tend to underestimate 
the influence that conflicts of interest have on 
them.10 It is documented that physicians errone-
ously tend to believe that contacts with industry 
do not influence their behavior,11 and it has been 
9 See, for example, Barnes, M. and Florenico, P.S., “Fi-
nancial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research: 
the Problem of Institutional Conflicts”, Journal of law, 
medicine and ethics, 2002, 390–402, Bekelman, J., Li, Y. and 
Gross, C., “Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of 
Interest in Biomedical Research, a Review”, Journal of the 
American Medical Association. 2003, 4,454–465; Lo, B. och 
Field, M., (Eds.) Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education and Practice, Washington, National Academies 
Press, 2009; Appelbaum, P.S. and Gold, A., “Psychia-
trists’ Relationships with Industry: the Principal-Agent 
Problem”, Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 2010, 18, 255–265, 
Dahlman, C. and Wahlberg, L., “Appeal to Expert Tes-
timony: a Bayesian Approach” in C. Dahlman and T. 
Bustamente (eds.) Argument Types and Fallacies in Legal 
Argumentation, Springer 2015.
10 Moore, D. A., Tanlu, L. and Bazerman M. H., ”Conflict 
of Interest and the Intrusion of Bias”, Judgement and Deci-
sionmaking, 2010, 5, 37–53.
11 Gold, A. and Appelbaum, P.S., “Unconscious Conflict 
of Interest: a Jewish Perspective”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 
2011, 37, 402–405.
argued that self-interests, unlike professional re-
sponsibilities, are processed unconsciously and 
therefore difficult to eliminate or correct for.12 
More research is needed on how different kinds 
of self-interest work and how powerful they are. 
However, recalling that the environmental im-
pact assessment is a means to promote a sustain-
able development and prevent damage to human 
health and the environment, and that this area of 
law is normally governed by the precautionary 
principle, it seems wise to be very attentive of 
investigator self-interest and the risks that such 
interests create in the environmental process. 
3. Investigator Self-Interest in the 
 Environmental Permit Process
As we have seen, Swedish environmental law 
requires the applicant to submit an environmen-
tal impact assessment. If the applicant has pro-
duced the investigation without the assistance of 
external experts, the risk that the investigation is 
influenced by the applicant’s self-interest seems 
obvious. However, the problem with investiga-
tor self-interest does not disappear just because 
the applicant hires an external investigator (con-
sultant) to conduct the investigation. Environ-
mental impact assessments are often very cost-
ly13 and are hence important assignments for the 
consultants that are hired to conduct them. Nor-
mally, therefore, the consultant wants to make 
the applicant – the client – content. Moreover, 
and as will be illustrated below, the relationship 
between the consultant and the applicant is of-
ten long-lasting and frequently includes other, 
larger assignments too.14 The ensuing risk that 
12 Moore, D. A. and Loewenstein, G., ”Self-Interest, Au-
tomaticity and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest”, 




14 Hedlund, A. and Kjellander, C., MKB: Introduktion till 
miljökonsekvensbeskrivning, Lund, Studentlitteraur, 2007, 
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hired consultants produce unreliable environ-
mental impact assessments is not just theoretical 
– there are many accounts of consultants who 
have felt pressured to present an assessment that 
gives a favourable impression of the applicant’s 
project.15 
The risk that investigator self-interest im-
pacts the environmental impact assessment 
brings with it the risk that court decisions are 
based on incomplete or erroneous facts and 
assessments, which – in turn – risk damaging 
not only the environment but also the public’s 
 confidence in the process. In law, conflicts of 
interest are often managed ex ante, by rules that 
disqualify a person with secondary interests 
from participating in a decision. Thus, according 
to Swedish administrative law, factors such as 
family relations, interests in the decision’s out-
come and other similar circumstances that un-
dermine the confidence in an administrator, are 
treated as reasons for disqualification.16 Similar 
rules apply to judges, court appointed experts 
and other administrators that are involved in a 
decision, but they do not apply to experts that are 
appointed by the parties, or to the parties. Rules 
for disqualification can hence not be adduced to 
disqualify neither an applicant, nor a consultant 
who has been hired by the applicant, from con-
ducting the investigation. 
The fact that rules for disqualification do 
not hinder parties or party-appointed experts 
to conduct the investigation raises the question 
whether investigator self-interest can instead be 
satisfactorily managed ex post, i.e. whether the 
environmental process has the capacity to detect 
deficiencies in the investigation that result from 
such interests. The environmental process has an 
open character and is designed to include par-
p. 128 f.
15 Morgan, R.K. Environmental Impact Assessment, a Meth-
odological Perspective, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1998, p. 262.
16 Administrative Act (1986:223), sections 11–12. 
ticipation by stakeholders and relevant experts. 
While preparing the environmental impact as-
sessment, the applicant must consult with public 
authorities and private parties.17 Before the le-
gal trial begins, the public is invited to comment 
on the application and the impact assessment.18 
During the trial, public authorities, such as the 
National Environmental Agency and the Fishery 
Agency, and private parties that are likely to be 
affected by the planned activity, such as neigh-
bours, have a right of action. Moreover environ-
mental courts consist not only of legally qualified 
judges but also include expert members with sci-
entific training and experience. Hereby, the pro-
cess allows for review from various perspectives, 
including review of other experts. An important 
question is therefore whether the environmen-
tal process’s capacity to detect deficiencies in the 
consultant’s assessment makes redundant ex ante 
approaches to investigator self-interest. 
Some deficiencies, such as erroneous calcu-
lation, choice of inappropriate statistical method, 
omission of relevant alternatives or absence of 
appropriate investigations, are relatively easy to 
detect. Others, such as excluded results, biased 
measurements and fabricated data, are much 
more difficult for an external reviewer to iden-
tify, even if she too is an expert within the par-
ticular domain. It is a well-known fact within the 
 scientific community that peer review processes 
are unlikely to detect flaws in scientific research.19 
An empirical study found that peer reviewers 
succeed in detecting less than one third of ma-
jor errors.20 In this light, and considering the fact 
17 SEC chapter 6, section 4.
18 SEC chaper 6, section 8.
19 See e.g., Hardwig, J., ”The Role of Trust in Knowl-
edge”, The Journal of Philosophy, 1991, 88, 693–708. 
20 Schroter, S., Black, N., Evans. S., Godlee, F., Osorio, 
L. and Smith, R., ”What Errors do Peer Reviewers De-
tect, and Does Training Improve their Ability to Detect 
them?”, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 2008, 101, 
507–514.
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that expert members of the environmental courts 
often lack relevant specialization, it appears too 
optimistic to expect the legal process to detect all 
serious deficiencies that investigator self-interest 
might cause in an impact assessment. We there-
fore conclude that the open character of the en-
vironmental process does not make ex ante man-
agement of investigator self-interest redundant. 
Now, rules for disqualification do not exhaust 
the means for ex ante management of investigator 
self-interest. According to the principle of free 
evaluation of evidence, Swedish courts are free to 
evaluate the evidence presented to them. Hence, 
environmental courts may take evidence of in-
vestigator self-interest into account when they 
evaluate the investigator’s assessment. However, 
so far, little is known of whether and how envi-
ronmental courts do this in practice. In the next 
section, we will therefore present a newly made 
empirical study of how arguments about inves-
tigator self-interest are considered and taken 
aboard by Swedish environmental courts. 
4. Arguments about Investigator Self-
Interest in the Environmental Process
The discussion so far has shown that investiga-
tor self-interest risks influencing the investiga-
tor’s assessment of an activity’s environmental 
impact. We have also seen that the legal process 
cannot be expected to detect all deficiencies that 
investigator self-interest might cause in an im-
pact assessment. Hence, there is a risk that inves-
tigator self-interest – if ignored – leads to permit 
decisions on false premises. This raises the ques-
tion in what ways courts take arguments about 
investigator self-interests into account when 
they evaluate the investigation presented by the 
applicant. To get an idea of what the answer to 
this question might be, we set out to investigate 
whether and how arguments about investigator 
self-interest are considered and taken aboard by 
Swedish environmental courts. 
We used Karnov database to search for 
cases in which a private party (other than the 
applicant) argued that an investigator involved 
in the environmental impact assessment had a 
self-interest. The database allowed us to search 
among cases that were decided by the environ-
mental courts21 since 1999, provided that the 
Supreme Environmental Court22 has reviewed 
them. Because our study is concerned with issues 
of fact, we included only verdicts from the envi-
ronmental courts.23 To find relevant arguments, 
we searched the material using a total of 12 key-
words relating to investigator self-interest.24 
A search of this kind is unable to find argu-
ments that the parties put forward during the 
process but that the courts do not include in 
their written judgments; finding such arguments 
would have required a different methodological 
approach.25 Nor could our search detect argu-
ments that do not make use of any of our key-
words. Consequently, another set of keywords 
might have detected other or more relevant ar-
guments. However, it should be noted that one 
of our keywords, opartisk [impartial], was pres-
ent in almost every relevant case that we found, 
(including most of the arguments identified by 
the other 11 keywords).26 This suggests that the 
keyword opartisk is very effective, and that add-
21 Mark- och miljödomstolarna.
22 Mark- och miljööverdomstolen. The final search was 
made 150416.
23 We did not find anything in the Supreme Environ-
mental Court’s reviews indicating that the environmen-
tal courts’ treatments of investigator self-interest were 
relevant for the leaves to appeal. Therefore, we think that 
our way of selection is adequate and acceptable for the 
purpose of this study. However, and as stressed below, 
we recognize the need for more comprehensive studies. 
24 The following Swedish keywords were used: opar-
tisk, partisk, egenintresse, intressekonflikt, oberoende 
utredning, oberoende expert, oberoende part, oberoende 
konsult, oberoende granskning, oberoende bedömning, 
oberoende mätning and oberoende miljögranskare. 
25 See section 5 below.
26 See the next note. 
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ing more keywords would not have given many 
more relevant hits. 
Our search resulted in hits in more than 
200 cases. Many of the hits were unrelated to 
the research question. However, we found 21 
cases with arguments of the kind searched for.27 
Some of these arguments are mere demands for 
an “impartial investigation”. Many of the argu-
ments we found, however, are more explicit. In-
deed, some arguments seem meant to convince 
the courts about the general risk that investigator 
self-interest influence the assessment: 
”An impact assessment conducted by the 
wind power company is not objective. Re-
sults can be distorted, numbers manipulated 
and data omitted. We simply don’t trust the 
information.”28
Other arguments draw attention to specific 
circumstances that are claimed to undercut the 
investigator’s credibility in the particular case. 
For example, several arguments point out that 
there is a more substantial business relation at 
hand between the hired investigator and the 
 applicant, than that which normally holds be-
tween an applicant and her consultant:
27 I.e. arguments in which a private party (not the ap-
plicant) complained that the investigator was biased. 
The keyword opartisk was present in 18 cases: M 6300-
11 Nacka tingsrätt, M 1044-11 Växjö tingsrätt, M 4315-
10 Växjö tingsrätt, M 2190-07 Nacka tingsrätt, M 2090-
06 Umeå tingsrätt, M 2474-06 Umeå tingsrätt, M 80-03 
Stockholms tingsrätt, M 208-06 Umeå tingsrätt, M 417-06 
 Vänersborgs tingsrätt, M 141-03 Vänersborgs tingsrätt, 
M 39-03 Stockholms tingsrätt, M 318-01 Vänersborgs 
tingsrätt, M 4-00 Vänersborgs tingsrätt, M 6-01 Växjö 
tingsrätt, M 306-99 Stockholms tingsrätt, M 29-99 Växjö 
tingsrätt, M 49-99 Växjö tingsrätt, M 515-99 Väners-
borgs tingsrätt. Three additional cases were found us-
ing the keywords oberoende mätning, oberoende expert and 
oberoende miljögranskare; M 4034-13 Vänersborgs tingsrätt, 
M 13-99 Växjö tingsrätt, M 41-01 Vänersborgs tingsrätt. 
28 M 4034-13, Vänersborgs tingsrätt, p. 12. The argu-
ments quoted in this section are originally in Swedish 
and have been translated into English by us.
“For more than two decades now, the Min-
ing company [the applicant] has contracted 
NK [the external investigator hired to make 
the impact assessment] to measure vibra-
tions and make inspections. What NK does 
and says is to be regarded as a plea by the 
Mining Company.”29
“The reliability of HydroGIS [the external 
investigator hired by the applicant] can be 
called in question, since HydroGIS does not 
only represent the applicant, but was also 
previously engaged by the Municipality of 
Orust to investigate the seabeds.”30 
“The investigations have been conducted by 
NCC [a company contracted to carry out the 
construction works if the application was 
granted]. They should have been made by 
an impartial investigator.”31
Other arguments try to demonstrate that second-
ary interests have had an effect on the investiga-
tor’s behavior in the case at hand. This is the case 
in our next example, where it is argued that the 
absurdity of the investigator’s statement reveals 
that the investigator’s reasoning is affected by 
self-interests:
“We are deeply critical of the author of the 
report, and regard its statement that dump-
ing of mud will lead to an amelioration of 
the site as a sign of partiality.”32
In a typical legal doctrinal study, the question of 
whether and how arguments like these are taken 
into account by the courts is answered by turning 
to the courts’ own explicit reasoning. We did this, 
and found that in none of the 21 cases included 
29 M 2090-06, Umeå tingsrätt, p. 56.
30 M 417-06, Vänersborgs tingsrätt, p. 11.
31 M 318-01, Vänersborgs tingsrätt, p. 5.
32 M 2190-07, Nacka tingsrätt p. 135.
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in our study, were these arguments explicitly 
addressed – or even mentioned – in the courts’ 
opinions. However, the fact that the courts have 
not explicitly addressed the arguments about 
investigator bias does not necessarily mean that 
courts are uninfluenced by these arguments 
when they assess the EIA. Although Swedish 
courts are supposed to state the reasons that un-
derlie their evidence assessments explicitly,33 it 
is a notorious fact that courts’ reasoning in this 
respect is often quite opaque. Moreover, it may 
be the case that arguments about investigator 
self-interest affect courts’ reliance on experts in 
a subconscious manner. This suggests that it is 
difficult to assess how much relevance – if any – 
courts attach to investigator self-interest by just 
looking at the courts’ explicit reasoning. To com-
plement our reading of the courts’ opinions, we 
therefore conducted a quantitative analysis of 
the outcomes in the 21 cases.
Quantitative analysis can be used to detect 
aspects of legal decision-making that cannot be 
found through a traditional doctrinal analysis. 
Doctrinal studies of legal decisions have a quali-
tative character and make in-depth analyses of 
courts’ explicit reasoning.34 A quantitative analy-
sis, in contrast, can look for correlations among 
variables in a large number of legal decisions, 
and can detect patterns and identify factors that 
have influenced the legal decision-making but 
that have not been accounted for by the court.35 
Over time, quantitative method has gained 
a wider acceptance as a tool for legal research 
33 SOU 1938:44, Processlagberedningens förslag till rätte-
gångsbalk, p. 378.
34 Dobinson, I. and Johns, F., “Qualitative Legal Re-
search” in M McConville and W.H. Chui, Research Meth-
ods for Law, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
2007. p. 40. 
35 For an accessible introduction to quantitative legal re-
search, see W.H. Chui, “Quantitative Legal Research” in 
M McConville and W.H. Chui, Research Methods for Law, 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2007.
and has become recognized as a powerful but 
underutilized instrument for analysing the legal 
system and its effects.36 Several previous stud-
ies have used such methods to analyse Swedish 
court decisions and court decisions on environ-
mental matters.37 However, we are not aware of 
any study using quantitative methods to investi-
gate the legal effects of arguments about investi-
gator self-interest in the environmental process. 
The aim of the quantitative study was to 
measure whether there is a correlation between 
arguments about investigator self-interest and 
courts’ reliance on the impact assessment. Hence, 
we wanted to compare courts’ reliance on im-
pact assessments in cases where these arguments 
 occur, with their reliance on impact assessments 
in cases where these arguments do not occur. A 
fundamental problem in a quantitative analysis 
like this, is how to empirically measure the quan-
tity of interest38 – in this case the courts’ reliance 
on the impact assessments. Initially, we consid-
36 Dobinson and Johns, note 34; Heise, M., “The Past, 
Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: 
Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism”, 
University of Illinois Law Review, 2002.4 (2002): 819–850, 
p. 849. Posner, R. A., ”The State of Legal Scholarship To-
day: A Comment on Schlag”, Georgetown Law Journal 97.3 
(2008–2009): 845–856, p. 852. Since 2004 there is also a 
law journal focusing on empirical legal studies, Journal 
of Empirical Legal Studies. Rachlinski, J., ”Evidence-Based 
Law”, 96 Cornell Law Review 2010-2011, s. 901–924.
37 See e.g. Czarnezki, J. J., ”An Empirical Investigation of 
Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutuory Interpretation, and 
the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law”, University 
of Colorado Law Review 79.3 (2008): 767–824. For some re-
cent quantitative analyses of Swedish court decisons, see 
Stendahl, S.. “Sakkunniga och värdet av materiellt riktiga 
domar” in Festskrift till Lotta Vahlne Westerhäll Stockholm 
2011: 337–356; Pettersson, M., Dahlman, C., Sarwar, F: 
”Att bedöma personer med kriminell belastning”, SvJT 
2016/1 (forthcoming); and Wahlberg, L., Dahlman, C., 
Sarwar, F., Sikström, S and Åkerman, S., ”Rättslig pröv-
ning av skälen för sluten psykiatrisk tvångsvård: bör 
domstolarna lita på den medicinska expertisen?” För-
valtningsrättslig tidskrift 4 (2015): 629–646.
38 Sverke, M., ”Quantitative Methods: The Art of Mea-
suring What You Want Measured” in B. Gustavsson 
(Ed.), The Principles of Knowledge Creation: Research Meth-
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ered using the strength of the provisions that the 
courts decide on when they grant a permit (con-
trol programs, probations etc.) as a measurable 
reflection of courts’ reliance. We hypothesized 
that strong provisions would be correlated with 
low reliance and vice versa.39 However, we soon 
realised that it would be extremely difficult – and 
create serious risks for interpretation errors – to 
try to identify a group of relevantly similar cases 
(without arguments about investigator self in-
terest), which could be used as control group. 
Therefore, we chose to measure rejection rates 
instead. Because the application shall be rejected 
if the investigation is poor, rejection rates reflect 
courts’ reliance on the investigation. Admittedly, 
the reflection is far from perfect. Acceptance rate 
is a very rough measure: an application can be 
rejected for reasons other than a poor investiga-
tion, and an investigation can be poor for reasons 
other than investigator self-interests (reasons, 
however, that a quantitative study can even out). 
Keeping this in mind, the fact that rejection rate 
is an unambiguous and easily measurable quan-
tity makes it a suitable object of comparison. 
To our knowledge, there is no official statis-
tics available on the environmental courts’ rejec-
tion rate. Therefore, we also needed to conduct 
a study of the rejection rate in other cases from 
the same period that were searchable in the same 
database and hence could serve as our control 
group. All such cases from the randomly chosen 
years 1999, 2003, 2006 and 2013 were included in 
the control group. The rejection rate in the control 
group (i.e. cases without arguments about inves-
tigator self-interest) was approximately 11 %.40 
ods in the Social Sciences, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2007: 
46–65. 
39 Let alone that the correlation would not be perfect, 
since other factors too affect the strength of the provi-
sions.
40 More precisely, 9 out of 85 (10,58 %) applications were 
rejected. 
Among the 21 cases in the test group (i.e. with 
arguments about investigator self-interest) the 
rejection rate was approximately 17 % (4 rejec-
tions). Hence, the rejection rate in the test group 
is slightly higher than in the control group, but 
too low to demonstrate a correlation between 
arguments about investigator self-interest and 
rejection. 
Of course, it should not come as a surprise 
if courts are unimpressed by arguments about 
investigator self-interest. Many of these argu-
ments merely restate what is already known and 
accepted by the legal system: the applicant is 
responsible for the investigation. Not even the 
claim that a hired external investigator has an 
unusually strong secondary interest (such as 
“NK’s” business relation with the applicant in 
the second quote above) constitutes compelling 
reasons to question the assessment – the law 
does not contain any absolute requirement to 
appoint external expertise to conduct the inves-
tigation in the first place. However, some of the 
arguments about investigator self-interest that 
we found stated reasons for taking this interest 
seriously that add to the already known fact that 
the applicant is responsible for the investigation. 
More precisely, there are arguments that draw 
attention to something in the investigator’s be-
havior, which allegedly is an observable effect of 
the investigator’s self interest. We will refer to ar-
guments of this kind as arguments about behavioral 
impact. A typical example is the argument “We 
are deeply critical of the author of the report, 
and regard its statement that dumping of mud 
will lead to an amelioration of the site as a sign 
of partiality”,41 in the fifth quote above. Argu-
ments about behavioral impact try to show that 
the conflict of interest is “active”, and that the 
investigation therefore cannot be relied on. These 
arguments clearly add something to the picture 
41 M 2190-07, Nacka tingsrätt, p. 135.
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since they imply not only that there is a conflict 
of interest which risks influencing the investiga-
tion, but also that this conflict has influenced the 
investigation in the particular case. Consequent-
ly, these arguments could be expected to have a 
greater effect on courts’ reliance on the investi-
gation than other arguments about investigator 
self-interest. 
A necessary condition for qualifying as an 
argument about behavioral impact on our defi-
nition is thus that the argument draws attention 
to aspects of the investigator’s behavior, that are 
claimed to result from investigator self-interest. 
In addition to the argument mentioned above, 
we found the following two arguments about 
behavioral impact: 
“The photomontages in the impact assess-
ment show the most favorable conditions 
from the developer’s point of view – the 
turbines are barely visible. […] The pictures 
in the photomontage have been taken from 
a favorable perspective, or with a favorable 
view at a favorable time. Sometimes, the 
camera is angled to avoid a “benchmark” 
in the landscape. The impact assessment 
is a plea, in which the developer’s choice 
of words and considerations want to pres-
ent the project as favorably as possible. It is 
therefore not truthful for us.”42
“The investigator’s conclusions do not ac-
cord with the local and regional limnologi-
cal competence that we have been in con-
tact with. On the contrary, the investigator 
appears to present arguments that make a 
power station appear more beneficial than a 
demolition. To succeed with this, the value 
of salmon is belittled, while perch and pike 
are presented as valuable for angling. We 
42 M 208-06, Umeå tingsrätt, p. 31.
interpret this as loyalty with the investiga-
tor’s client, i.e. the applicant. It does not give 
a truthful picture of the conditions. […] To 
summarize, we inform the investigator, as 
well as the court, that we cannot accept the 
contents of the environmental impact assess-
ment and the fishing-investigation, because 
it includes errors, leaves out important ques-
tions, ignore visions for Oreälven’s future 
and does not present impartial facts.”43
After having identified the cases with arguments 
about behavioral impact, we complemented the 
quantitative study with a study of the rejection 
rate in this particular subgroup. Interestingly, 
we found that applications were rejected in two 
of the three cases in which arguments about be-
havioral impact occurred. This means that the 
rejection rate in this group was 67 % – hence 6 
times higher than in the control group. Of course, 
correlation does not imply causation. Hence, the 
correlation between arguments and rejections 
does not per se imply that the arguments have in-
fluenced the courts’ decisions – alternative expla-
nations are conceivable. Moreover, three cases 
make a very small sample, and the study needs 
to be complemented by more comprehensive in-
vestigations to establish whether the effect is real. 
However, it should be noted that – despite the 
small number of cases – the chance is less than 
4 % of getting two rejections in three cases ran-
domly picked from a population with a rejection 
rate of 11 % (like the control group). More pre-
cisely, we can reject the “null hypothesis” (i.e. the 
hypothesis that the rejection rate in cases where 
arguments about behavioral impact occur too is 
11 %) with a significance of 0.033638.44
43 M 80-03, Stockholms tingsrätt, p. 10 f.
44 See Appendix, where n is the number of cases with 
arguments about behavioral impact, x is the number of 
rejections among these cases, and 0.11 is the result of the 
study of the rejection rate in cases from the same peri-
od (see note 40 above). We thank Dragi Anevski at the 
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The result of the study of cases is summa-





















No of cases 85 18 3











11 % 11 % 67 %
5. Concluding Remarks
This article has discussed the risk that investi-
gator self-interest decreases the adequacy of 
environmental impact assessments. We have 
seen that -in the cases that were included in our 
study- the courts did not explicitly address ar-
guments about investigator self-interest in their 
judgments. This is remarkable, since investigator 
self-interest is known to influence judgment, and 
because courts and other external assessors who 
are invited to comment on the impact assessment 
cannot be expected to detect all serious deficien-
cies that such interests might lead to. Moreover, 
the fact that arguments of this kind do occur 
shows that people worry about the risk that in-
vestigator self-interest leads to biased investiga-
tions in environmental permit processes. The 
lack of trust that is manifested in these arguments 
 Centre for Mathematical Sciences, Lund University, for 
helping us with these calculations.
could therefore by itself be a reason for the courts 
to address the argument, if only to explain to the 
public that this kind of conflict is built into – and 
accepted – by the legal system. Our study did 
not find any noteworthy difference between the 
rejection rate in cases with arguments about in-
vestigator self-interest and other cases. However, 
we found en elevated rejection rate in the small 
group of cases with arguments about so-called 
behavioral impact (arguments about investigator 
self-interest that draw attention to aspects of the 
investigator’s behavior, that are claimed to result 
from investigator self-interest), but the courts did 
not address these arguments either. 
More research is needed on how the risk 
associated with investigator self-interest is 
managed in the environmental process. To be-
gin with, more studies are needed to establish 
whether the effect in cases with arguments about 
behavioral impact is real, and to clarify what, 
more precisely, goes on behind the courts’ ex-
plicit reasoning in cases where arguments about 
investigator self-interest occur. Recently, some 
databases have begun to publish all cases de-
cided by the environmental courts. The study 
presented here could hence be followed up by 
more comprehensive quantitative studies, which 
could include decisions that have not been sub-
jected to review by the Supreme Environmental 
Court.45 It would also be interesting to know to 
what extent, and when, arguments about inves-
tigator self-interest occur without being included 
in the court’s written judgments. Information of 
this kind could probably be attained through 
presence at oral proceedings, or through studies 
45 Although conditions for granting leave to appeal do 
not suggest that investigator self-interest is treated differ-
ently in decisions reviewed by the Supreme Environmen-
tal Court than in others, more comprehensive studies are 
needed to establish whether the results from our study 
are in fact representative for all decisions by environmen-
tal courts.
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of other kinds of written material. Furthermore, 
it is relevant to know what the parties, the courts, 
the public and the experts themselves think of 
the risks associated with investigator self-inter-
est. For example: How do courts conceive of the 
risk that an investigator’s self-interest influenc-
es the assessment, and what do courts think of 
their own ability to detect deficiencies that result 
from such interests? How do experts in cases like 
these conceive of the risk that secondary interests 
might influence their own judgment? To what 
extent is the public concerned about these risks, 
and is the public’s confidence in the environmen-
tal process affected by them? 
Underlying the discussion in this article lays 
a more fundamental question jostling for atten-
tion: Perhaps it is not such a good idea to entrust 
the applicant with the investigation? Not only 
does the fact that the applicant is responsible for 
the investigation make rules for disqualification 
inapplicable. In addition, the fact that the appli-
cant is responsible for the investigation implies 
that the system is obliged to accept the typical 
risks associated with investigator self-interest.
 At the outset of this article, we said that sys-
tems like the Swedish therefore seem to assume 
either that experts’ secondary interests do not 
affect the experts’ judgments, or that secondary 
interests and their effects can be satisfactorily 
handled within the process. The discussion in 
this article suggests that both these assumptions 
are mistaken and that payer-provider relations 
as well as other secondary interests can decrease 
the adequacy of the consultant’s assessment in 
ways that cannot be detected during the process. 
A system with court-appointed experts could 
potentially decrease the problem with investiga-
tor self-interest of either kind. It goes beyond the 
scope of this article to discuss the feasibility of 
such a system, but one very general remark can 
be made here. As mentioned, the requirement 
that the applicant produces an impact assess-
ment specifies the code’s generally formulated 
demand that a person who pursues an activity 
must demonstrate that he possesses sufficient 
knowledge to protect the environment from det-
rimental impact. Hence, it is the developer’s re-
sponsibility to see to that an impact assessment is 
produced, and it is the developer’s responsibility 
to pay for the assessment. These starting-points 
should not be compromised. However, there is 
nothing in these premises that implies that the 
applicant must appoint the consultant: the distri-
bution of responsibility would be maintained if 
the court appointed and paid the consultant and 
was compensated for this by the applicant. This 
alternative system would tend to align the con-
sultant’s interests with those of the courts, and 
allow disqualification of biased experts, when 
conflicts of interest nevertheless occur. In addi-
tion to promoting the adequacy of the impact 
assessments, a system like this would probably 
also increase the public’s confidence in the pro-
cess. Clearly, the management of investigator 
self-interest in the Swedish environmental pro-
cess deserves more attention in policy-making 
and scholarly debate than it has hitherto been 
given.
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Appendix to the article "Investigator Self-
Interest in the Environmental Process": 
An exact test for testing the proportion of 
rejection
Dragi Anevski, Centre for Mathematical Sciences, LU 
1 Model and test
Let p be the probability of rejection by a courtroom (i.e. the proportion of
cases rejected). The model assumptions are that each case is rejected or not
with the same probability p, independent of the outcome in other cases. Let
n be the number of cases that are presented in the courtroom. Let X be
the number of cases among those n that are in fact rejected. Then X is a
random variable which is Binomially distributed with parameter n and p.
That means that the probability that exactly k of the cases are rejected can
be calculated with the formula






for k = 0, 1, . . . , n.
Now assume that n = 3 and we have observed x = 2. The courtroom
claims that there is nothing particular about the outcome x = 2 and that
this is consistent with the normal rejection rate of no more than p = 0.11.
We want to test the hypothesis
H0 : p ≤ 0.11 The rejection rate is the normal
H1 : p > 0.11 The rejection rate is higher than the normal
We make a test by calculating the error probability of rejecting the null
hypothesis H0 if the null hypothesis is true, on the basis of the outcome.
That means that we calculate the probability of claiming that "the rate is
higher than normal" when in fact "the rate is only normal".
This is done as follows: If H0 is true p = 0.11. Then the probability of
X ≥ 2 is












This is a small error probability. Therefore we can reject the null hypothesis
of "a normal rejection rate" with a significance of 0.033638.
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The Helsinki Water Convention:  
Implementation and Compliance in Asia
Simon Marsden*
Since 2013 it has been a global treaty,2 and in fo-
cusing on transboundary water cooperation, is 
applicable to Asian as well as other states.3 This 
is significant for the following reasons: first, Asia 
contains the largest number of transboundary 
watercourses and lakes; second, there is a need to 
ensure environmental protection, and equitable 
and reasonable use of them; third, the potential 
for conflict based on state sovereignty4 is high, 
and cooperation is therefore essential; fourth, the 
Helsinki Convention is the only international wa-
ter treaty with detailed substantive environmen-
tal provisions, and with a primary focus on envi-
ronmental protection5; and fifth, Asia has grow-
2 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and Lakes, The Global Opening of the 1992 
UNECE Water Convention (UNECE, 2013).
3 Ruby Moynihan and Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, ‘The Rising 
Role of Regional Approaches in International Water Law: 
Lessons from the UNECE Water Regime and Himalayan 
Asia for Strengthening Transboundary Water Coopera-
tion’ (2014) 23 Review of European, Comparative and Inter-
national Environmental Law 43.
4 See Julie Gjørtz Howden, ‘Aspects of Sovereignty and 
the Evolving Regimes of Transboundary Water Manage-
ment’ (2015) 1 Nordic Environmental Law Journal 47, who, 
while making no mention of the Helsinki Water Conven-
tion, comments: ‘…conflict and competition over quan-
tity and quality of water use will often occur between 
domestic groups or between transnational groups…’
5 For a comparison of the regimes with reference to 
China, see Patricia Wouters and Huiping Chen, ‘China’s 
‘Soft Path’ to Transboundary Water Cooperation Exam-
ined in the Light of Two UN Global Water Conventions 
– Exploring the ‘Chinese Way’’ (2014) 22 Water Law 229.
Abstract
In 2013 the Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes (‘the 
Helsinki Convention’) became a global treaty, and 
is now open to all states, including in Asia. This 
article reviews the application of the Helsinki Con-
vention in Asia, with a particular focus on imple-
mentation and compliance. This focus follows an 
outline of the main institutions and procedural pro-
visions, and experience derived from the first and 
second assessments of transboundary waters. The 
development of a regime within the Helsinki Con-
vention is needed because of the absence of formal 
reporting and compliance mechanisms, which are 
considered to be essential to modern multilateral 
environmental agreements.
I. Introduction
There are 41 Parties to the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Con-
vention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and Lakes (‘the Helsinki 
Convention’) which came into force on 6 October 
1996 after adoption in Helsinki on 17 March 1992.1 
* Professor, Flinders Law School, South Australia, simon.
marsden@flinders.edu.au 
1 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transbound-
ary Watercourses and Lakes (Helsinki, 17 March 1992), 31 
ILM (1992) 1312, in force 6 October 1996. See Attila Tanzi, 
‘Regional Integration and the Protection of the Environ-
ment: The UNECE Process on Water Law as a Model for 
the Global Dimension’, in Tullio Scovazzi (ed) The Protec-
tion of the Environment in a Context of Regional Economic In-
tegration (Università degli studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2001).
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ing experience with both this treaty and other 
agreements for transboundary cooperation,6 with 
potential for increased membership. Scholarly in-
terest to date has, despite this, focused on the 1997 
United Nations Convention on International Wa-
tercourses (‘the New York Convention’), which 
has recently entered into force and has 36 Parties.7 
This article, with a focus on the Helsinki Con-
vention, is a modest contribution to address the 
imbalance.
The current Asian Parties to the Helsinki 
Convention are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is expected that 
other states will also join, including Georgia.8 Iran 
has furthermore expressed an interest,9 as has 
6 See for example Agreement on Cooperation for the Sus-
tainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (Chi-
ang Rai, 5 April 1995), unreported, in force 5 April 1995.
7 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of In-
ternational Watercourses (New York, 21 May 1997, by 
UNGA Res. 51/229), 36 ILM (1997) 700, in force 17 August 
2014. There are eight Asian Parties to the New York Con-
vention: Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq,  Qatar, 
Uzbekistan and Vietnam. The provisions of the Hel-
sinki Convention are more specific, with the exception 
of the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization 
in the New York Convention. For differences between 
these regimes, see ‘The Global Opening’, above n 2, 9–10; 
UNECE, ‘How the Two Global Water Conventions Sup-
port Transboundary Water Cooperation’ – http://pro-
gramme.worldwaterweek.org/event/how-the-two-3637; 
and United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
/ Attila Tanzi, The Economic Commission for Europe Water 
Convention and the United Nations Watercourses Convention: 
An analysis of their harmonized contribution to international 
water law (United Nations, 2015).
8 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe / 
OSCE Environment and Security Initiative, Draft Report of 
the National Working Group Meeting for Identification of the 
Legal and Institutional Needs for Accession and Implementa-
tion of the UNECE Water Convention by Georgia, Tbilisi, 26 
June 2009.
9 UNECE, ‘Iran discusses the benefits of the UNECE 
 Water Convention’, press release, 23 January 2013.
Iraq,10 and most recently, Lebanon,11 Jordan,12 
and Mongolia.13 There is hence a likely future 
overlap between the Parties to both the Helsinki 
and New York Conventions.14 As the potential 
for conflict, environmental harm and industrial 
accidents involving watercourses is high, the 
Helsinki Convention has the added advantage 
of inter-related linkages with the other UNECE 
treaties that address some of these issues.15 Asia 
has growing experience with both this treaty 
and these other agreements for transboundary 
cooperation, and there is clear potential for mem-
bership to increase further to avoid and resolve 
disagreements, pollution and accidents.16 
The objective of this article is to review the 
application of the Helsinki Convention in Asia, 
with a particular focus on implementation and 
compliance. This focus is appropriate because 
implementation and compliance is acknowl-
edged to be the weakest link in international en-
10 UNECE, ‘Iraq and Tunisia express interest in joining 
UNECE Water Convention’, press release, 16 October 
2013.
11 UNECE, ‘Lebanon to consider joining UNECE Water 
Convention following Beirut workshop’, press release, 
10 February 2015.
12 UNECE, ‘Jordan initiates study of the UNECE Water 
Convention’, press release, 17 March 2015.
13 UNECE, ‘New countries from outside the UNECE 
region express interest in the Water Convention’, tenth 
meeting of the Working Group on Integrated Water Re-
sources Management, Geneva, 24 and 25 June 2015.
14 Uzbekistan is however currently the only Party to 
both, with the Asian Parties to the Helsinki Convention 
primarily in central Asia and those to the New York Con-
vention in western Asia.
15 Simon Marsden and Elizabeth Brandon, Transboundary 
Environmental Governance in Asia: Practice and Prospects 
with the UNECE Environmental Agreements (Edward El-
gar, 2015).
16 In relation to China see for example, Patricia Wouters, 
‘The Yin and Yang of International Water Law: China’s 
Transboundary Water Practice and the Changing Con-
tours of State Sovereignty’ (2014) 23 Review of European, 
Comparative and International Environmental Law 67.
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vironmental law,17 and this is true also of Asia.18 
This article will firstly outline the main institu-
tions and explain the procedural provisions of 
the Helsinki Convention;19 it will secondly re-
view current implementation in Asia based on 
information received as part of the assessment 
of transboundary watercourses, and growing ca-
pacity building efforts; it will thirdly, and most 
significantly, consider the work of the Legal 
Board in the establishment of the Implementa-
tion Committee to deal with compliance and 
compliance issues; finally, some conclusions fol-
low at the end.
II. Institutions and procedures
The main institutions are the Meeting of the 
Parties (MOP), Bureau, Legal Board and Im-
plementation Committee, the latter which as a 
non-compliance procedure (NCP) is intended 
to avoid rather than settle disputes.20 The MOP 
is the main decision making body comprising 
17 See Carl Bruch and Elizabeth Mrema, Manual on Com-
pliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (UNEP, 2006).
18 Note for example the role of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the inability to resolve 
the haze pollution issue despite an international agree-
ment on the matter; see Koh, KL and Karim, MS, ‘South 
East Asian Environmental Legal Governance’ in Alam, 
S, Bhuigan, MJH, Choudhury and Techera, EJ, Routledge 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Routledge, 
2013) 463.
19 The Convention also has two protocols, the Protocol 
on Water and Health, and the Protocol on Civil Liabili-
ty, neither of which is discussed here due to space con-
straints. The latter is shared with the UNECE Convention 
on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 
(Helsinki, 17 March 1992) UNTS 2105 (1992) 457, in force 
19 April 2000.
20 See Tullio Treves, Attila Tanzi, Cesare Pitea, Chiara 
Ragni, and Laura Pineschi (eds) Non Compliance Proce-
dures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Agreements (TMC Asser Press, 2009); Karen 
Scott, ‘Non-compliance Procedures and the Resolution 
of Disputes under International Environmental Agree-
ments’, in Duncan French and Nigel White (eds) Interna-
tional Law and Dispute Settlement: New Problems and Tech-
niques (Hart Publishing, 2010) 225.
all Parties, the Bureau develops the workplan, 
and the Legal Board has focused on the develop-
ment of authoritative guidance21 together with 
the formal compliance procedure administered 
by the Implementation Committee. There are 
also working groups on Integrated Water Re-
sources Management and Monitoring and As-
sessment, task forces on Water and Climate and 
Water-Food-Energy-Ecosystems Nexus, and a 
Joint ad-hoc Expert Group on Water and Indus-
trial Accidents.
While the Helsinki Convention establishes 
a general institutional structure to assist with 
implementation, compliance and further devel-
opment, realisation of these matters depends 
on bilateral and multilateral agreements being 
concluded between riparian states that share the 
resource and the establishment of joint bodies to 
administer them.22 An absence of specific report-
ing and compliance mechanisms in the treaty 
has, as will be seen below, led to the work of the 
Legal Board, Implementation Committee and 
others, in developing such mechanisms. Part I 
duties of the Helsinki Convention are the more 
general and apply to all Parties; Part II duties are 
more specific and must be implemented via fur-
ther agreements between the Riparian Parties; 
Part III provisions also apply to all Parties. 
In relation to Part I, Article 2 contains obliga-
tions to ‘take all appropriate measures to prevent, 
21 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and Lakes, Guide to Implementing the Water 
Convention (United Nations, 2013) (Implementation Guide). 
22 There are some similarities with other joint bodies 
operating in other regions of the Asia Pacific. See for 
 example the role of the International Joint Commission in 
resolving issues of transboundary water and air pollution 
in North America; Jason Buhi and Lin Feng, ‘Honoring 
the International Joint Commision’s Role in the United 
States-Canada Transboundary Air Pollution Control 
Regime: A Century of Experience to Guide the Future’ 
(2009) 11 Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 107.
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control and reduce any transboundary impact’,23 
including pollution ‘with the aim of ecologically 
sound and rational water management, conser-
vation of water resources and environmental 
protection.’ Article 4 requires the establishment 
of monitoring programmes for transboundary 
waters, primarily to collect baseline data rather 
than to evaluate the outcomes of approved de-
velopment proposals. Article 5 obliges coopera-
tion in research efforts by the Parties to develop 
effective techniques to prevent, control and re-
duce transboundary impact. Article 6 provides 
for the ‘widest exchange of information, as early 
as possible’ in relation to issues of concern.
In relation to Part II, Article 9, supplement-
ing Article 2(6) on cooperation in general, re-
quires the preparation of bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements between them.24 Agreements 
are intended to include matters covered by the 
Helsinki Convention and other issues the Ripar-
ian Parties wish to include for the catchment 
area they specify within. Article 9(2) for example 
provides for the establishment of joint bodies 
between the Riparian Parties under the Helsinki 
Convention, one of the purposes of which (j) is 
‘to participate in the implementation of envi-
ronmental impact assessments relating to trans-
boundary waters, in accordance with appro-
23 This is the codification of the ‘no harm’ customary 
international law rule and is a due diligence obligation 
focused on what is appropriate and proportional to the 
degree of risk and harm; see Implementation Guide, above 
n 21, 19–21. This was a key part of the decision by the 
ICJ in Pulp Mills; see Timo Koivurova, ‘Transboundary 
Environmental Impact Assessment in International Law’, 
in Simon Marsden and Timo Koivurova (eds) Trans-
boundary Environmental Impact Assessment in the European 
Union: The Espoo Convention and its Kiev Protocol on Strate-
gic Environmental Assessment (Routledge, 2011) 15, 23–25.
24 These can be located in the document: Economic Com-
mission for Europe Convention on the Protection and 
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes, Second Assessment of Transboundary Rivers, Lakes 
and Groundwaters (United Nations, 2011) (Second Assess-
ment).
priate international regulations’.25 Because it is 
mandatory for such agreements to be prepared, 
this distinguishes ‘the Water Convention from 
other international instruments in the field and 
is considered to be the main added value of the 
Convention.’26
Other significant provisions in Part II in-
clude the Article 11 obligation which enables the 
collection of baseline data to evaluate practice, 
including ‘the effectiveness of measures taken for 
the prevention, control and reduction of trans-
boundary impact’ (Article 11(3)). The Working 
Group on Monitoring and Assessment has an im-
portant role in preparing periodic assessments of 
the status of transboundary waters, promoting 
the exchange of data on environmental condi-
tions, encouraging Parties to inform each other 
about critical situations with transboundary 
impact and verifying compliance with water-
quality objectives and permit conditions. These 
assessments, while a means of considering im-
plementation of Parties obligations under the 
Helsinki Convention, are not however the same 
as more formal reporting obligations required 
under other environmental treaties. They are a 
means of collecting baseline data rather than a 
way of demonstrating clear adherence to treaty 
obligations.
III. Implementation in Asia
Russia, Asia’s largest state, is an example of a 
 Riparian Party to have implemented the obliga-
tion to enter into agreements with under states 
under the Convention. Russia shares trans-
boundary waters with both Asian Parties (Azer-
baijan and Kazakhstan) and Asian non-Parties 
25 This includes the Convention on Environmental Im-
pact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 25 
February 1991), 30 ILM (1991) 802, in force 27 June 1997. 
26 Other requirements to establish joint bodies and for 
institutional cooperation are also emphasized. See Imple-
mentation Guide, above n 21, 63–64.
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(China, North Korea, Georgia and Mongolia). 
In the 1990s it entered into bilateral agreements 
with Kazakhstan (1992, replaced by an agree-
ment in 2010), Mongolia (1995), China (2008) and 
Azerbaijan (2010). There is however no bilateral 
agreement between Russia and Georgia.
As three of the five current Parties are in 
central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
 Uzbekistan) and another is in Caucasia (Azer-
baijan) capacity building efforts to improve im-
plementation of the Convention and compliance 
with it in, and related to, these sub-regions are 
particularly significant.27 The UNECE notes that 
Phase II of the UNECE Programme, ‘Regional 
Dialogue and Cooperation on Water Resources 
Management in Central Asia’, aims to improve 
the capacity of the International Fund for Saving 
the Aral Sea (IFAS), including its organizations 
and institutions and to strengthen their legal 
 basis.28 
IFAS was established by all five central Asian 
States to implement in a coordinated way the 
practical measures and programmes to overcome 
the impacts of the Aral crises and to improve en-
vironmental and socioeconomic conditions in 
the Aral Sea Basin. The Interstate Commission 
on Sustainable Development is a body of the IFAS 
which is in charge of coordinating regional coop-
eration on environment and sustainable devel-
opment in central Asia. The UNECE also notes 
that the project is a component of the ‘Trans-
boundary Water Management in Central Asia’ 
programme, which is carried out on behalf of the 
German  Federal Foreign Office.29 The protection 
27 See Chapter 8, ‘Practice and Capacity Building in 
Central Asia’ in Marsden and Brandon, above n 15.
28 UNECE, ‘UNECE cooperates with Interstate 
Commission on Sustainable Development to strengthen 
implementation of Rio+20 outcomes in Central Asia,’ 
press release, 31 May 2013.
29 Ibid.
of the Aral Sea is a priority issue for the UNECE, 
as noted at a recent conference.30
Vulnerable ecosystems are also a key area of 
Afghan-Tajik cooperation on environment and 
hydrology in the upper Amu Darya Basin, which 
the Convention supports, where steps have been 
taken to establish data exchange and assess the 
status of ecosystems.31 In the Chu and Talas 
River Basins, a project supported by the Global 
Environmental Facility and UNECE will expand 
the cooperation of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
to water quality and biodiversity.32 In another 
example, this time in Caucasia, deterioration of 
water quality and degradation of ecosystems 
has brought Georgia and Azerbaijan together 
to develop a bilateral agreement on the shared 
water resources of the Kura River Basin as part 
of a joint UNECE-Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe project under the Envi-
ronment and Security Initiative.33
In eastern Asia as part of the preliminary 
assessment exercise,34 formal evaluations were 
completed by the Working Group on Monitor-
30 UNECE, ‘UNECE Executive Secretary participates in 
conference on sustainable development in the Aral Sea 
Basin’ press release, 29 October 2014.
31 UNECE, ‘UNECE supports Afghan-Tajik cooperation 
on environment and hydrology in the Amu Darya Basin,’ 
press release, 28 March 2013.
32 See UNECE, ‘UNECE fosters cooperation between 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to address water issues’, 
press release, 2 June 2015; and Bo Libert, ‘The UNECE 
Water Convention and the Development of Trans-
boundary Cooperation in the Chu-Talas, Kura, Drin and 
 Dniester River Basins’ (2015) 40 Water International 168.
33 UNECE, ‘Water and Biodiversity: UNECE Water Con-
vention puts ecosystems at the heart of water manage-
ment’, press release, 22 May 2013.
34 United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Economic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the 
Parties to the Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes, Working Group on Monitoring and Assessment, 
Eight meeting, Helsinki, 25–27 June 2007, Preliminary 
assessment of transboundary rivers discharging to Pacific 
Ocean and their major transboundary tributaries. ECE/
MP.WAT/WG.2/2007/14. (Preliminary Assessment).
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ing and Assessment for the Amur River Basin,35 
which is shared between China, Mongolia and 
Russia; and the Tumen River Basin, shared be-
tween China, North Korea and Russia.36 In rela-
tion to the latter, regulation of which overlaps 
to an extent with the Tumen Agreements (which 
include South Korea as a Party also),37 the assess-
ment comments: ‘The drawing up of a multilat-
eral agreement between China, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Fed-
eration is of utmost importance. It should provide 
for joint measures on monitoring and assessment 
… in order to decrease the overall human impact 
on the waters in the Tumen River basin.’38 
The Second Assessment of Transboundary 
Rivers, Lakes and Groundwaters, was completed 
in 2011.39 Contributions were received from nu-
merous states, not only Parties to the Conven-
tion, but also UNECE members who are not 
Parties, and experts from countries outside the 
UNECE region who share waters with UNECE 
35 See Ariel Dinar, Shlomi Dinar, Stephen McCaffrey, 
and Daene McKinney, ‘Case Study 4: The Aral Sea Basin’ 
in Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation 
and Cooperation (World Scientific, 2013, second edition) 
339–362.
36 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Work-
ing Group on Integrated Water Resources Management, 
Sixth meeting Geneva, 4–5 May 2011; Working Group on 
Monitoring and Assessment, Twelfth meeting, Geneva, 
2–4 May 2011.
37 1995 Agreement on the Establishment of the Tumen 
River Area Development Coordination Committee, 
signed in New York, 6 December 1995, unreported; 1995 
Agreement on the Establishment of the Consultative 
Commission for the Development of the Tumen River 
Economic Development Area and Northeast Asia, signed 
in New York, 6 December 1995, unreported. See Simon 
Marsden, ‘Developing Approaches to Transboundary 
Environmental Impact Assessment in China: Cooperation 
through the Greater Tumen Initiative and in the Pearl 
River Delta Region’ (2010) 9 Chinese Journal of International 
Law 393.
38 Preliminary Assessment, above n 34, para 25, 7–8.
39 Second Assessment, above n 24.
states: Afghanistan, China, Iran and Mongolia. 
Part III contains the major findings, with the Cau-
casus the subject of chapter 4 and central Asia 
chapter 5; drainage basins of the Aral Sea and 
other transboundary waters in central Asia are 
considered in part IV, chapter 3. In part IV, the 
drainage basins of the White, Barents and Kara 
Seas are however examined in detail in chapter 1; 
the Sea of Othotsk and the Sea of Japan in chap-
ter 2;40 and the Caspian Sea in chapter 4.41 
As an example of some of the findings, part 
of the relevance of part IV chapter 1 is the Yenisey 
River, which flows entirely within Russian ter-
ritory, although the upper part of the basin is 
transboundary, as it includes parts of the Selenga 
River, shared with Mongolia.42 This also consists 
of the Selenga River, Lake Baikal and the Angara 
River, where heavy metals and petroleum prod-
ucts have impacted water quality, which in the 
Selenga is concluded to be ‘heavily polluted’.43 
40 This includes the shared basins of the Amur River 
(shared by China, Russia, and in small part, Mongolia); 
the Argun/Hailaer River (shared by the same states); the 
Ussuri/Wusuli River (shared by China and Russia); the 
Khanka/Xingkai Lake (China and Russia); the Sujfun/
Razdolnaya River (China and Russia); the Tumen/
Tumannaya River (China, Russia, North Korea). Second 
Assessment, above n 24, 99–106.
41 For a summary of the numerous transboundary 
watercourses and international lakes in this sub-region 
which cross nine riparian states, see Second Assessment, 
above n 24, 131.
42 Other shared basins include the Ob River (shared by 
China, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Russia); the Irtysh/
Ertis (shared by Russia, Kazakhstan, and, with a very 
small part shared by China and Mongolia); the Tobol 
and Ishim/Esil sub-basins (shared between Russia and 
Kazakhstan). See Second Assessment, above n 24, 91–98.
43 Second Assessment, above n 24, 90. While it also con-
cludes that Lake Baikal serves as a natural barrier for 
the transboundary flow of pollutants, preventing their 
impact on the downstream part of the watercourse, it is 
however significantly impacted by mining activity and 
as such is being considered for inscription on the List 
of World Heritage in Danger under the World Heritage 
Convention. See: Convention Concerning the Protection 
of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, opened for 
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The Russian-Mongolian Joint Commission on 
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Wa-
ters is however in existence, which operates on 
the basis of the intergovernmental 1995 Agree-
ment on the protection and use of transbound-
ary waters, meets regularly.44 To address current 
pressures, there are 19 surface water monitoring 
stations observing daily in the Selenga Basin in 
Mongolia. In the framework of the ‘Strengthen-
ing Integrated Water Resources Management in 
Mongolia’ project, 17 groundwater-monitoring 
wells are proposed to be established within the 
Selenga River Basin area.45
IV. Establishment of the Implementation 
Committee and compliance in Asia
A NCP was recently established, known as the 
Implementation Committee. While not required 
under the original Convention text, it was initi-
ated by the Legal Board at its seventh meeting 
based on experiences with the other UNECE 
treaties.46 The Chair of the Legal Board recom-
mended the body be of an ‘advisory, consultative 
and facilitative nature and as such would serve as 
a dispute prevention mechanism’.47 Participants 
from central Asia added that reporting could 
also serve as a benchmark for implementation.48 
It was accepted that non-state actors, especially 
signature 16 November 1972, 11 ILM 1358 (entered into 
force 17 December 1975).
44 The provisions of the Agreement include an exchange 
of information on transboundary waters.
45 Second Assessment, above n 24, 90, and note the other 
governance mechanisms in place.
46 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Legal 
Board, Seventh meeting Geneva, 15 and 16 April 2010; 
Report of the Legal Board on its Seventh Meeting, ECE/
MP.WA/AC.4/2010/2, para II, ‘Mechanism to facilitate 
and support implementation and compliance’.
47 Legal Board, above n 46, para II.9.
48 Legal Board, above n 46, para II.15.
the public, should have a role in bringing issues 
to the Implementation Committee.49 
Together with Meetings of the Parties and 
other arrangements, NCPs are an example of 
an ‘autonomous institutional arrangement’; 
they are however, no longer a ‘little-noticed 
phenomenon’.50 There is also an increasing trend 
towards the judicialisation of such procedures,51 
with a developing quasi-jurisprudence some-
times referred to as ‘case law’.52 This is especial-
ly so in connection with public communications 
heard by the Aarhus Convention53 Compliance 
Committee (ACCC), which frequently consid-
ers the link between environmental and human 
rights. The ACCC is the most advanced of these 
bodies in providing public access, with numer-
ous communications to date from individuals 
and NGOs. It is therefore perhaps not surpris-
ingly heralded as a precedent for other compa-
rable bodies, with recent consideration given to 
transplanting some aspects of the ACCC into a 
more complex global context. 54
At the eighth meeting of the Legal Board, 
discussions of the drafting group (established 
49 Legal Board, above n 46, para II.25.
50 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous In-
stitutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: a Little-Noticed Phenomenon in Interna-
tional Law’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 
623.
51 Neil Craik and Timo Koivurova, ‘Subsidiary Decision 
Making under the Espoo Convention: Legal Status and 
Legitimacy’ (2011) 20 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 258.
52 A Andrusevych, T Alge and C Konrad (eds) Case Law 
of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (2004–
2011), 2nd editon (RACSE, 2011).
53 Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 25 June 1998) 2161 
UNTS 447, in force on 30 October 2001.
54 Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann, ‘Constitutionalising 
Secondary Rules in Global Environmental Regimes: 
Non-Compliance Procedures and the Enforcement 
of Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2012) 24 
Journal of Environmental Law 103.
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to prepare the compliance procedure) were con-
sidered.55 A distinctive feature was an advisory 
procedure, emphasising assistance where there 
was a lack of deliberate non-compliance. A Party 
or Parties could therefore request advice from 
the Committee about efforts to attempt to secure 
compliance.56 It was not however proposed that 
the public directly make submissions, unlike un-
der the ACCC. In relation to follow-up measures 
these were confirmed to be facilitative rather 
than punitative, and ranging from assistance to 
requests for action plans and progress reports. 
More serious measures could only follow MOP 
decisions, such as statements of concern, declara-
tions of non-compliance, cautions or suspension 
of rights and privileges.57
The ninth meeting of the Legal Board en-
dorsed most of the previous recommendations, 
although referrals by the secretariat were con-
sidered unnecessary.58 The need for a formal re-
porting mechanism was also discussed and the 
need to separate this from the compliance proce-
dure.59 Such reporting mechanisms typically are 
55 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Legal 
Board, Eighth meeting Geneva, 24 and 25 February 2011. 
ECE/MP.WAT/AC.4/2011/2, para II.
56 Legal Board, above n 55, para II.13.
57 Legal Board, above n 55, para II.17. Note that perfor-
mance reviews of individual states are another means 
by which the UNECE evaluates treaty compliance, or 
 according to the UNECE is ‘an assessment of the progress 
a country has made in reconciling its environmental 
and economic targets and in meeting its international 
environmental commitments’; most of the central Asian 
and Caucasian states have been through two cycles of 
performance reviews; see http://www.unece.org/env/
epr.html
58 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Legal 
Board, Ninth meeting Geneva, 1 and 2 September 2011. 
ECE/MP.WAT/AC.4/2011/5, para II.10.
59 Legal Board, above n 58, para II.14.
based on the completion of questionnaires by the 
Parties which enable follow up by treaty bodies 
as appropriate; other information means, such 
as involvement of the public, often supplement 
such procedures. The tenth meeting approved 
the text of such a procedure and determined that 
the MOP would examine it further in November 
2012,60 when a draft decision was prepared for 
adoption.61 This was duly done, and the Imple-
mentation Committee commenced its work soon 
thereafter.62
The Implementation Committee has since 
held five meetings, with members serving in a 
personal capacity rather than as state representa-
tives. The first was in June 2013,63 and the agenda 
included discussion of lessons learnt from other 
implementation and compliance mechanisms. 
In addition to procedures under various multi-
lateral agreements these also included those es-
60 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Legal 
Board, Tenth meeting Geneva, 31 January and 1 February 
2012. ECE/MP.WAT/AC.4/2012/2, para II.9. Annex I con-
tains the text of the ‘Mechanism to support implemen-
tation and compliance’, and Annex II the ‘Core rules of 
procedure of the Implementation Committee’.
61 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Sixth 
session, Rome, 28–30 November 2012, Item 4(a) of the 
provisional agenda, Draft decision on support to imple-
mentation and compliance. ECE/MP.WAT/2012/L.4. 
62 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties to 
the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transbound-
ary Watercourses and International Lakes, Sixth session, 
Rome, 28–30 November 2012, Report of the Meeting of 
the Parties on its sixth session. ECE/MP.WAT/37, Ad.2, 
23 July 2013.
63 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Imple-
mentation Committee, First meeting Geneva 5 June 2013. 
ECE/MP.WAT/IC/2013/2, para II.7.
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tablished under the Aarhus and Espoo Conven-
tions (and SEA Protocol64), and the Convention 
Water and Health Protocol.65 The relationship 
between compliance procedures and domes-
tic remedies, periodic reporting and compli-
ance procedures, the non-adversarial nature of 
the procedures, and the role of the secretariat, 
together with other issues, received particular 
 attention.66 
The first meeting discussed at length the 
need for a formal reporting mechanism.67 The 
work programme adopted at the 2012 MOP in-
cluded ‘Consideration of the need for reporting 
under the Convention’, to be led by the Conven-
tion Bureau as supported by the Secretariat. The 
Working Group on Integrated Water Resources 
Management in consultation with the Commit-
tee was tasked to analyse the need for a report-
ing mechanism.68 Concentrating on policy issues 
rather than data, such a reporting mechanism 
would therefore distinguish itself from related 
reporting procedures,69 which had caused con-
cern among certain Parties, and threatened the 
prospect of the establishment for other Parties, 
in particular those outside the European Union, 
such as in Asia. 
The second meeting of the Committee in 
December 2013 began by examining issues 
raised by an environmental NGO in relation to 
Kazakhstan, where concern was expressed re-
garding difficulties in transboundary water co-
operation in the Irtysh River Basin, shared by 
64 Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to 
the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment 
in a Transboundary Context (Kiev, 21 May 2003), 
unreported, in force 11 July 2010.
65 Protocol on Water and Health to the Convention on 
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and Lakes (London, 17 June 1999), UNTS 2331, 202, in 
force 4 August 2005.
66 Implementation Committee, above n 63, para II.8
67 Implementation Committee, above n 63, para II.13
68 Implementation Committee, above n 63, para II.13.
69 Implementation Committee, above n 63, para II.15.
Russia, Kazakhstan, China and Mongolia, and 
the situation in the Ili River Basin, shared by Chi-
na and Kazakhstan. Among other matters, it also 
exchanged views on the possibility of detailing 
general criteria or factors to guide the determi-
nation of when a Committee initiative might be 
started, and how best to publicise the availability 
of the new compliance procedure.70 
The third meeting of the Committee took 
place in May 2014, and discussed further the 
matter in relation to Kazakhstan, as well as dis-
cussion about reporting requirements under the 
Helsinki Convention, and raising awareness of 
the NCP mechanism to facilitate and support 
implementation and compliance.71 In relation to 
reporting, the Committee noted that it ‘should 
be on the implementation of Parties’ cooperation 
obligations’, it ‘should be thematic (issue-based)’, 
and that it ‘should take into account other inter-
national or regional reporting obligations with a 
view to avoiding duplication of effort’.72
The fourth meeting was held in December 
2014 and the Committee noted that Kazakhstan 
and Russia had yet to respond substantively to 
the questions posed by it in connection with the 
70 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Imple-
mentation Committee, Second meeting Geneva 12 De-
cember 2013. ECE/MP.WAT/IC/2013/4, 13 January 2014, 
paras II and IV.
71 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Imple-
mentation Committee, Third meeting Bologna 15 May 
2014. ECE/MP.WAT/IC/2014/2, 18 June 2014, paras III, 
IV and V.
72 Implementation Committee, above n 71, para IV.12–14. 
See Economic Commission for Europe / Environment, 
Informal Network of the Chairs of compliance / imple-
mentation bodies under the Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, Third Meeting, Geneva, 29 June 2015, ‘Note 
prepared by the Chair of the Aarhus Convention Compli-
ance Committee with the assistance of the secretariat’.
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implementation of the principles of reasonable 
and equitable use and the ‘no harm’ rule. While it 
was grateful for the general information provid-
ed by them, it observed that ‘cooperation per se 
was not the overall objective of the Convention.’73 
There was therefore a need for them to provide 
more comprehensive information on the Irtysh 
River Basin in relation to the development activ-
ity in the upstream part of the basin. 
The fifth meeting was held in May 2015, 
and further discussed the situation in the Irtysh 
River Basin, deciding to gather information from 
other sources than the Parties.74 The Committee 
also decided to approach Kazakhstan and Russia 
again for the information requested in earlier cor-
respondence, and to explain to them that a Com-
mittee initiative may well be considered neces-
sary to advance the process.75 Among the usual 
business of considering any requests of advice, 
submissions, Committee initiatives and informa-
tion gathering, Committee members were invit-
ed to share information about future possibilities 
to promote the mechanism to facilitate and sup-
port implementation and compliance, including 
an international water law event for the benefit of 
central Asian states in May 2016.76 Two members 
of the Committee also reported on results of the 
meetings held by the Core Group on Reporting 
73 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Econom-
ic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties to the 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, Implementation 
Committee, Fourth meeting London 4 December 2014. 
ECE/MP.WAT/IC/2014/4, 20 January 2015, para III, 7.
74 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, Meeting of the Parties 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Imple-
mentation Committee, Fifth meeting Vienna, 5–6 May 
2015. ECE/MP.WAT/IC/2015/2, 27 May 2015, Report 
of the Implementation Committee on its fifth meeting, 
para III.6.
75 Implementation Committee, above n 74, paras III. 7 
and 8.
76 Implementation Committee, above n 74, para IV.10.
held between December 2014 and March 2015, 
which was mandated to prepare a proposal for a 
reporting mechanism under the Convention; this 
was supported by the Committee.77 
It should be emphasised that the lack of an 
explicit legal basis for the NCP in the Convention 
text is not uncommon, and is consistent with the 
dispute avoidance objective of NCPs generally; 
a legal basis for such a provision would be dif-
ficult to support for many states. As suggested, 
the strongest NCP found in any of the UNECE 
treaties is the ACCC. In accordance with Article 
15 of the Aarhus Convention,78 the MOP is there-
fore required to establish ‘optional arrangements 
of a non-confrontational, non-judicial and con-
sultative nature for reviewing compliance with 
the provisions of the Convention’. At its first 
session in October 2002, the Aarhus MOP adopt-
ed decision I/7 on review of compliance,79 and 
elected the first Committee which has since been 
highly effective in its work.80 Whether the Hel-
sinki Convention Committee is able to operate 
as  effectively, given the high political sensitiv-
ity surrounding transboundary water issues, re-
mains to be seen. What is important is that any 
NCP is supported by a formal reporting proce-
dure; while reporting was not originally foreseen 
in the Convention’s text, current discussion on 
the possible introduction of a reporting mecha-
nism shows that the Convention is evolving to 
meet emerging needs.
77 Implementation Committee, above n 74, paras IV.11 
and 12.
78 See Aarhus Convention, above n 53. This is largely 
because of the possibility of public submissions. Note 
the Compliance Committee under the Protocol on Water 
and Health. The Compliance Committee noted at its 
meeting held in Geneva on 25 November 2014, that the 
first communication it had received was from a member 
of the public. See Implementation Committee, above 
n 73, para V.13.
79 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/docu-
ments/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf
80 See Cardesa-Salzmann, above n 54.
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V. Conclusions
The Helsinki Convention is well established in 
the UNECE region, and is now playing a major 
role in bringing states in the Caucasus, central, 
northern and eastern Asia together to resolve 
potential disagreements over water resources; 
other Asian states have also expressed an inter-
est in joining. The global opening of the Con-
vention has enhanced interest generally, and 
will assist further in capacity building efforts 
to develop implementation and compliance ef-
forts in Asia; these are likely to extend to south-
ern and western Asia as experience grows. The 
provisions of the Convention are advanced in 
providing both a framework and requiring fur-
ther detailed agreement between Parties; sig-
nificantly also, in mandating the establishment 
of joint bodies to, among other things, evaluate 
proposals with potential to impact detrimen-
tally on transboundary watercourses. The Con-
vention is  furthermore aided by the broader 
transboundary environmental governance of 
the UNECE and its related treaties on environ-
mental impact assessment, public participation 
and industrial accidents, which add value to its 
operation.
In relation to implementation and compli-
ance, the Implementation Committee is leading 
this challenging task as the Committee work 
develops. This has already targeted instances 
where there is the potential for non-compliance 
by individual Parties, and it has contributed 
significantly to capacity building efforts more 
broadly. The relationship between compliance 
and reporting is also receiving increased atten-
tion, and benefits from the clustering of the en-
vironmental agreements that the UNECE has 
produced. Experiences learned in relation to the 
other treaties and protocols are therefore free-
ly shared, and the fact that states are typically 
Party to one or more of these agreements means 
that they are familiar with the procedures that 
are contained within them. Ensuring domestic 
implementation and adherence to these proce-
dural obligations is ultimately the responsibility 
of treaty bodies, Parties, the public and others in 
tandem. Yet assisting states to comply with these 
obligations, where there is either a deliberate fail-
ure or lack of capacity, is a very important role of 
the Implementation Committee. In Asia, where 
states have frequently avoided confrontation or 
legal challenge,81 it is all the more important. 
81 See Simon Chesterman, ‘The International Court of 
Justice in Asia: Interpreting the Temple of Preah Vihear 
Case’ (2015) 5 Asian Journal of International Law 1, who 
finds that, where Asian states do pursue international 
litigation, they have a clear preference for bilateral settle-
ment of disputes.
